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ABSTRACT
FACULTY OF ENGINEERING, SCIENCE AND MATHEMATICS
SCHOOL OF ELECTRONICS AND COMPUTER SCIENCE
Doctor of Philosophy
by Nurlida Basir
Model-based development and automated code generation are increasingly used for ac-
tual production code, in particular in mathematical and engineering domains. However,
since code generators are typically not quali¯ed, there is no guarantee that their out-
put is correct or even safe. Formal methods which are based on mathematically-based
techniques have been proposed as a means to improve software quality by providing
formal safety proofs as explicit evidence for the assurance claims. However, the proofs
are often complex and may also be based on assumptions and reasoning principles that
are not justi¯ed. This causes concerns about the trustworthiness of the proofs and hence
the assurance claims on the safety of the program. This thesis presents an approach to
systematically and automatically construct comprehensive safety cases using the Goal
Structuring Notation from a formal analysis of automatically generated code, based on
automated theorem proving, and driven by a set of safety requirements and properties.
We also present an approach to systematically derive safety cases that argue along the
hierarchical structure of systems in model-based development. This core safety case is
extended by separately speci¯ed auxiliary information from other veri¯cation and vali-
dation activities such as testing. The thesis also presents an approach to develop safety
cases that correspond to the formal proofs found by automated theorem provers and
that reveal the underlying proof argumentation structure and top-level assumptions.
The resulting safety cases will make explicit the formal and informal reasoning prin-
ciples, and reveal the top-level assumptions and external dependencies that must be
taken into account in demonstrating software safety. The safety cases can be thought
as \structured reading guide" for the software and the safety proofs that provide trace-
able arguments on the assurance provided. The approach has been illustrated on code
generated using Real-Time Workshop for Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C)
systems of NASA's Project Constellation and on code for deep space attitude estimation
generated by the AutoFilter system developed at NASA Ames.Contents
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Term De¯nition
Accident Event that occurs unexpectedly and unintention-
ally. Here speci¯cally as an unsafe condition (i.e.,
system failure) due to presence of hazards at the
system-environment boundary.
Adelard ASCE v3.5 Tool for safety case construction.
Annotation Logical expression that expresses properties that
hold at a given location during the execution of a
program; usually integrated into the program code
as assertions of formal comments.
Annotation Inference Al-
gorithm
Constructs annotations by analyzing the program
structure, i.e., annotates the program at key pro-
gram locations.
Annotation Schema Template used by the annotation inference algo-
rithm for the annotation construction.
Argumentation Process of showing that some view or statement is
correct or true.
AutoCert Generator plug-in to support the formal certi¯ca-
tion of automatically generated code, based on an-
notation inference algorithm.
AutoFilter Generator that automatically generates implemen-
tations for the state estimation problems.
Code Generator Tool that translates a high-level problem speci¯ca-
tion into executable source code.
Control Flow Transition between two statements in a program
that might happen during an execution of the pro-
gram; usually represent as an edge in a control °ow
graph.
Data°ow Data dependency between di®erent statement in a
program; usually represent as an edge in a data
°ow graph.
xGLOSSARY xi
DCM Direction cosine matrix; describes the orientation
of object relative to a coordinate reference frame.
Def-Use Chain The underlying concept of the annotation inference
algorithm, i.e., ¯nd all program locations where the
safety-relevant information will be established (de-
¯ned) and all potentially unsafe location (location
that can violate the safety), where it is used.
ECI Earth-Centered Inertial; describes the coordinate
reference frame with its origin at center of mass of
the earth.
Explanation Process of showing why and how some phe-
nomenon occurred or some event happened.
External Certi¯cation
Assumption
Logical formula expressing assumption about a sys-
tem input signals.
Failure A deviation of the system behavior from its speci-
¯cations. In the context of the research prescribed
here, types of failures are considered, failures of
the generated program and of the formal program
veri¯cation system, respectively:
² generated program - deviation from the given
safety property and safety requirement
² formal program veri¯cation system - inability
to produce accurate proofs for the generated
program
Fault Tree Analysis Top down search method for analyzing possible
faults and failures to the program safety and cer-
ti¯cation process and their interaction logic that
initiate the hazard.
Formal Software Safety
Certi¯cation
Process of formally proving that a program satis¯es
a given safety property or a set of safety require-
ments.
Formal Program Veri¯ca-
tion
Process of formally proving program correctness
wrt. a given speci¯cation.
Goal Structuring Nota-
tion
Graphical argumentation notation which explicitly
represents individual elements of a safety argument
and the relationship that exist between these ele-
ments.GLOSSARY xii
Generated Code Code that is automatically generated by the code
generator.
GN&C Guidance, Navigation, and Control system; vehicle
subsystem.
Hoare Logic Set of logical rules for reasoning about the safety
of a program.
Hazard A state of a system that may lead to an accident.
In the context of the research prescribed here, any
conditions that could violate the given safety prop-
erty and safety requirement.
Hazard Analysis Process of identifying the characteristic of hazards,
determining their signi¯cance and evaluating mea-
sures to be taken to control and mitigate the haz-
ards.
Internal Certi¯cation As-
sumption
Logical formula expressing assumptions about an
internal signal connecting two system components.
Muscadet Prover Automated theorem prover based on the natural
deduction calculus.
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration,
responsible for space program, aeronautics and
aerospace research.
Natural Deduction Cal-
culus
Proof system for the predicate calculus that is
based on a set of speci¯c rules.
Natural Deduction Proof Sequence statements that follow the rules of the
natural deduction calculus to derive a goal.
Navigation System Vehicle subsystem, part of GN&C; designed to pro-
cess location and movement data.
Nominal Behavior Operation of the system in the event of normality.
O®-nominal Behavior Operation of the system in the event of failures or
anomaly.
Program Veri¯cation
Hazard Decision Matrix
Severity classi¯cation scheme to assess the sever-
ity level caused by the disagreement of the code
generator and the certi¯cation system.
Proof Tree A representation of the underlying natural deduc-
tion proof construction that starts with the con-
jecture to be proven as root and the given axioms
and hypotheses at each leaf of the tree.
Quaternion Four-dimensional vector used to describe rigid
body orientation in space e.g., matrices and an-
gles.GLOSSARY xiii
Real-Time Workshop Commercial code generator that automatically
generates code from Simulink models.
Reference Implementa-
tion
Standard implementation of a component that can
be used in place of speci¯cation.
Reference Interpretation Standard assignment of meaning to symbols.
Safety Freedom from accidents. Here speci¯cally freedom
from any violation of the given safety property and
safety requirement.
Safety Condition Logical formula describing the safety of a state-
ment wrt. a given safety policy.
Safety Case A structured argument, supported by a body of
evidence that provides a valid case that a program
is safe with respect to the given requirements (i.e.,
safety property and safety requirement).
Safety Case Abstraction Mechanism to construct minimal but consistent
safety case to reduce complexity and allow better
understanding.
Safety Policy A set of Hoare rules designed to show that safe
program satis¯es a safety property of interest; for-
malized as Hoare triples (i.e., fPgCfQg), which
are extended with a shadow variable and a safety
predicate.
Safety Predicate Denote semantic safety condition of the program.
Safety Property A property stating that \something bad does never
happen" during the execution of the program; for-
malized as an invariant that needs to hold every-
where in the program.
Safety Requirement A property that needs to hold for the program to
be safe; formalized as an assertion that needs to
hold at particular location in the program (usually
at the end).
Shadow Variable Record information for the corresponding program
variable that is related to the safety property.
Software Fault Tree
Analysis
Top down search method for analyzing possible
software logic errors and uses proof by contradic-
tion as reasoning approach.
Velocity Direction and speed of vehicle movement.DECLARATION OF AUTHORSHIP
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Introduction
Chapter 1 describes the problem statement and its solution. It also explains the propo-
sition and structure of the thesis.
1.1 Introduction
This thesis discusses issues associated with the formal program veri¯cation approach for
demonstrating software safety, such as how to comprehensively show that a program
satis¯es all given safety requirements and safety properties based on the formal proofs,
and how to establish trust in these proofs. Such issues have become a major concern in
formal program veri¯cation [70, 73, 122]. Software development standards [61, 111, 113]
usually describe only evidence to be produced, but the arguments and claims on how
the evidence, whether informal or formal, supports the veri¯cation objective are left
implicit. Hence, it is hard to tell whether the given evidence meets the objective, if
no explicit explanation or arguments are provided. Recently, a goal-based argument
technique known as safety cases [29, 86, 113] has been introduced to justify certain
claims based on the reliable evidence [68, 126]. The development and acceptance of
safety cases is now one of the key element of safety regulation in many of safety-critical
sectors [56, 99, 113, 145]. In this thesis, the safety case technique is used to argue the
acceptability of formal program veri¯cation in demonstrating the safety of a program
with respect to all given requirements, in particular for automatically generated code.
In our work, we concentrate on constructing a safety case for automatically generated
code because there is no human insight in the process to generate the code, in contrast
to manual development. However, it is easy to automate the safety case construction
from the generated code due to the regularities in the code. Further to this, an approach
on how to automatically construct the safety cases is described.
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1.2 Problem Description
Model-based design and automated code generation [40] have become popular, but sub-
stantial obstacles remain to their widespread adoption in safety-critical domains: since
code generators are typically not quali¯ed, there is no guarantee that their output
is safe, and consequently the generated code still needs to be fully tested and certi-
¯ed [44, 108, 138, 152]. To realize the full bene¯ts of code generation, there must be
some explicit evidence, or even proofs, of the correctness of the generated code. In
correct-by-construction techniques such as deductive synthesis [136] or re¯nement [131]
this is provided by a mathematical meta-argument. However, such techniques remain
di±cult to implement and extend and have not found widespread application. Currently,
most generators are validated primarily by testing [138, 139], as recommended by soft-
ware development standards such as DO-178B [61]. However, the testing process can be
time-consuming and expensive, and cannot guarantee the same level of assurance as a
full veri¯cation. As a result, this can slow down generator development and deployment
especially in safety-critical domains.
Formal methods such as formal program veri¯cation which are based on mathematically
oriented techniques have been proposed as a means to demonstrate and improve software
quality by providing formal proofs as explicit evidence for the assurance claims [37, 75,
76]. Formal program veri¯cation can be used in a product-oriented assurance approach,
where checks are performed on each and every program rather than on the generator
itself, showing the generated code to be correct or at least safe.
However, several problems remain. For automatically generated code it is particularly
di±cult to relate the proofs to the code [48, 52]; moreover, the proofs are the ¯nal stage
of a complex process. In addition, these proofs are typically constructed by automated
theorem provers (ATPs) based on machine-oriented calculi such as resolution [124] which
are often too complex and too di±cult to understand, because they spell out too many
low-level details [74, 149, 150]. The proofs may be also based on assumptions that are not
valid, or may contain steps that are not justi¯ed [63, 122]. This complicates an intuitive
understanding of the assurance claims provided by the proofs. Moreover, it often remains
unclear what is actually proven [34]. In addition, there is no traceability provided
between the proofs on one side and the certi¯ed program and the used tools on the
other side to gain con¯dence in the formal certi¯cation process. Consequently, questions
such as whether the proofs really imply safety or whether the VCs are appropriate still
remain as an issue. Concerns also remain on using these proofs as evidence or even
argument in safety-critical applications [122].
Hence, it is important to make explicit which claims are actually proven, and on which
assumptions and reasoning principles both the claims and the proofs rest. In this the-
sis, we address these problems and present an approach to construct safety cases from
information collected during a formal analysis, based on automated theorem proving, ofChapter 1 Introduction 3
the automatically generated code. Safety cases [29, 86, 113] are structured arguments,
supported by a body of evidence, that provide a convincing and valid case that a sys-
tem is acceptably safe for a given application in a given operating environment. The
Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) [86] is used as a technique to explicitly represent the
structure of the safety case graphically.
To date, GSN has been applied mostly in European companies, and mainly in safety-
critical industries. However in most companies, safety cases are constructed traditionally
(i.e., manually) [90, 99, 145]. Manual construction is impractical especially when demon-
strating the safety of large and complex software-intensive systems which requires mar-
shalling large amounts of diverse information, e.g., models, code, speci¯cations, mathe-
matical formalization, and proofs. Issues such as:
² size and complexity of the constructed safety case;
² di±culties in coordinating and presenting results from many di®erent sources and
using di®erent types of evidence;
² di±culties in ¯nding a trace through the information provided;
² di±culties in generating and maintaining the safety case, especially when dealing
with iterative software development and code generation;
should be considered when constructing the safety case manually. Obviously, tools
supported by automated analyses are needed to produce a traceable safety argument [48]
that shows in particular where the code, veri¯cation artifacts (e.g., proofs, veri¯cation
conditions, etc.) and the argument itself depend on any external assumptions.
1.3 Outline of the Solution
Since there are many possible ways in which the trustworthiness in certi¯cation claims
can be compromised, we use fault tree analysis [94] to identify the chain of causes and
their interaction logic that initiate the undesired events in the formal program veri¯-
cation. Here, we consider undesired events as any certi¯cation failures or errors (for
example, any missing and incorrect certi¯cation information or error in a certi¯cation
tool) or combinations of them that might undermine the assurance provided by the
formal proofs on safety of the program wrt. the given safety property and safety require-
ment. A safety property is a property stating that \something bad does never happen"
during the execution of the program. Two types of safety properties are considered in
this work, language-speci¯c properties and domain-speci¯c properties. Language-speci¯c
properties concern the safety aspects of the code which depend on the semantics of the
programming language, while domain-speci¯c properties concern the use of the code inChapter 1 Introduction 4
a particular domain. A safety requirement is usually related to the functional require-
ments of the system. It has usually been identi¯ed during the hazard analysis of the
overall system. In our work, we assume the safety requirements as given. Any possible
failure in the system wrt. the safety requirements should be controlled and mitigated in
order to prevent a failure from turning into an accident. In our work, we use the fault
tree analysis as a guideline in the safety case construction. We have constructed four
di®erent types of safety cases that argue about the program safety wrt. the given safety
property and the given safety requirement respectively, about the architecture slices of
the system, and about the soundness of the formal proofs. We show in the safety cases
how all the potential undesired events have been controlled and perhaps mitigated. We
provide evidence to justify our claims.
The core argument structure of our safety cases is based on information collected by a
formal analysis (called annotation inference) of the generated code [46, 47]. It is driven
by a set of requirements (safety properties and safety requirements) and assumptions of
the program. In particular, it analyzes the system structure on the code level to identify
where the requirements are ultimately established, and so checks the program, providing
independent assurance. It also identi¯es how the system safety requirements are broken
down into component requirements, and where they are ultimately established, thus
establishing a hierarchy of requirements that is aligned with the hierarchical model
structure. The overall argument structure is then extended by auxiliary veri¯cation and
validation information, which is separately speci¯ed. In addition, we also present an
approach to develop safety cases that correspond to formal proofs found by automated
theorem provers. Here, we concentrate on natural deduction style proofs which are closer
to human reasoning than for example resolution proofs.
The resulting safety cases will make explicit the formal and informal reasoning principles,
and reveal the top-level assumptions and external dependencies that must be taken into
account in showing software safety. The safety cases thus provide a \structured reading
guide" for the software and the safety proofs that will allow users to understand the safety
claims without having to understand all the technical details of the formal machinery
and also provide a traceable route to the safety requirements, safety claims and evidence
that are required to demonstrate software safety. We use the GSN [86] as a technique
to explicitly represent the logical °ow and linkage of the safety argument in the safety
case.
In our work, instead of manual safety case construction, we present an approach to
systematically (and ultimately automatically) derive a safety case from formal program
veri¯cation information. So far we have automatically constructed safety cases for safety
properties, safety requirements, hierarchical system structures and safety proofs. We
leave the implementation that integrates diverse types of other veri¯cation and validation
information such as testing result with the existing constructed safety cases for future
work.Chapter 1 Introduction 5
 
Figure 1.1: Approach: From Formal Proofs to Safety Cases
Figure 1.1 shows an overview of our automatic safety case generation approach. All
doubts concerning the correctness of the proofs, the correctness of any of the certi¯cation
tools and whether the proofs actually entail program safety are analyzed using a fault
tree analysis technique. Our main focus is on process safety i.e., identifying the events
that can induce the hazard related to the underlying proofs construction. Def Stan 00-
56 requires that the safety of the product is argued in a separate safety case [112, 135].
Here, safety cases are then used to provide a defensible argument that all of these doubts
have been controlled and thus, establish trust why the generated code can be assumed
to be su±ciently safe. Here, the core argument structure of the safety cases is derived
from information collected during a formal veri¯cation of the code, in particular from
the construction of the logical annotations necessary for a formal, Hoare-style safety
certi¯cation. The annotations formalize auxiliary safety information of the program. In
our work, the structure of the program-speci¯c argument directly follows the course the
annotation construction takes through the code. In addition, the information for the
remaining arguments of safety cases are provided by other veri¯cation and validation
activities such as testing and background knowledge of the formal veri¯cation phase.
In principle, our approach is independent of the given requirements and program, and
also independent of the underlying code generator. So far, our approach has been suc-
cessfully applied to the AutoFilter [153] and MathWorks Real-Time Workshop [52] code
generators, based on the information provided by the formal software safety certi¯cation
system.Chapter 1 Introduction 6
1.4 Thesis Proposition
This thesis demonstrates an approach to establish trust in the assurance provided by the
formal proofs of safety of program with respect to a given set of requirements (i.e., safety
properties and safety requirements), in particular for automatically generated code. It
identi¯es problems and doubts associated with the formal program veri¯cation approach
that can invalidate the assurance provided. Further to this, a defensible argument to
reason that all undesired events have been controlled and mitigated is developed. This
argument provides a traceability between the proofs, the certi¯ed program and the used
tools in the formal program veri¯cation to establish trust in the safety of the program.
An approach on how to automatically construct these arguments in the form of safety
cases from a formal analysis, based on automated theorem proving, of the automatically
generated code is also introduced.
1.5 Thesis Structure
This introduction has, so far, outlined the problem addressed by this thesis, the solution
and the proposition of the research. The rest of the chapters are organized as follows:
Chapter 2, Background, describes relevant literature on automated code generation and
current recommended approaches and standards for program certi¯cation e.g., formal
methods and testing. Chapter 2 also discusses relevant literature on hazard analysis,
such as techniques used in identifying and analyzing hazards. In addition, it also includes
an explanation about the safety case and its applications.
Chapter 3, Hazard Analysis for Formal Program Veri¯cation, describes the results of
a hazard analysis (i.e., fault tree analysis) for the formal program veri¯cation system.
All possible events and their interaction logic that might invalidate the safety claim
construction during the formal program veri¯cation phases are discussed in detail in
this chapter.
Chapter 4, Property-Oriented Safety Cases, presents the structure of the safety case
that focuses on demonstrating safety of the generated code with respect to a given
safety property by providing formal proofs as explicit evidence for the assurance claims.
This chapter illustrates the approach on code generated by the AutoFilter system [153]
for the attitude estimation of a deep space probe.
Chapter 5, Requirement-Oriented Safety Cases describes an approach on how to con-
struct safety case from formal safety requirements which express as logical formulas that
a (software sub-) system's output signals must satisfy for the (overall) system to be safe.
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spacecraft navigation system that was generated from a Simulink model by Real-Time
Workshop [4].
Chapter 6, Architecture-Oriented Safety Cases, describes an approach to systematically
derive safety cases that argue along the hierarchical structure of systems in model-
based development. This chapter illustrates the approach on °ight code generated from
hierarchical Simulink models by Real-Time Workshop for NASA's Project Constella-
tion uses Real-Time Workshop for its Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C) sys-
tems [114, 148].
Chapter 7, Proof-Oriented Safety Cases, presents an approach to develop safety cases
that correspond to formal proofs found by automated theorem provers and reveal their
underlying argumentation structure and top-level assumptions. In particular it shows
how the approach can be applied to the proofs found by the Muscadet prover [118].
Chapter 8, Heterogenous Safety Cases, describes an approach on how the results from
a formal analysis and additional veri¯cation and validation information such as testing
results for control software can be communicated in a single integrated safety case.
Chapter 9, Implementation and Preliminary Assessment of the Approach, shows the
feasibility of the approach (i.e., the construction of safety cases from the formal program
veri¯cation information of the automatically generated code) on industrial applications.
Further to this, a checklist is described on whether the constructed safety cases provide
a convincing and valid argument that the program is adequately safe for a given context
in a given environment based on the formal analysis information.
Chapter 10, Conclusions, concludes the contributions of the work described in this thesis
and describes how the work di®er from others. It also outlines the limitations of the
approach and describes some suggestion for future work.Chapter 2
Background
Chapter 2 describes the background literature relevant to the thesis. This chapter is
divided into the following sections:
² Automated Code Generation describes the literature on automated code generation
and gives examples.
² Generator Assurance describes existing approaches to guarantee the correctness
of generators or the code they guarantee.
² Formal Methods and Formal Logic presents the literature on formal methods, in
particular the di®erence between a formal speci¯cation and formal veri¯cation and
also the di®erence between various types of formal logic (e.g., temporal logic and
Hoare-logic).
² Hoare-style Veri¯cation Systems describes relevant literature on existing systems
following the Hoare-style program veri¯cation approach, in particular, proof car-
rying code and formal software safety certi¯cation.
² Hazard Analysis describes the relevant literature on terminologies, models and
techniques that are used for hazard analysis.
² Argumentation explains the di®erences between an argumentation and explanation
approach. This section also describes a relevant literature on safety cases including
safety case patterns and safety case assurances.
2.1 Automated Code Generation
Automated code generation [40], also known as program synthesis, is a technique to au-
tomatically translate a high-level problem speci¯cation into source code for the targeted
platform. The high-level problem speci¯cation can be:
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or even modi¯ed to automatically generate the code. CodeSmith Code Genera-
tion [1] and Code-gen with Velocity [15] are examples of a template-driven source
code generators. CodeSmith automates the creation of source code for languages
such as C, Java, VB and SQL by using the templates designed for a speci¯c pro-
gram in a speci¯c language. These templates can easily be modi¯ed or written
based on user requirements [1]. Code-gen with Velocity automates the creation of
Java program from the templates written in Velocity Template Language (VTL).
Velocity uses normal Java classes, associated to a speci¯c context, as the data
model (i.e., generates more code from an existing program) and produces output
in the format speci¯ed by the VTL [15].
² Model-based or transformative code generation. In the transformative approach,
speci¯cations are normally designed as a model by using a modeling tool. A
generator then repeatedly transforms the models and translates the ¯nal model into
the target languages, e.g., C or Ada. Real-Time Workshop Embedded Coder 5.1 [4]
is an example of commercial model-based generator that generates executable C
code from Simulink and State°ow models. The executable code is ANSI/ISO C
compliant, enabling it to run on any microprocessor or real-time operating system
(RTOS). Another example of a model-based code generator is SCADE Suite KCG -
DO178B Code Generator [17, 32]. KCG produces C code from the SCADE model
that has all properties required for safety-critical embedded software. Similar
to Real-Time Workshop, KCG also produces executable code that is ANSI C
compliant and works on any target microprocessor. Our focus in this thesis is on
model-based code generators because it is the most common approach in safety-
critical application domains.
² Proof-based or deductive code generation. In the deductive approach, the spec-
i¯cation is de¯ned as logical theorem to be proven and transformations of the
speci¯cation into the program can be represented as inference rules. Kestrel In-
teractive Development System (KIDS) [131] is an example of proof-based code
generator that supports the development of correct and e±cient programs in vari-
ous domains, including scheduling, combinatorial design, graph theory, and linear
programming. KIDS provides automated tools for performing deductive inference,
algorithm design, expression simpli¯cation, ¯nite di®erencing, partial evaluation
and data type re¯nement. The purpose of KIDS tool is to provide correct and
e±cient executable code with less e®ort. However KIDS has been applied to a few
domains only and is di±cult to use in practice. In addition, since we do not get
any insight from the way of the proofs been constructed in KIDS, the application
of our approach is quite di±cult.
However, some generators use a combination of these three approaches to automatically
generate code. For example, they may generate and translate code into a target plat-
form by repeated application of schemas (template-based approach), use a mathematicalChapter 2 Background 11
model (e.g., statistical models and di®erential equations) as input in the code generation
(model-based approach) and check the applicability of the templates by theorem proving
(proof-based approach). Below are examples of the generators that are based on mixed
approaches:
² CTADEL [54] is a generator of multi-platform high performance codes for partial
di®erential equation-based scienti¯c applications that is applied to the HIRLAM
numerical weather forecast system.
² The AutoFilter [153] Program Synthesis System is a program synthesis system
that takes high level speci¯cations of state estimation tasks and derives code by
repeated application of schemas, i.e., algorithms and solution methods of the do-
main. This synthesis system automatically generates and translates code into a
target platform, for instance C and Modula-2, after schemas are applied that use
the appropriate variants of the Kalman ¯lter.
² The AutoBayes [59] Program Synthesis System is a fully automatic program syn-
thesis system for the statistical data analysis domain. AutoBayes has been applied
to a number of advanced textbook examples, machine learning benchmarks, and
NASA applications. It is based on the same underlying approach as the AutoFilter
synthesis system which was also developed at NASA Ames.
Nowadays, model-based development has become popular in software engineering. It
comprises a number of techniques that focus on creating and transforming domain-
speci¯c abstractions or models rather than algorithmic concepts or even code. It has
o®ered improved productivity and simpli¯ed development of large systems as the possi-
bility to generate code automatically from the model accelerates the software develop-
ment process. In model-based design [4, 128], mathematical or, more commonly, visual
methods are used to create an initial model of the system design. It is commonly used
in the control systems domain, where block diagrams provide an accepted notation.
Blocks can represent arbitrary computations and can be nested hierarchically, which
helps countering system complexity. They are connected by wires that represent the
°ow of signals through the system. A large number of academic and commercial tools
support model-based design in this domain [4, 8, 17, 153]. Many NASA projects use it
for at least some of their modeling and code development, particularly in the GN&C
domain, where MathWorks Simulink [4] is commonly used. Simulink comes with a large
library of standard modeling blocks that provide mathematical operations and signal
routing suitable for control systems and complex operations.
Model-based code generation [109, 128] usually complements model-based design, and
translates speci¯cations in the form of a model into a program in a high-level program-
ming language such as C or Ada. The translation process is often organized as a sequence
of model transformations, where the last model is equivalent to the program. The ¯nalChapter 2 Background 12
source code generation step can then be implemented using a simple template engine
such as CodeSmith Code Generation [1]. In this thesis, we focus on one commercial
generator, Mathworks Real-Time Workshop Embedded Coder 5.1 [4]. Real-Time Work-
shop generates ANSI/ISO compliant C and C++ code from MathWorks Simulink and
State°ow models. Embedded Coder is an add-on that has various additional features
which are useful for generating C code tuned for embedded devices.
2.2 Generator Assurance
Although automated code generation has become commercially available, substantial
obstacles remain to its widespread adoption in safety-critical domains [108], which in
turn lead to missing assurance for the correctness and safety of the generated code.
Generator assurance is thus substantially important, especially in safety-critical appli-
cations. However, generator assurance as required by software development and certi¯-
cation standards, for example DO-178B [61], requires enormous e®ort and is di±cult to
accomplish. Most of the standards are process-based, and provide extensive guidelines
for measuring safety and quality of the applied software development tools. For example,
DO-178B has de¯ned a guideline for the use of code generators in the avionics industry.
DO-178B requires the development process of the code generator itself to satisfy the
same objectives as the development process of other airborne software. The standard
also requires that the generator is assured as safe and does not initiate or contribute
to a failure in the aircraft's functions. Basically, DO-178B requires the submission of a
valid justi¯cation as to why and how code generator achieves the required certi¯cation
goals. Obviously, to realize any bene¯ts from code generation, the generated code thus
needs to be shown correct or at least safe. In correct-by-construction techniques such
as deductive synthesis [136] or re¯nement [131] this is done by a mathematical meta-
argument. However, such techniques remain di±cult to implement and have not found
widespread application. In addition, the meta-argument does not provide any insight in
the generated code.
Most previous work on generator assurance has focused on techniques to ensure cor-
rectness of the code generator via testing. StÄ urmer and Conrad [138, 139] present a
systematic testing approach and safeguarding techniques for model-based code gener-
ator. Safeguarding refers to techniques and procedures which are applied to increase
con¯dence in the generated code as well as to ensure that the generator works as ex-
pected. The technique provides a guideline for manually reviewing the generated code,
testing the generator and conducting a generator simulation. StÄ urmer and Conrad [138]
also introduce a test suite approach as a means to identify missing requirements and
irregular behavior caused by improper formal speci¯cations. Similarly, SCADE [32] in-
troduces an approach for the veri¯cation of the generator based on requirements-based
testing. SCADE uses the SCADE simulator and Design Veri¯er for the veri¯cation ofChapter 2 Background 13
the source code by SCADE Suite KCG - DO178B Code Generator [17, 32]. The de-
velopment of SCADE KCG follows a step-by-step approach to satisfy the objectives of
safety standards, i.e., DO-178B Level A standard for software applications in airborne
systems. The requirements-based testing processes verify that SCADE KCG complies
with the system requirements. For example, Stephenson et al. [135] develop an argument
to assess the development of SCADE KCG adequately meets the objectives of Def Stan
00-56. However, the testing e®orts easily become excessive and time-consuming, and
testing on its own is insu±cient to provide enough assurance, especially in safety-critical
systems. Moreover, testing is usually done for a speci¯c generator. Thus, the testing
results are not valid and cannot guarantee the same assurance for any new version of
the tool, and the entire testing process must be repeated.
Full functional correctness of the generator, which would imply correctness and safety
of the generated code, is di±cult to show practically, due to the generator's complexity,
size and frequent changes. Similar issues also arise in compiler veri¯cation [78], which is
similarly hard to achieve in practice because of the complex architecture, sophisticated
analysis and optimization algorithm that are used in compilers. However, Necula sug-
gested that if we cannot prove that a compiler is always correct, then maybe we can at
least check the correctness of each compilation [107]. This observation has inspired the
technique of translation validation [107, 121, 159], which checks the result of each com-
pilation against the source program and detects any compilation errors. The translation
validation approach o®ers assurance of the correctness of the machine code by providing
formal proofs showing that the machine code is a correct implementation of the source
program. In translation validation, the code is validated thoroughly on each and ev-
ery compilation process. It is a promising technique to isolate compilation errors and
consequently, to increase the reliability of compilers. Since compilation and automated
code generation are based on similar concepts, the same approach can also be applied
for a code generator. Instead of assuring correctness of the code generator, checks can
be performed on each and every generated program.
Thus, many researchers believe that a product-oriented assurance approach [44, 66, 76,
108] such as translation validation is a viable alternative to testing. Here, assurance
is not implied by the trust in the generator but follows from an explicit arguments for
the generated code. Jones and Glenstrup [85] argue that in order to establish trust
in the generated programs, a ¯rm semantic basis is needed and must be clearly and
precisely de¯ned in order to guarantee that users' intentions match the behavior of the
generated programs. Jones and Glenstrup also suggest that in order to make clear what
was speci¯ed in the model, ¯rst, the semantics of the speci¯cation language must be
clearly understood. Second, evidence such as proofs and testing results are needed to
show that the outputs of the program generator have the same semantics as speci¯ed
by its inputs or speci¯cations. Third, the program generator and the programs that
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in line with what has been described by Whalen and Heimdahl in [151, 152]. Whalen
and Heimdahl describe a minimum set of requirements for creating code generators that
are ¯t for application in safety-critical systems. In addition to Jones and Glenstrup,
Whalen and Heimdahl add an additional requirement for code generation assurance,
i.e., the generated code must be well structured, well documented and easily traceable
to the original speci¯cations. Clearly, it can be seen that both approaches argue that the
assurance should be ultimately derived from the code rather than from the generator.
In addition, O'Halloran [108] and Denney and Fischer [44] suggest explicit evidence
through formal proofs should be provided to show the correctness of the generated code.
Denney and Fischer demonstrate their ideas in the certi¯able program generation ap-
proach [43, 44, 49]. It uses automatic program veri¯cation and is based on four basic
ideas. Firstly, in order to assure the safety of the code, the generated program itself is
certi¯ed, not the generator. Secondly, the generator needs to be extended to support the
construction of the necessary logical annotations together with the generated code. Here,
annotations record all pertinent information that is necessary for an automated theorem
prover to prove that the program is safe. Thirdly, the proof is based on partial correct-
ness rather than total correctness of the program, and Hoare-style program veri¯cation
(cf. Section 2.3.2 for details) is used as the underlying veri¯cation approach. Hoare-style
program veri¯cation provides a rigorous mathematical foundation for producing safety
proofs that illustrate partial correctness of the generated program. Finally, the objective
of certi¯able program generation is to show that the generated code conforms to safety-
relevant aspects identi¯ed, i.e., a given safety property. The safety property serves as
a high-level requirement of the program assurance. It is an exact characterization of a
property stating that something bad never happens [23, 119, 130] during the execution
of the program. The safety property is de¯ned based on the operational semantics of
the programming language. Di®erent safety properties are formalized by di®erent safety
policies. Safety policies are formalized as a set of Hoare rules to show that the generated
program satisfy the safety property of interest. As usual in Hoare-style program veri¯-
cation, a veri¯cation condition generator (VCG) will turn the annotated program into a
set of veri¯cation conditions (VCs) and if all VCs are proven to hold by an automated
theorem prover (ATP), the program can be concluded to be safe with regard to the given
safety property.
2.3 Formal Methods and Formal Logic
2.3.1 Formal Methods
In recent years, formal methods which are based on mathematical and logical techniques,
have been proposed as a means to improve software quality. Formal methods [37, 73, 74]
are applicable to the speci¯cation, design, and veri¯cation of software and computerChapter 2 Background 15
hardware. A rigorous formal methods application helps in better understanding com-
plex systems, eliminating ambiguity of natural language descriptions and, producing
software that is correct. There are two main parts to a formal method [37], formal
speci¯cation and formal veri¯cation. Formal speci¯cation is a process of describing the
system and its desired property using a mathematically de¯ned syntax and semantics.
Formal speci¯cation techniques o®er a deeper understanding of the system being speci-
¯ed. Several examples of formal speci¯cation languages and methods are Z [133], B [19]
and temporal logic [119, 120].
Formal veri¯cation on the other hand is a process of proving correctness of software
or computer hardware with respect to formal speci¯cation. Two well-established ap-
proaches to formal veri¯cation are model checking and theorem proving. Such tech-
niques have signi¯cant potential to ensure correctness and reduce cost in software and
hardware veri¯cation. Model checking [37, 116] is a technique to verify that a desired
property holds in a ¯nite model of a system. Checks are performed on all possible
states that a system could enter during its execution. Model checking helps to tell why
a property is not satis¯ed (i.e., it produces counterexamples of the claimed property).
It also helps in ¯nding bugs in the program, which will help in the debugging process.
Theorem proving [37, 116] conversely is a process of ¯nding a proof of a property from
given axioms and rules. The proof of a property is then a means to establish trust on
safety of the program. Traditionally, formal program veri¯cation concentrated on show-
ing full functional equivalence between the speci¯cation and the program, but recent
applications are more on showing safety and security aspects that can be de¯ned and
formalized via a safety property. In this research, we use the formal program veri¯cation
of the automatically generated code as basis for the construction of safety cases.
2.3.2 Formal Logic
Predicate Logic. Predicate logic [60, 83] is used as a means to overcome the limitations
of propositional logic in encoding the declarative sentences. Propositional logic usually
deals with sentence components, such as not, and, or and if ...then without covering
the logical aspects of other natural languages such as all and only, for example, the
declarative sentence [83]:
Not all birds can °y.
Propositional logic is unable to represent the properties in this sentence and to express
their logical relationships, dependences and truth. In contrast, predicate logic can be
used to communicate the relation that exist among the objects and properties in this
sentence. Predicate logic (also referred to as ¯rst-order logic) represents a relation
between these properties that can be true or false. Two properties are identi¯ed for the
sentence i.e., x is a bird and x can °y. We use variable x to replace the bird's name,Chapter 2 Background 16
and quanti¯ers 8 and 9 to describe the meaning of all and there exist in the sentence.
The sentence can be represented as:
:(8x(B(x) ! F(x)))
Alternatively, we could rephrase the above sentence as It is not the case that all things
which are birds can °y, which gives the same meaning. We could represent this as:
9x(B(x) ^ :F(x))
In our work, we use formal proofs found by ATP as evidence on safety of the program.
ATPs usually use formal logics such as ¯rst-order logic, type theory, higher order and
modal logics to express a speci¯cation of arbitrary problems. In proving correctness
and safety of a program, di®erent types of proofs (such as resolution proofs and natural
deduction proofs) are provided by theorem provers which will be described in the next
subsection.
Liveness and Safety Properties. Temporal logic [23, 119, 120, 130] provides a for-
malism for specifying and verifying correctness of computer programs. It is a mechanism
to relate the states of a system over time. It is appropriate for reasoning over sequential
and non-terminating concurrent programs. Temporal logic gives rise to the notions of
safety property and liveness property. Table 2.1 shows a comparison between safety and
liveness property.
In temporal logic, the correctness of a program can be shown based on two concepts,
invariance and eventuality [119]. Invariance is used to prove that a safety property holds
continuously throughout the execution of a program and eventuality is used to prove
both the correct behavior in time non-terminating programs and liveness properties.
Basically, the notion of eventuality also includes proofs of total correctness. Alpern
and Schneider [23] show that every property of a program is an intersection of a safety
property and a liveness property. Moreover, total correctness is de¯ned as a combination
of partial correctness and termination.
In our work, we focus on partial correctness proofs, i.e., by showing that the program
does not violate certain conditions during its execution, and establishes certain other
conditions if and when it terminates. Our work is based on a notion of safety property
that is slightly more specialized than the general notion of safety property as de¯ned in
temporal logics. We consider two types of safety properties, language-speci¯c properties
and domain-speci¯c properties. Language-speci¯c properties concern the safety aspects
of the code which depend on the semantics of the programming language, while domain-
speci¯c properties concern the use of the code in a particular domain. However, both
versions are safety properties in the sense that they are invariants that the program
is not allowed to violate during its execution. We also consider safety requirements inChapter 2 Background 17
Table 2.1: Comparison of Safety Property and Liveness Property [23, 130]
Safety Property Liveness Property
Informal de¯nition: Something bad
never happens during program execu-
tion
Informal de¯nition: Something good
will eventually happen during pro-
gram execution
A safety property corresponds to par-
tial correctness which does not ensure
termination, but only that all termi-
nating computations produce correct
results
Liveness property corresponds to total
correctness which guarantees termina-
tion
Proof method based on global invari-
ants extensively used for proving cor-
rectness with respect to the safety
property
Proof method based on proof lattices
or well-founded induction extensively
used for proving correctness with re-
spect to the liveness property
addition to the safety properties, which are assertions that need to hold at particular
occurrence in the program and thus have more of a liveness \°avor".
Hoare Logic. Hoare logic [77] is extensively used for proving correctness of a program
wrt. a correctness speci¯cation, e.g., a safety property. In Hoare logic, the correctness
of a program can be speci¯ed in two ways:
² A partial correctness speci¯cation of the form fPgCfQg says that whenever P
holds for the state before the execution of C, and C terminates then Q holds
afterwards.
² A total correctness speci¯cation of the form [P] C [Q] says that if P holds before
the execution of C, then C is guaranteed to terminate, and when it does, then Q
holds.
The relationship between partial and total correctness can be expressed as:
Total correctness = Termination + Partial correctness
A central feature of Hoare logic is the Hoare triple. A triple describes how the execution
of a command changes the state of the computation. For partial correctness, a Hoare
triple is in a form:
fPgCfQg
where P is a precondition, Q is a postcondition and C is a command. Both precondition
and postcondition are assertions. Assertions are formulas in predicate logic. Essentially,
there are two ways to read the triple, forward and backward [22, 44]. In the forward
direction, the triple can be read as whenever C is executed in a state satisfying P and if
the execution of C terminates, then the state in which Cs execution terminates satis¯es
Q. In the backward direction, the triple can be read as in order to establish Q after exe-
cuting C, P must hold. In addition, in the forward direction, in order for Q to be valid,Chapter 2 Background 18
Q has to follow from the strongest postcondition spc(C,P) of C with respect to P, while
in backward direction, in order for P to be valid, P has to entail weakest precondition
wpc(C,Q) of C with respect to Q.
Hoare logic provides axioms and inference rules for each statement type in the pro-
gramming language, for instance while, if-then-else and assignments. Axioms like the
assignment axiom:
fP[X=E]gX := EfPg
describe valid triples, while inference rules like the composition rule:
fPgC1fRg;fRgC2fQg
fPgC1;C2fQg
describe how to derive valid triples from other given valid triples. For example, let us
consider the Hoare triple [22]:
fx = 5gx := x ¤ 2fx > 0g
If we read this triple in forward direction, we can see that it is clearly correct: if x =
5 and we multiply it by 2, we get x = 10 which clearly implies that x > 0. However,
although correct, this Hoare triple does not use the strongest postcondition. For reason-
ing in forward direction, we would prefer a stronger postcondition instead of any valid
postcondition. For example, x > 5
V
x < 20 is stronger because it is more informative
and it pins down the value of x more precisely than x > 0. The strongest postcondition
is x = 10. Formally, if fPgCfQg and Q is the strongest postcondition of C with respect
to P, then Q logically implies all other post-conditions that make the triple valid.
In another example, let us consider the while program [22] as below:
r := 1;
i := 0;
while i < m do
r := r ¤ n;
i := i + 1
The proof rule for while loops uses a loop invariant P, i.e., a formula that is true at the
begin and the end of the loop's body:
fP ^ BgSfPg
fPgwhile B do S done f:B ^ Pg
We need to determine the right loop invariant as di®erent loop invariants could result
in di®erent preconditions. Based on the program, we must have m ¸ 0 in order to enter
the while loop and we can assume n > 0. Therefore we can de¯ne the precondition asChapter 2 Background 19
m ¸ 0 ^ n > 0 and the loop invariant as r = ni. However, this is not strongest loop
invariant, as we need to know that i = m as exit condition. Therefore we can add i · m
to the loop invariant together with 0 · i, m ¸ 0 and n > 0 in the precondition to give
a complete invariant for proving the loop body is correct. Thus the full loop invariant
will be r = ni ^ 0 · i · m ^ n > 0.
Several logics have been introduced as extensions to Hoare logic. For example, O'Hearn
et al. [110] introduce separation logic for reasoning about programs that manipulate
pointer data structures. Owicki and Gries [117] extend Hoare's system for the veri¯ca-
tion of parallel programs with shared variables. Jones [84] introduces the rely-guarantee
method, a compositional version of the Owicki-Gries system. Our work primarily fo-
cuses on Hoare logic as a means for assuring correctness of a program wrt. all given
requirements (i.e., safety properties and safety requirements).
2.3.3 Formal Proofs
Natural Deduction. A formal proof is a sequence of statements that follows certain
rules of reasoning. Most automated theorem provers produce proofs that are often
complex and di±cult to understand, because the rules of reasoning used to construct
and encode them is machine-oriented e.g., resolution [134]. In resolution proofs, the
conclusion is proved following the proof by contradiction technique (if the falsity has
been shown impossible, then the conclusion must be true) [25, 79, 134] and using only
very few inference rules. Machine-generated proofs may also be based on assumptions
that are not justi¯ed. This causes concerns about the trustworthiness of using them as
arguments in safety-critical applications. Therefore, various e®orts [25, 79] have been
made to transform such proofs into a more readable presentation that is closer to the
human reasoning approach, in particular into natural deduction proofs.
Natural deduction [64, 79, 83] is an attempt to provide a foundational yet intuitive sys-
tem to construct formal proofs. It consists of a collection of proof rules that manipulate
logical formulas and transform premises into conclusions. A conjecture is proven from
a set of assumptions if a repeated application of the rules can establish it as conclusion.
The proof rules can be divided into basic rules, derived rules (which can be seen as proof
\macros" that group together multiple inference steps) and replacement rules (which are
derived rules for equivalence and equality handling).
Natural deduction uses two sets of rules for each logical connective or quanti¯er (e.g.,
^;_;);8), where one introduces the symbol, while the other eliminates it. In the
introduction rules, the connective or quanti¯er is used as the top-level operator symbol
of the unique conclusion, while it occurs in the introduction rules in the same role in
one of the premises. For example, the rule for conjunction introduction concludes that
if A is true and B is true, then evidently A ^ B is true as well (^-i), while conjunctionChapter 2 Background 20
elimination says if A ^ B is true, then both A and B must be true as well (^-e1 resp.
^-e2). The conjunction rules can be written as:
A B
A ^ B ^-i A ^ B
A
^-e1 A ^ B
B
^-e2 (2.1)
Further discussion related to natural deduction rules can be found in Chapter 7 of this
thesis. A full exposition of natural deduction can be found in the literature [83].
Proof Verbalization and Visualization. Other approaches have been used to ad-
dress concerns with using proofs for assurance purposes. Many of them also try to bring
formal proofs into a form closer to human reasoning, to aid with their understanding.
Proof visualization tools (e.g., [142]) present the proof in a graphical form, but quickly
get overwhelmed by the proof size. Proof verbalization (e.g., [36, 80]) transforms the
proofs into natural language but the explanations are often too detailed. Proof abstrac-
tion groups multiple low-level steps that represent recurring argumentation patterns into
individual abstract steps and thus accentuates the hierarchical structure of the proof [51]
but has so far only been applied to interactively constructed proofs. Our work combines
abstraction, verbalization and visualization to reveal and present the proofs' underlying
argumentation structures and top-level assumptions.
Proof Checking. Proof checkers [101, 140] have been used to increase trust in formal
proofs, by demonstrating that every individual step in the proof is correct. However,
proof checking does not address the real problem: while errors in the implementations of
provers do occur, they are very rare [63]; errors and inconsistencies in the formalization
of the domain theory in contrast are much more common [21, 125], but these are not
detected by the standard proof checking techniques.
2.4 Hoare-Style Veri¯cation Systems
This section presents and compares two examples of Hoare-style proof systems that
have been used to demonstrate the partial correctness of a program wrt. a given safety
property. We focus on implementations that are integrated into compilers and code
generators respectively.
2.4.1 Proof-Carrying Code
Proof-Carrying Code (PCC) [106] is a method for ensuring safe execution of untrusted
machine code. It is based on Hoare logic, which is used to formally demonstrate that the
code satis¯es the safety property of interest. The general presentation of PCC is centered
on the interaction between a code consumer, a code producer and a proof validator.Chapter 2 Background 21
 
Figure 2.2: Overview of Proof-Carrying Code [106]
The code producer is required to establish safety proofs that prove the untrusted code's
adherence to the formalized safety policy. The proof validator is required to verify and
double-check the validity of the proofs generated. The code consumer will then check,
with the help of proof validator, that the safety proofs are valid and hence guarantee
that the untrusted code is safe to execute wrt. the given safety policy. Code producer
and code consumer must agree on a safety policy that formalizes the safety property of
interest, and will guide the veri¯cation process. A safety policy consists of two main
components, namely the safety rules and the interface. The safety rules describe all legal
operations and safety preconditions of the code, while the interfaces describe essential
conventions between the code consumer and the untrusted code. Figure 2.2 shows an
overview of the PCC approach.
According to Necula [106], an implementation of proof-carrying code must consist of the
following ¯ve elements:
² a formal speci¯cation language used to express the safety policy;
² a formal semantics of the language (i.e., in the form of a logic) used by the untrusted
code;
² a language that allows natural representation of the de¯ned logic in order to express
the proofs;
² an algorithm for validating the proofs; and
² a method for generating the safety proofs.Chapter 2 Background 23
code backwards and applies the safety policy to produce VCs. If all VCs are proven by
an ATP, it can be concluded that the program is safe with regard to the given safety
property. In its current form [43, 46, 47], FSSC only works on the intermediate represen-
tation of the source code and provides only partial correctness proofs (no termination).
It also does not support any real-time or °oating-point reasoning.
Figure 2.4 shows the overall system architecture of the FSSC. Here, the code generator
is complemented by the annotation inference subsystem and the standard Hoare-style
veri¯cation components (i.e., VCG, automated theorem prover and proof checker) to
achieve a fully automated veri¯cation of the generated code. Several tools such as
simpli¯er, TPTP2X-converter, and domain theory are also used to help in the automatic
veri¯cation. The simpli¯er simpli¯es the VCs before they are transmitted to the ATP,
the TPTP2X-converter converts VCs into the particular ¯rst order logic syntax of the
di®erent ATPs and a domain theory supports the capability of ATPs in providing proofs.
The domain theory consists of ¯xed axioms, lemmas, and rewrite rules. In FSSC, the
components are distinguished into two categories, namely trusted (in pink) and untrusted
components (in light blue). Trusted components are crucial to the assurance and must be
correct because any error in them can compromise the assurance provided by the overall
system, while untrusted components are not crucial to the assurance as their results can
be checked by at least one trusted component. The FSSC follows the certi¯able code
generation approach as introduced in [43, 44, 49]. FSSC system shifts the trust burden
from the code generator and the program to the certi¯cation system: instead of having
to trust an arbitrary generated program to be safe, users have to trust the certi¯er to
be correct.
Annotation Inference. A program logic requires annotations at key program lo-
cations to perform a fully automated veri¯cation. This can in principle be achieved
by integrating into the generator to support for the construction of the annotations,
in particular by embedding annotation templates into the code templates, which are
then instantiated and re¯ned in parallel by the generator. However, this requires a
tight integration of code generator and annotation construction. Alternatively, annota-
tions can be constructed by a separate annotation inference algorithm that is completely
independent of the code generator and analyzes the generated code after the fact.
The key technical idea of the approach is to exploit the idiomatic nature of auto-
generated code in order to automatically infer the annotations. The idea of the an-
notation inference algorithm [46, 47] is to \get the information from de¯nitions to uses",
i.e., to ¯nd all program locations where the safety-relevant information will be estab-
lished or \de¯ned", as well as all potentially unsafe locations, where it is used, and then
to construct the formulae required for the annotations, and to annotate the program
along the control °ow-paths between de¯nitions and uses. The annotations along the
control-°ow paths formalize the property that needs to be maintained by the program
for the use to be safe. The annotations will then be converted into three sets of VCsChapter 2 Background 24
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Figure 2.4: Architecture of Formal Software Safety Certi¯cation System [44]
by the VCG, corresponding to establishing and maintaining appropriate invariants, and
satisfying the safety condition in the program; if and only if all VCs can be shown to
hold, then safety property holds for the entire program. Note that an annotation only
serves as an auxiliary lemma that contains the desired safe conditions of the program;
any error in an annotation does not compromise the assurance provided but only leads
to unprovable VCs.
The annotation inference algorithm is generic, and parameterized with respect to a
library of annotation schemas that depend on the safety policy and the code generator.
The schemas consist of a code pattern and a set of actions. The patterns characterize
the notions of \de¯nitions" and \uses" that are speci¯c to the given safety property. For
example, for initialization-before-use safety property, de¯nitions correspond to variable
initializations while uses are statements which read a variable, whereas for array bounds
safety, de¯nitions are the array declarations, while uses are statements which access
an array variable. The actions are used to compute the annotations that are inserted
into the code when the schema is applied. A schema compiler translates the high level
declarative schemas into low-level term manipulations.
AutoCert: Automatic Certi¯cate Generation. AutoCert [52] is a generator plug-
in to support the subsequent certi¯cation of the code created by the AutoFilter Program
Synthesis Tool [153] and MathWorks Real-Time Workshop [52] code generators. Au-
toCert is based on an implementation of the generic annotation inference algorithm
described above. It has been instantiated for a range of mathematically oriented re-Chapter 2 Background 25
quirements, mostly in the vehicle navigation domain. Given a set of formal assumptions
(e.g., constraints on input signals) and requirements (e.g., constraints on output signals),
it formally veri¯es that the generated code complies with the speci¯ed requirements. It
also supports the certi¯cation of several safety properties, as described in Section 2.4.2.
This provides high-level assurance about the safety and reliability of the code without
excessive manual veri¯cation and validation e®ort.
Since AutoCert follows the FSSC approach to certi¯cation, it carries out a symbolic
analysis of the generated source code in order to infer the required annotations and
ultimately to prove properties about the code. During the course of this analysis (where
it e®ectively \reverse engineers" the code), AutoCert records various facts, such as the
locations of variable de¯nitions and uses, which are later used as an input in the safety
case generation process.
2.4.3 Proof-Carrying Code vs Formal Software Safety Certi¯cation
FSSC uses a similar approach as PCC for ensuring safety of a program i.e., Hoare-style
program veri¯cation for the given safety property. Both of these approaches use formal
proofs to demonstrate that the program adherence to the given safety property (e.g,.
type safety and memory safety), rather than showing full functional correctness of the
program. They are also similar in:
² the components that are used in the veri¯cation framework, i.e., VCG, ATP, proof
checker, safety property and safety policy;
² the category of components which are distinguished into two categories, namely
trusted and untrusted components;
² the veri¯cation process (i.e., it starts with identifying and constructing a safety
policy to represent the safety property of interest, and continues with instantiation
of annotations that formalize safety of the program, followed by formally verifying
the VCs by ATP and ¯nally providing formal proofs for the assurance claim on
program safety);
² the certi¯cation assurance provided, i.e., provides formal safety proofs as assurance
on safety of the program with respect to the given safety property.
However, there are some aspects that are di®erent in these two approaches. FSSC is
focused on auto-generated code, while PCC is focussed on mobile code such as JavaScript
and ActiveX controls. In addition to the PCC, FSSC can ensure not only the safety
of program wrt. the language speci¯c property (e.g., initialization-before-use and array
bounds safety) but also wrt. the properties and requirements that relate to the program'sChapter 2 Background 26
Table 2.2: Di®erences between FSSC and PCC
FSSC PCC
Domain Automatically Generated
Code
Mobile Code
Property Language speci¯c property Language speci¯c property
Domain speci¯c property
Code
Level
Source Code Object Code
application domain (e.g., matrix symmetry). Both FSSC and PCC also work on di®erent
level of code representation: while FSSC works on an intermediate representation of the
source code, PCC works on the object code level. Table 2.2 shows these di®erence
aspects of FSSC and PCC. In our work, we use FSSC as it works on the source code
level which is closer to human readable language than object code.
2.5 Hazard Analysis
2.5.1 Hazard Analysis Terminology
As computers became increasingly important components of complex systems, concerns
about the correctness and safety of the software began to emerge, especially in safety-
critical systems. Research has shown that software failures have led to catastrophic
accidents as for example in the Mars Climate Orbiter Crash [20] and Therac-25 acci-
dents [98]. According to the accident report, Mars Climate Orbiter crashed in September
1999 because of a \silly mistake", i.e., the use of wrong units in a program. In another
case, a large number of cancer patients died due to overdoses of radiation resulting from
a race condition between concurrent tasks in the Therac-25 software [98]. It can be seen
that software safety [94, 132] is not merely a software-speci¯c issue but it also a part of
the system safety issues.
Since software is a part of a system, the hazards caused by a software must be analyzed
and mitigated in order to retain system safety. Hazard analysis [94] is a process of
identifying the characteristic of hazards, determining their signi¯cance and evaluating
measures to be taken to control and mitigate the hazards. Hazard analysis is a tool
within the discipline of system safety engineering and \at the heart of an e®ective safety
program" [94].
In system and software safety, terms are used inconsistently, where di®erent literature
interprets similar terms in slightly di®erent meanings. Frequently, confusion exists be-
tween the notions of failure, error and fault, and sometimes they are used interchange-
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instant of time", while an error is a \static condition or a state that remains until it
has been removed". In comparing fault and failure, Leveson describes failures as \basic
abnormal occurrences", for example a burned-out bearing in a pump or a short circuit
in an ampli¯er and faults as \abnormal conditions or defects at the component or sub-
system level", for instance an improper functioning of some upstream component. In
general, Leveson concludes that \all failures are faults, but not all faults are failures". In
the same review, Leveson also points out the association between hazard and accident,
where a hazard is de¯ned as a \potential condition that can cause harm to personnel,
system, property or environment", while an accident is an \event that occurs unexpect-
edly and unintentionally". For example, if an accident is de¯ned as a collision between
two aircraft, then a possible hazard is the lack of minimum separation between aircraft.
\The longer the hazardous state exists, the greater the chance of the accident to occur,
thus the higher the risk" [94].
Table 2.3 provides de¯nitions of the basic terms that are frequently used in hazard
analysis. In our work, we customize the de¯nition of the terms such as hazard, error,
fault, failure and safety to suit the research context (see Chapter 3 Section 3.1).
2.5.2 Hazard Severity Classi¯cation Scheme
Di®erent certi¯cation standards classify hazard severity in di®erent schemes. MIL-STD-
882 [111] de¯nes a severity scheme with four categories, namely catastrophic, critical,
marginal and negligible, while the FAA System Engineering Council (SEC) [132] severity
scheme de¯nes ¯ve classes, namely catastrophic, hazardous, major, minor and no safety
e®ect. The severity classi¯cation is used as an indication of the worst possible e®ect
caused by the identi¯ed hazard in the particular environment. The severity classi¯cation
scheme is important as a guideline in analyzing the hazards of a critical system, especially
when human life is involved. In a safety-critical system, safety experts are responsible to
identify the e®ect of each associated system hazard. The experts are required to classify
each of the e®ect in terms of its severity, from the most severe to the least severe, by
referring to the severity classi¯cation scheme. They also have to identify the likelihood
of the occurrence of the hazard, i.e., either it anticipated to occur frequently, probably,
occasionally, remote or improbable.
Since software failures have become one of the main contributors to catastrophic acci-
dents (see for example [20, 95, 98, 115]), the assessment of the severity level of software
failures and their e®ects to the environment is crucial. In our work, we customize the
severity scheme (see Chapter 3 Section 3.3) to ¯t our context in analyzing errors and
faults in program veri¯cation process that can cause doubt on whether the proofs really
entail program safety and cause failure to the software and hence a system.Chapter 2 Background 28
Table 2.3: Terms and De¯nition
Term Literature De¯nitions
Error - Design °aw or deviation from a desired or intended state [94].
- A defective value in an erroneous state of a system [82].
Fault - Defect in part of a component or in the design of a system [82].
- A manifestation of an error in software. A fault, if it occurs,
may cause a failure [32].
Failure - Inability of a system or component to perform its intended
function for a speci¯ed time under speci¯ed environmental
conditions [94].
- A deviation of the system behaviour from its speci¯cation [82].
- Inability of any component of the system to perform its
intended function or to perform it correctly within speci¯ed
limits [93].
Hazard - State or set of conditions of a system, together with other
conditions in the environment system that will lead to an
accident [94].
- A state of a system with the potential for harm [82].
- Any condition, event, or circumstance, which could induce an
accident. A potentially unsafe condition. A situation which
has the potential to lead to harm [93].
- A physical situation or state of a system, often following
from some initiating event, that may lead to an accident [113].
Safety - Freedom from accidents or losses [94].
- Freedom from unacceptable risk [93].
Accident - Undesired, unavoidable and unplanned (but not necessarily
unexpected) event that results in (at least) a speci¯ed level
of loss [94].
- An unintended event, or sequence of events, that causes harm
or, also de¯ned as a mishap [113].Chapter 2 Background 29
2.5.3 Hazard Analysis Models and Techniques
There are a number of established models and techniques for identifying hazards and
assessing their probabilities and severities. Some di®er primarily in their names, whereas
others truly have their own unique and important characteristics. In the development
of safety-critical systems, functional hazard assessment, fault tree analysis and failure
mode e®ect analysis techniques are extensively used for hazard analysis. The techniques
help in identifying and analyzing the hazards and also in preparing a plan to cope with
the identi¯ed and unidenti¯ed hazards.
Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) [105, 132, 143] is a \systematic and comprehensive
assessment method for identifying the potential functional failures or hazards of each
component in the system" [105, 143]. FHA starts with de¯ning the functionality of each
component, analyzing the consequences of their failure and assigning their severity level.
Results of the analysis are documented in a tabular listing diagram. Appendix A shows
the roles and principles of the formal program veri¯cation components used in FSSC.
However, the further analysis of the consequences of each component's failure and the
corresponding severity levels is not part of this thesis.
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) [12, 94, 143] is \a top-down search method used for analyzing
causes of hazards, but not for identifying the hazards" [94]. FTA is a \procedure for
determining the various combinations of hardware and software failures and also human
errors that could result in the occurrence of speci¯ed undesired events at the system
level" [12]. FTA begins with a single undesirable event, then attempts to work backward
and forward to identify and determine the chain of events and their interaction logic
that initiated the most undesirable event. FTA uses Boolean logic to illustrate the
combinations of these undesired events. Results of the analysis are presented graphically
as a tree structure and built using conventional logic gate symbols with the undesirable
event at the root and the cause event at the bottom of the tree. The undesired events are
connected to each other using 'OR' and 'AND' gate symbols. In our work, we use FTA
to analyze possible events that might invalidate the safety claim construction. Details
of the analysis are discussed in the next chapter.
Software Fault Tree Analysis (SFTA) [94, 96, 97] is slightly di®erent from fault tree
analysis, as it focuses more on software safety (e.g., program errors) than on system
safety [94]. SFTA is suitable for \verifying the safety aspects of software" [94, 96, 97].
The analysis starts with the software hazard that could a®ect systems safety, and traces
backward to ¯nd paths through the code to detect software logic errors. SFTA uses
mathematical proof by contradiction as reasoning approach. It starts with the hypothesis
that the software has produced an unsafe output, and further down the analysis shows
that this event could not happen because the hypothesis leads to a contradiction. SFTA
is only concerned with the \safety of the code logic" [94, 96, 97]. In SFTA, the code
is analyzed in isolation from the system analysis. SFTA uses Boolean logic and treesChapter 2 Background 30
to illustrate the chain of the undesired events graphically. The root of the tree is the
software hazard, while the necessary preconditions that initiated the de¯ned hazard are
described at the leaves of the tree. Nodes are connected with either a logical 'OR' or
a logical 'AND' relationship. However, the application of SFTA is less signi¯cant here
since we have deferred the argument on the correctness of the VCG to future work.
Failure Mode E®ect Analysis (FMEA) [94, 132, 143] is a \reliability analysis that focuses
on assuring successful system operation" [94]. The main objective of this analysis is to
identify actions and strategies to mitigate and control the potential failure modes and
their e®ect on the system operations. The results of this analysis are presented in a
table with columns that include details about component, failure probability, failure
mode, percent failures by mode, and their e®ect. FMEA documents all possible failures
of a system, determines the e®ect of each failure on system operation, and ranks each
failure according to its severity. By anticipating these failure modes in the software and
system development, it helps in identifying actions to overcome the identi¯ed failure
and enhancing the reliability of the system. FMEA also can be used to check the
completeness of the resulting fault tree by analyzing the e®ects of each single failure at
the bottom of the tree and assessing the seriousness of this failure mode to the overall
system. However, we left the implementation of FMEA for future work.
2.6 Argumentation
2.6.1 Explanation and Argumentation
Explanatory information is essential to increase understandability and eliminate misper-
ception. Explanation [58, 92] constitutes an \intelligent dialogue" that is understandable
and uses natural language as medium of its interaction. Lacave and Diez [91, 92] describe
several basic properties of explanations as shown in Table 2.4.
Generally, explanation is based on three main concepts: content, communication and
adaptation. The most important aspect is the content of the explanation, i.e., what is
going to be explained and how clear it could be. The content should contain the focus,
purpose, level, and causality of the explanation to be presented. The communication is
concerned with how the explanation is going to be o®ered. In a computer system, the
explanation can for example be delivered by a natural language dialogue, by selecting
options from a menu, or by prede¯ned questions. The explanation can be displayed or
presented in text, graphically, or interactively via multimedia tools such as video and
audio. The ¯nal aspect is adaptation or to whom the explanation is o®ered. Variation
of users' knowledge, users' expectation, and the level of detail of the explanation are
properties that should be considered in making a good explanation. In a heuristic
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Table 2.4: Basic Properties of Explanation [91, 92]
Category Property Options
Content - Focus - evidence/model/reasoning
- Purpose - description/comprehension
- Level - micro/macro
- Causality - causal/non-causal
Communication - User-System Interaction - menu/prede¯ned questions/
natural language dialogue
- Display of Explanations - text/graphics/multimedia
Adaptation - Users knowledge about - no model/scale/dynamic model
the domain
- Users knowledge about the - no model/scale/dynamic model
reasoning method
- Level of Detail - ¯xed/threshold/auto
² Non-adaptive methods: The detail of explanation is ¯xed. The interaction between
the system and the user is made through prede¯ned questions or options, for
example in text planning [33, 102].
² Adaptive methods: The detail of explanation is not ¯xed. The interaction be-
tween the system and the user is conducted dynamically where explanations are
addressed in di®erent level based on the user request. Examples are reactive ex-
planations [102, 103] and dialog planning [33].
Frequently, confusion exists between the notion of explanation and argumentation. Ar-
gumentation [104] is a medium for generating interactive and collaborative explanations.
From a theoretical point of view, explanation and argumentation are two notions that
are relatively close and di±cult to distinguish [141]. The main di®erence between them is
that in explanation the topic to be explained is not discussed whereas in argumentation
the topic is explicitly argued [144]. Hughes [81] de¯nes the purpose of an explanation
is to show why and how some phenomenon occurred or some event happened, while the
purpose of the argument is to show that some view or statement is correct or true. Expla-
nation is appropriate when we are seeking to understand why something occurred, while
argument is appropriate when we want to show that something is true, usually when
there is some possibility of disagreement about its correctness. Lacave and Diez [92]
de¯ne two types of argumentation as follows:
² Textual argumentation, where arguments are presented in free text using natural
language. A user has the ability to request an explanation and the system will
then generate the new explanation with strong argumentation in natural language.
² Graphical argumentation, where graphical notations are used to clearly communi-
cate the relationship between the claim and evidence. Research has shown thatChapter 2 Background 32
graphical representation can improve human ability to solve ill-structured real
world problems in comparison to textual representation. Kelly [86], in his research
showed that textual argumentation can lead to unclear and ambiguous argumen-
tation due to poorly structured English.
In addition, Schroeder [129] claims that visualization of argumentation is a promising
approach to make complex reasoning of single or multiple agents more intuitively under-
standable, without requiring knowledge of the foundations of logic. Given the motivation
to show that \something bad never happens during the execution of the program", argu-
mentation seems to be the appropriate approach for this research in comparison to the
explanation approach. Here, the argument helps in showing the truth of the assurance
claim provided by the certi¯cation system. The argument will also help to establish
trust and con¯dence on the assurance provided.
2.6.2 Safety Cases
Safety cases [13, 29, 86, 113] are \structured arguments, supported by a body of evidence,
that provide a convincing and valid case that a system is safe for a given application in a
given operating environment" [29, 113]. Both Bishop and Bloom¯eld [29] and Kelly [86]
have de¯ned the main elements of a safety case. Bishop and Bloom¯eld [29] decompose
a safety case into the following four main elements:
² Claim i.e., the property of the system or some subsystem;
² Evidence i.e., the basis of the safety argument. Evidence can be facts, assumptions,
or subclaims;
² Argument i.e., a link of the evidence to the claim. Arguments can be deterministic,
probabilistic or qualitative; and
² Inference i.e., the mechanism that provides the transformational rules for the ar-
gument.
Figure 2.5 illustrates the relationship that exists between the elements as suggested by
Bishop and Bloom¯eld. Similarly, Kelly [86] points out that a safety case consists of
four key elements as follows:
² Requirements i.e., the safety objectives that must be addressed to assure safety;
² Evidence i.e., the information from analysis, testing or simulation of the system;
² Argument i.e., a link showing how the evidence indicates compliance with the
requirements; andChapter 2 Background 33
Figure 2.5: Principal Elements of Safety Case - Bishop and Bloom¯eld [29]
Figure 2.6: Principal Elements of Safety Case - Kelly [86]
² Context i.e., the basis of the overall argument presented in the safety case.
Figure 2.6 illustrates the macro-dependencies that exist between the elements suggested
by Kelly [86]. There are signi¯cant commonalities between the safety case elements
de¯ned in [29] and [86]. Both approaches agree that evidence and argument are impor-
tant elements in a safety case. Kelly also claims that \an argument without evidence is
unfounded and evidence with no argument is unexplained" [86] . However, Kelly uses
term requirement instead of claim to describe the target to be met by the system or
subsystem. Despite the similarities, Bishop and Bloom¯eld [29] introduced three types
of inference rule as a means to support the link between the evidence and claim, i.e.,
deterministic - relying upon axioms, logic and proof, probabilistic - relying upon proba-
bilities and statistical analysis, and qualitative - relying upon adherence to the standards,
design code, etc, while Kelly [86] uses context to describe the contextual information
of the argument such as context, constraints, justi¯cations and assumptions to support
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2.6.3 Goal Structuring Notation
Various approaches [29, 30, 57, 86] have been developed and introduced to construct
safety cases. In most recent studies, the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) has been used
to model the entities and relationships as shown in Figure 2.6. GSN [65, 86, 89, 155]
is a graphical argumentation notation which explicitly represents individual elements of
a safety argument and the relationships that exist between these elements. GSN also
o®ers [86]:
² explicit representation of the logical °ow of the safety argument;
² explicit representation of the role of evidence; and
² explicit representation of the rationale underlying an argument.
Table 2.5 describes principal elements of the GSN. In this thesis, we make some modi¯-
cations to the notations (see Table 2.5) to represent our arguments.
Kelly [86] describes six structured steps for the GSN construction as illustrated in Fig-
ure 2.7. Step 1 in the goal structure development is to state the goal of the argument.
For example, the goal is to demonstrate that the generated code is safe to execute with
respect to a safety property of interest. Having identi¯ed a goal in Step 1, Step 2 of the
process requires the context of the argument to be identi¯ed. For instance, the context
explains the informal interpretation of key notions like safe and safety property. Step
3 of the method requires that an argument strategy for supporting the top level goal is
identi¯ed. The strategy can vary as it depends on the objective of the argument. For ex-
ample, the strategy can be based on showing that all of the operating hazards have been
controlled and mitigated. Then, Step 4 requires that all the underlying assumptions
and judgements that support the evidence and strategy to derive the top level goal have
been addressed. Further to this, in Step 5, the de¯ned strategy has to be elaborated
until the arguments are completed. Finally, in Step 6, the valid evidence to support the
argument should be provided. The evidence can be the analysis results, audit reports,
testing results, or any supporting documents.
Figure 2.8 shows an example of a goal structure for the Safety of Air Navigation
project [56]. Here, the argument starts with the claim (G0) that the risk of collision
under a Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum (RVSM) is tolerable. Cr0001 describes
the requirements for the RVSM, i.e., collision risk under RVSM meets TLS for vertical
risk and the overall risk is not increased. It is based on the assumption (A0001) that the
current level of RVSM risk is tolerable. This is justi¯ed by the fact that RVSM is being
introduced to meet a legitimate business need. The further arguments are reduced to
four principal safety arguments (G1 to G4), which together represent the necessary and
su±cient conditions for G0 to be true.Chapter 2 Background 37
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Figure 2.9: GSN Extensions to Represent Patterns and Their Relationships
2.6.4 Safety Case Patterns
Safety case patterns have been described as a means of documenting and reusing suc-
cessful safety arguments [86, 88]. The patterns are not intended to provide a reusable
model of a complete safety case but only to describe partial solutions, i.e., tackling just
one aspect of the overall structure of the safety argument contained within a safety case.
Safety case patterns generalize the structure of the safety argument and can be used
as a way of abstracting the fundamental strategies from the details of particular safety
case designs. Patterns are based upon reusable goal structures that can be instantiated
to aid the construction of parts of a safety argument [146].
Alternative documentation structures have been proposed and used for the description
of the safety case pattern. Kelly [86] has de¯ned an extension of the GSN to describe
a safety case pattern, i.e., generalize the details of the argument. Figure 2.9 shows the
GSN extensions to represent patterns and their relationship, and Figure 2.10 shows the
template for the safety pattern document. According to [86], the details of the element
descriptions in the pattern document are as follows:
² Pattern Name. Communicates the key principle or central argument being
presented by the safety argument pattern. It is important to give the right pattern
name as it will be the label to identify the pattern.
² Intent. Describes what the pattern is trying to achieve or its purposes.
² Also Known As. Other names that can be used to appropriately describe the
pattern.
² Motivation. Describes why the pattern was constructed.Chapter 2 Background 38
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Figure 2.10: Template for the Safety Pattern Document
² Structure. Presents the structure of the argument pattern.
² Participants. Describes each of the elements of the goal structure pattern.
² Collaborations. Describes how the di®erent elements of the pattern work to-
gether to achieve an e®ective argument. It also explicitly describes the links be-
tween elements that are not communicated by the argument structure.
² Applicability. Describes under what circumstances the argument can and should
be applied. Any assumptions and principles underlying the argument pattern
should clearly described too.
² Consequences. Describes what work remains after carried out the argument
pattern.
² Implementation. Communicates how the application of the pattern should be
carried out and hints or techniques to ease the application of the pattern. Any
possible problems in applying the pattern and misinterpretations of the terms or
concepts used should be described here as well.
² Examples. Provides examples that illustrate the instantiation of the pattern.Chapter 2 Background 39
² Known Uses. Describes known uses of the form of argument presented in the
pattern.
² Related Patterns. Identi¯es any related safety case patterns.
2.6.5 Safety Case Assurance
Safety case assurance [87] is the process of evaluating the safety case to obtain mutual
acceptance of the claim-argument-evidence presented. To conclude that the claim made
in the safety case deserves su±cient con¯dence and is convincing, the argument has
to be well-structured, the right evidence has to be used, the assumptions have to be
accepted and the reasoning has to be consistent. Littlewood [100] introduces an ap-
proach to formally treat the argument structures by presenting a formal probabilistic
treatment of \con¯dence" by using a Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN) model to measure
the \strength" of arguments. In addition, Strigini [137] suggests the potential of BBNs
to audit strengths and weaknesses of the argument. Cyra and Gorski [39] introduce an
appraisal mechanism based on the Dempster-Sha®er Model of gathering expert opinions
about basic elements of the argument (i.e., the value of evidence, assumptions and facts).
The mechanism presents an aggregation of the opinions to assess quality of the overall
argument. In di®erent studies, Kelly [86], Despotou [53], Fan Ye [158] and Weaver [146]
implement peer review, questionnaire, and case study techniques to evaluate the feasi-
bility of the safety case constructed. In addition, Kelly [87] also introduces a structured
approach for the argument review. He introduces four reviewing process steps:
² Argument Comprehension: make the argument readable, e.g., highlight the di®er-
ence of argument elements (claims, assumptions, contexts, etc);
² Well-formedness (syntax checks): identify structural errors, e.g., claims without
supporting evidence;
² Expressive Su±ciency Checks: identify any missing context, justi¯cations, assump-
tions, constraints;
² Argument Criticism and Defeat: recognize the distinction between deductive and
inductive arguments and audit the integrity of evidence based on several attributes
such as dependency, directness, and robustness.
In this thesis, we evaluate the comprehensiveness, well-formedness and expressiveness of
the resulting safety cases by using safety case checklists and by presenting them to the
research community. Further intensive evaluation is left for future work.Chapter 2 Background 40
2.7 Conclusions
This chapter presented a review of relevant literature on automated code generation
and existing approaches and standards for program veri¯cation and validation, e.g.,
formal methods and testing. The main focus is on describing the Hoare-style formal
program veri¯cation approach, which is used for ensuring safe execution of code, in
particular for automatically generated code. It also discussed relevant literature on
techniques used in identifying and analyzing hazards, including an explanation on safety-
related terminologies. A basic overview on the di®erences between argumentation and
explanation approach is also given. In addition, relevant literature on safety cases, the
Goal Structuring Notation and its applications in safety-critical industries are discussed.
Finally, the documentation structures of the safety case pattern and the approaches used
for the safety case assurance are discussed in this chapter.Chapter 3
Hazard Analysis for Formal
Program Veri¯cation
Chapter 3 describes the hazard analysis methodology and the results from the fault tree
analysis of the formal program veri¯cation method. Any errors or faults in the program
veri¯cation process that can cause doubts whether the proofs really entail program safety
are described in this chapter.
3.1 Introduction
In our work, safety is de¯ned as freedom from any violation of the requirements (i.e.,
safety properties and safety requirements) imposed on the program. We use formal
program veri¯cation to demonstrate this notion of safety. In this chapter, we describe
the technique to identify undesired events in the formal program veri¯cation process
that might invalidate the assurance claim provided by the formal proofs, i.e., errors or
faults in the program veri¯cation process that can lead to invalid or incorrect proofs.
Incorrect proofs might lead us to believe that an unsafe program is safe to be executed.
The execution of an unsafe program, especially in safety-critical applications, has con-
siderably high potential to lead to a failure of the system that executes the program and
thus potentially to cause an accident. This is because when a program violates a safety
property or safety requirement during its execution, it results can become undetermined,
(e.g., for a violation of the initialization-before-use safety property), and its interaction
with the system can lead to system failure. Hence, incorrect proof can indirectly increase
the overall risk of the system failure, because they provide a false sense of safety.
Since we do not know at program generation time the full system context in which the
program is executed, we have to assume that any violation of the safety property or
safety requirement can lead to a system failure that can cause an accident. Hence, a
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Table 3.1: AFCG Component Groups
Role Components Tool/Artifact
Generate Code Code Generator Tool
Symbolic Computation Tool
Schema Artifact
Code Fragment Tool
Intermediate Code Artifact (derived)
Optimization Tool
Generated Code Artifact (derived)
Generated Annotation Annotation Schema Artifact
Annotation Inference Algorithm Tool
Annotation Artifact (derived)
De¯ne Safety Safety Property Artifact
Safety Requirement Artifact
Safety Policy Artifact
Safety Predicate Artifact
Generate and Simplify VCs VCG Tool
VC Artifact (derived)
Simpli¯er Tool
TPTP2X-Converter Tool
Produce and Check Proofs ATP Tool
Proof Artifact (derived)
Domain Theory Artifact
Proof Checker Tool
validate the proofs of VCs, e.g., the ATP and proof checker. An explicit explanation of
each component is provided in Appendix A. Note that the derived components capture
the safety-relevant information about a speci¯c program on di®erent levels of abstraction
(i.e., annotations, VCs, and proofs) but that the ultimate evidence of the safety cases
we are constructing are the proofs.
3.2.2 Hazard Assessment Process
The hazard assessment process helps in identifying and assessing hazards and dealing
with them [93]. The purposes of the process are:
² to identify and assess the severity of the hazards;
² to identify and document the potential hazards and their e®ects on the safety of
operation;
² to identify contributing elements that cause the identi¯ed hazards (e.g., error, fault
or failure);
² to specify the safety objectives to be achieved.Chapter 3 Hazard Analysis for Formal Program Veri¯cation 45
In our work, the hazard assessment process is divided into two parts, severity classi¯ca-
tion scheme and hazard analysis. The details of each part are described in the following
sections.
3.3 Hazard Severity Classi¯cation Scheme for Program
Veri¯cation
Categorizing hazards according to their severity level helps in a consistent assessment of
hazard impacts and is also bene¯cial in identifying the level of improvement and correc-
tive action that are required to control and mitigate the identi¯ed hazard [111, 132]. In
this section, a dedicated severity scheme is constructed to help in assessing the severity
level of the worst possible e®ect caused by the hazards identi¯ed in program veri¯cation.
This scheme, called the program veri¯cation hazard decision matrix combines the per-
spective of users of the code generator and the perspective of users of the certi¯cation
system as we have to consider the situation in both contexts. Our situation is compli-
cated by the fact that the code generator is a meta-level system, and we do not know
the application context of the generated program, and the fact that the working of the
certi¯cation system also highly depends on the program to be veri¯ed. Moreover, the
automatic certi¯cation is a complex process, which complicates an intuitive understand-
ing of the assurance provided by the certi¯cation system. To understand the interaction
between these two systems (i.e., code generator and certi¯cation system), we use the
following set of indicators to assess the possible e®ects:
² the output of the code generator, in particular, whether the program actually is
safe or unsafe; and
² the output of the certi¯cation system, in particular, its claim about the safety of
the program as safe, unsafe or unknown.
In principle, the generator only produces two types of output, either a safe or an unsafe
program and the certi¯cation system generates three types of output, i.e., a claim about
the safety of the program either as safe, unsafe or unknown. In the certi¯cation system,
an unknown claim is produced when it is unable to decide whether the program is safe
or unsafe. This can happen because the information provided to the certi¯cation system
is insu±cient to conclude safety of the program and of course because the underlying
¯rst-order logic is undecidable.
All situations in which these two indicators (i.e., the output of code generator and the
output of the certi¯cation system) do not agree are considered as abnormal, or as fault of
the combined system (i.e., code generator and certi¯cation system). Therefore, careful
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execute the program. Based on the situation here, there are three possible con°icts to
be considered. The con°icts are:
² when the certi¯cation system claims all safety requirements and properties are
proven but the program exhibits an unsafe behavior when executed; or
² when the certi¯cation system claims that one or more safety requirements or prop-
erties are violated but the program always exhibits a safe behavior when executed;
or
² when the certi¯cation system is unable to provide any speci¯c claims about the
program at the end of the certi¯cation process.
The worst possible outcome is if the certi¯cation system fails to provide an accurate
claim about the safety of an actually unsafe program, as the risk for the unsafe program
to fail when executed or to lead to unintended behavior is extremely high.
The customized severity classi¯cation scheme helps us in de¯ning the severity level
caused by the disagreement of the two systems. Here we de¯ned three severity levels
based on the interaction of the two systems, and the assumption that the outputs of the
systems can be characterized as \the program is safe and unsafe" and \the certi¯cation
system claims that the program is safe or unsafe or unknown", respectively. Level A
denotes hazardous disagreement, level B benign disagreement, or indecision, and level
C denotes agreement between both systems. The severity level of each situation or
any con°ict between these two systems is described in the program veri¯cation hazard
decision matrix as shown in Figure 3.3:
² level C for a \safe" claim that is produced on a safe program;
² level A for a \safe" claim that is produced on an unsafe program;
² level B for an \unsafe" claim that is produced on a safe program;
² level C for an \unsafe" claim that is produced on an unsafe program; and
² level B for any \unknown" claim.
Based on the interaction severity level assessment, the most undesirable situation is
when the certi¯cation system erroneously claims that the program is safe to be executed
but it turns out that the program is unsafe when executed (i.e., severity level A). This
might happen due to some faults or failures in the certi¯cation system such as incorrect
proofs or incomplete certi¯cation coverage of the program. These unnoticeable faults
can obviously undermine the assurance provided by the certi¯cation system. In contrast,
the best situation (i.e., severity level C) is when the accurate judgment has been madeChapter 3 Hazard Analysis for Formal Program Veri¯cation 47
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Figure 3.3: Program Veri¯cation Hazard Decision Matrix
by the certi¯cation system for the program, both positive and negative, for example a
claim that the program is safe to be executed, and the program is safe when executed.
Such as accurate claims on safe or unsafe programs can thus establish con¯dence on the
assurance provided by the certi¯cation system.
3.4 Fault Tree Analysis for Formal Program Veri¯cation
While formal program veri¯cation has become a viable alternative in demonstrating pro-
gram safety, doubts about the trustworthiness of the veri¯cation proofs remain. These
doubts concern not only the correctness of the proofs (i.e., whether each proof step is
legal in the underlying calculus) or the correctness of any of the other tools that han-
dle the veri¯cation conditions, but also the question whether the proofs actually entail
program safety. Since there are many possible ways in which the trustworthiness can be
compromised, a fault tree analysis is required to identify the chain of causes and their
interaction logic that initiate this undesired event. The customized severity classi¯cation
scheme de¯ned in the previous section helps in the process of identifying and analyzing
the hazards.
In order to analyze the situation at this meta-level (rather than deferring this to the ¯nal
application), we need to make the simplifying but conservative assumption that every
violation of a requirement (i.e., safety requirement and safety property) is a \potential
condition that can cause harm to personnel, system, property or environment", i.e., a
hazard [94]. A further complication is caused by the fact that the certi¯cation system
is purely observational in the sense that it cannot introduce any additional hazards as
de¯ned above, but should nonetheless be included in the hazard analysis. As outlined in
the previous section, we thus need to look at the interaction between the code generator
and the certi¯cation system to identify faults of the combined system. We consider
all situations in which these two indicators do not agree as abnormal or faults of the
combined system. The most critical fault (level A), on which we concentrate here, occurs
if the code exhibits an unsafe behavior when it is executed but the certi¯cation system
claims that all requirements (i.e., safety requirement and safety property) were proven
to hold.Chapter 3 Hazard Analysis for Formal Program Veri¯cation 48
The fault tree shown in Figure 3.4 demonstrates the combinations of events that could
lead to the top-level hazard (H1), (i.e., an undetected violation of the given require-
ments), are linked together. Here, the analysis focuses on showing possible events that
might invalidate the safety claim construction as it follows the structure of the generated
code.
Figure 3.4 shows that there are two potential causes for the top-level hazard, either the
certi¯cation system missed a potentially unsafe location in the code (F1) or erroneously
concluded that all locations in the code are safe (F2). Potentially unsafe locations can
be missed because of:
² E1: an incomplete or incorrect formalization and localization of the safety require-
ment (e.g., an incorrect formula); or
² E2: an incomplete coverage of the program, which can be caused by missing claims
for any variable (E2.1), variable occurrence (E2.2), or path (E2.3) in the program;
or
² E3: missing VCs (e.g., due to errors in the VCG); or
² E4: an incomplete or incorrect representation of the safety requirements in critical
annotations (e.g., a wrong global post-condition on the output variables); or
² E5: an incomplete or incorrect formalization of the safety policy corresponding
to the given safety property (e.g., the failure to detect a location as potentially
unsafe).
Since any location is considered safe if a proof for its corresponding safety obligation
can be found, assuming the hypotheses available at that location, the conclusion that
the program is safe at all locations can be wrong due to four reasons:
² E1: an incomplete requirement - note that this same hazard can also cause F1; or
² E6: the hypotheses used in the proof can be wrong (i.e., do not hold at the
location); or
² E7: the proof can be technically wrong (i.e., does not conform to the inference
rules of the underlying calculus); or
² E8: the safety obligation that is proven can be wrong (i.e., does not imply the
safety of the location).
The hypotheses can be wrong because of:
² E6.1: incorrect hypotheses from de¯nition because of:Chapter 3 Hazard Analysis for Formal Program Veri¯cation 49
{ E6.1.1: the hypotheses result from a wrong de¯nition location i.e., a de¯nition
is not connected to the calculated use location by the correct path; or
{ E6.1.2: the hypotheses have been constructed wrongly at a de¯nition; or
² E6.2: the hypotheses are not maintained along the paths from the de¯nition to
the calculated use; or
² E6.3: the di®erent hypotheses from the di®erent paths are inconsistent to each
other.
A proof can be incorrect due to the use of:
² E7.1: an invalid domain theory which can be caused by:
{ E7.1.1: incorrect speci¯cation of library functions; or
{ E7.1.2: invalid axioms for proving the proofs; or
{ E7.1.3: invalid certi¯cation assumptions in deriving the proofs; or
² E7.2: an incorrect mechanism which can be caused by:
{ E7.2.1: unreliable theorem prover (i.e., produce invalid proofs); and
{ E7.2.2: unreliable proof checker to detect invalid proofs).
Note that we subsume all auxiliary infrastructure for the ATP (e.g., the TPTP2X con-
verter) under E7.2.1 as well.
The safety obligation can be wrong if:
² E8.1: any of the critical annotations are wrong (similar to the case of missing a
potentially unsafe location described above); or
² E8.2: the formalization of safety policy is inadequate; or
² E8.3: the safety predicate is wrong; or
² E8.4: its implementation in the VCG are wrong.
E8.4 also subsumes other errors in the implementation of the VCG, e.g., its formula
handling. The completeness of the fault tree can be checked by a bottom-up analysis,
i.e., Failure Mode E®ect Analysis (FMEA) [94, 132, 143]. FMEA analyzes the e®ects of
each single failure on component and the seriousness of this failure mode to the overall
system. However, we defer the implementation of bottom-up analysis for future work.Chapter 3 Hazard Analysis for Formal Program Veri¯cation 50
3.5 Conclusions
Formal methods such as formal software safety certi¯cation [43, 46, 47] can be used to
demonstrate safety of the generated code in the sense that the execution of the code
does not violate a speci¯ed safety property or safety requirement, by providing formal
proofs as explicit evidence or certi¯cates for the assurance claims. However, in practice
there are reservations about the use of formal proofs as evidence (or even arguments) in
safety-critical applications. Concerns that the proofs may be based on assumptions that
are not valid, or may contain steps that are not justi¯ed, can undermine the reasoning
used to support the assurance claim and complicate an intuitive understanding of the
assurance claims provided by the proofs. Moreover, the complexity of the tools used can
lead to unforeseen interactions and thus causes additional concerns about the trustwor-
thiness of the assurance claims. In this chapter, we have identi¯ed possible events that
might invalidate the safety claim construction. We used the hazard analysis technique,
in particular the fault tree analysis to identify possible faults and failures to the program
safety and the certi¯cation process, as well as their interaction logic that initiate these
undesired events. The level of details of each undesired event identi¯ed in the fault tree
can be expanded further, however, we left this for future work. In the following chap-
ters, we construct safety cases that show all the undesired events have been considered,
controlled and perhaps mitigated in the formal program veri¯cation phase. This can
increase trust in using the formal program veri¯cation method to provide assurance for
the safety of the program.Chapter 3 Hazard Analysis for Formal Program Veri¯cation 51
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Figure 3.4: Fault Tree for Program Veri¯cationChapter 4
Property-Oriented Safety Cases
Chapter 4 presents an approach to systematically construct safety cases from information
collected during a formal safety certi¯cation of code, in particular from the construction
of the logical annotations necessary for a Hoare-style veri¯cation. Here, we describe the
structure of the safety cases that focus on demonstrating safety of the generated code
wrt. a given safety property. This chapter also presents the argument patterns for the
property-oriented safety cases.
4.1 Introduction
Formal methods such as formal program veri¯cation can in principle provide the highest
levels of assurance of code safety by providing formal proofs as explicit evidence for the
assurance claims. However, several problems remain, as described in Chapter 1, in par-
ticular for the use of program veri¯cation in auto-generated code. Here, we address these
problems and present an approach to systematically derive safety cases from information
collected during the formal program veri¯cation phase, in particular the construction of
the necessary logical annotations. In this chapter, our focus is on showing safety of the
program wrt. a given safety property. In Chapter 3, we have used a fault tree analysis
to identify possible risks to the program safety and the certi¯cation process, as well
as their interaction logic. We use the results of this analysis to guide the construction
of the safety cases, but their precise structure is derived from the construction of the
logical annotations, and re°ects the way in which the annotation inference has analyzed
the program. We instantiate our generic argument structure for code generated by Aut-
oFilter system [153] developed at NASA Ames. We then generalize this approach and
describe safety case patterns for the property-oriented safety cases.
In this chapter, we use the initialization-before-use safety property as running example,
but our framework can handle a variety of other safety properties, including absence
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of out-of-bounds array accesses [43]; we expect that other properties handled by proof-
carrying code such as null pointer dereferences [106] can be formalized easily. However,
we are not restricted to showing exception freedom but can also encode domain-speci¯c
properties such as matrix symmetry, measurement unit or coordinate frame consistency
(which requires signi¯cant proofs involving matrix algebra and functional correctness),
whose violation will not immediately cause a run-time exception but still renders the
code unsafe. These properties are called domain speci¯c properties because they only
apply in the domain of the code generator. For example, matrix symmetry applies to
the state estimation domain of the AutoFilter but not to the Guidance, Navigation, and
Control (GN&C) systems generated by Real-Time Workshop discussed in Chapter 5 and
6. The only assumption from the underlying certi¯cation framework that we use is that
the safety of the program can be expressed in terms of conditions on its variables.
AutoFilter: Synthesis of State Estimation Software. AutoFilter system is a
domain-speci¯c synthesis system that is implemented in SWI-Prolog [154]. It takes high
level speci¯cations of state estimation problems and derives code by repeating applica-
tion of schemas i.e., algorithms and solution methods of the domain [153]. The schemas
return the code fragment in AutoFilter's intermediate language. The code fragments
are formulated in an intermediate language that is essentially a \sanitized" variant of
C (e.g., neither pointers nor side-e®ects in expressions) but also contains a number of
higher-level domain-speci¯c constructs (e.g., vector or matrix operations, ¯nite sums,
and convergence loops) [50]. The code fragments resulting from the applications of the
individual schemas are assembled and the synthesizer will automatically generate and
translate code into the targeted platform, for instance C and Modula-2. The resulting
code uses variants of the Kalman ¯lter algorithm [31] that are appropriate for the spec-
i¯ed state estimation problem and typically comprises approximately 500-1500 lines of
code including auto-generated comments [50].
To support the automatic program veri¯cation, AutoFilter is extended with the standard
Hoare-style program veri¯cation components as described in Section 2.4.2. The formal
program veri¯cation works on the source code level to demonstrate that a program
meets the given safety property and remains safe during its execution. Figure 4.1 shows
the example of a code fragment and annotation generated by AutoFilter system from a
simpli¯ed model of the Crew Exploration Vehicle dynamics [42].
Initialization-Before-Use Safety. In this chapter, we show how to construct safety
cases for the initialization-before-use safety property, i.e., we check whether each variable
or individual array element has explicitly been assigned a value before it is used. In
general, in order to ensure a program is safe wrt. a safety property, the annotations
must formalize all pertinent information that is necessary for the ATP to prove that
all potentially unsafe locations are in fact safe. This information will be established
at some de¯nition location in the program and maintained along all control-°ow paths
to all the potentially unsafe locations, where it is used. For initialization-before-use,Chapter 4 Property-Oriented Safety Cases 55
4.2 Constructing Safety Cases for Demonstrating a Safety
Property
In our work, we consider each violation of the given safety property (e.g., use of an
uninitialized variable) by the generated code as a hazard. The purpose of the safety
cases here is to show that the safety property is in fact not violated and thus that the risk
associated with this hazard (as identi¯ed in Section 3.4) is controlled or mitigated and
can not lead to a system failure. The safety case makes explicit the formal and informal
reasoning principles, and reveals the top-level assumptions and external dependencies
that must be taken into account. It also provides information about why the generated
code can be assumed to be su±ciently safe. The structure of this argument is constructed
from information collected by the annotation inference algorithm. However, the evidence
still comes from the formal safety proofs.
We build a generic, multi-tiered argument and instantiate it with respect to a given
safety property and program. Its three tiers together constitute a single safety case that
justi¯es the safety of the program. The upper tier simply instantiates the notion of
safety and the formal de¯nitions for the given safety property; in particular, it explicitly
describes the context and constraints of the Hoare-style partial correctness proofs. The
two lower tiers argue the safety of the program as governed by the property. The lower
tiers are constructed individually to re°ect the program structure (i.e., the variables
and their relevant occurrences). This can be done systematically because their structure
directly follows the course the annotation construction takes through the program.
4.2.1 Tier I: Explaining the Safety Notion
Figure 4.2 shows the the top tier of the safety case. It starts with the top-level safety
goal (i.e., the safety of the generated code with respect to the safety property of in-
terest) and shows how this is achieved by a defensible argument based on the partial
correctness of the generated code. The argument stresses the meaning of the Hoare-style
framework, specialized to the given safety property. However, the argument structure
remains independent of the property. Here, contexts explain the informal interpretation
of key notions like \safe" and \safety property". Constraints outline limitations of the
approach, in particular, the fact that certi¯cation works on an intermediate representa-
tion of the source code and only shows a single property, e.g., initialization-before-use.
Hyperlinks can refer to additional evidence in the form of documents containing, for
example, the model from which the source code has been generated as an informal
description of the safety property.
The key strategy at this tier and its model (i.e., a Hoare-style partial correctness proof
using the dedicated proof rules of the init-before-use safety policy) as well as its limi-Chapter 4 Property-Oriented Safety Cases 58
of variables resp. occurrences. Each individual occurrence then leads to a subgoal to show
that the computed safety condition is valid at the location of the variable's occurrence.
This reduction to a formal proof obligation is justi¯ed by the soundness and completeness
of the safety policy; in addition, the speci¯c form of the safety condition is also justi¯ed.
Note that some of the root causes identi¯ed in the fault tree remain as assumptions in the
safety case (i.e., the list of variables and their occurrences are assumed to be complete).
However, these can be checked easily, e.g., by a simple program inspection, since they
require no deep analysis of the generated code; in fact, the check could be automated
easily. The safety case records this as a context to the strategy. Therefore, the argument
structure shown mitigates any doubts on the incomplete program veri¯cation coverage
(as shown in Figure 3.4, page 53).
4.2.3 Tier III: Su±ciency of Safety Condition
The ¯nal tier (see Figure 4.4 for the goal structure) argues the safety of each individ-
ual variable access, using a strategy based on establishing and maintaining appropriate
annotations. The purpose of the argument is to show that the undesirable events that
initiate E8 (primarily), and E4 and E6 (cf. Figure 3.4), have been controlled and miti-
gated. The argument structure directly re°ects the course the annotation inference has
taken through the code. The ¯rst subgoal is thus to show that the variable safety is estab-
lished on all paths leading to the current location, using an argument over all de¯nition
locations (the argument of this subgoal justi¯es that the undesired events E6.1, E6.1.1
and E6.1.2 (as shown in Figure 3.4, page 53) have been controlled). Here, the model for
the subgoal corresponds to the annotation schema that was applied during annotation
inference to identify the de¯nition. Each de¯nition thus leads to a corresponding subgoal
and then further to any number of VCs based on the strategy of the generation of the
VCs corresponding to the initialization location in the program, although here only a
single VC emerges in both cases. The proofs from these VCs demonstrate that the top
event identi¯ed in the hazard analysis does not occur for the given program.
The second subgoal of the top-level strategy here is to show that the established variable
safety is maintained along all paths. The argument of this subgoal justi¯es that the
undesired event of E6.2 (as shown in Figure 3.4, page 53) has been controlled. This
proceeds accordingly and the proofs of the VCs again demonstrate that the identi¯ed
top event is mitigated. The ¯nal subgoal is then to show that the variable safety implies
the validity of the safety condition. The argument of this subgoal justi¯es the undesired
events of E6.3 (as shown in Figure 3.4, page 53) has been controlled. This can again
lead to any number of VCs.
Note how goals that concern properties of the program (e.g., \xhatmin is safe") are
decomposed into subgoals that comprise program-independent tasks for the prover, i.e.,
VCs. The validity of the construction of the VCs depends on the soundness of the rules ofChapter 4 Property-Oriented Safety Cases 60
4.3.1 Safety Case Pattern: Explaining the Safety Notion
This pattern generalizes the safety argument for explaining the safety notion of the
program (as shown in the example in Figure 4.2). The main focus of the argument is to
describe the approach that was used in ensuring the safety of the program. It stresses
the meaning of the veri¯cation approach (i.e., Hoare-style framework), the contexts and
constraints of the approach. The structure of the arguments remain the same as shown
in the example Figure 4.2, but we generalize the contents of the safety case nodes.
The argument pattern can be customized for other programs and safety properties by
changing certain information such as the name of the safety property (i.e., hproperty-xi)
and the program (i.e., hmodule-xi) in the pattern. However, while the contents of some
pattern nodes are ¯xed (i.e., can be reused in new contexts or applications) but they
need to be further instantiated (such as labelled with triangle 4) or further developed
(such as labelled with diamond §). The link with ± describes the node that is optional
as it depends on the safety property. Tables 4.1 to 4.5 describe in details the safety case
pattern for explaining the safety notion.
4.3.2 Safety Case Pattern: Safety of Program Variables
This pattern generalizes the safety argument for arguing that the program safety can be
reduced to the safety of all program variables. The structure of the arguments remain the
same as shown in the example Figure 4.3, but we generalize the contents of the safety
case nodes. The argument pattern can be customized for other programs and safety
properties by changing certain information such as the de¯nition of safety wrt. the given
safety property (i.e., hproperty-xi), the program (i.e., hmodule-xi), the name of the
variable (i.e., hvar-xi), the location of the variable in the program (i.e., hloc-xi) and the
established safety condition (i.e., hsafety-condition-xi). However, the contents of some
pattern nodes are ¯xed (i.e., can be reused in new contexts or applications) but some of
them need to be further instantiated (labelled with triangle 4) and further developed
(labelled with diamond §). The link with ± describes the node that is optional as it
depends on a given safety property. Typically, semantic safety de¯nition is established
for the language speci¯c properties to give an explicit meaning of the properties. While
the link with ² describes the node that can be solved by zero or more instances as the
number of subgoals and strategies are program-speci¯c and re°ect the program structure.
The safety argument here can be constructed systematically from information collected
during the formal veri¯cation of the code. Tables 4.6 to 4.8 describe in details the safety
case pattern for arguing safety of program variables.Chapter 4 Property-Oriented Safety Cases 61
4.3.3 Safety Case Pattern: Su±ciency of Safety Condition
This pattern generalizes the safety argument for that the safety conditions hold. The
overall structure of the arguments remain the same as shown in the example Figure 4.4,
but we generalize the contents of the safety case nodes. The argument pattern can be
customized for other programs, safety properties and safety conditions by changing cer-
tain information such as the established safety condition (i.e., hsafety-condition-xi), the
line of code (i.e., hloc-xi), the variable (i.e., hvar-xi), the de¯nition location (i.e., hde°oc-
xi), the annotation schema that was applied during annotation inference to identify the
de¯nition (i.e., hannotation-schemai) and the VCs constructed for the corresponding def-
inition, maintenance and implication of variable safety (i.e., hvc-xi). The generalization
of the structure follows the same principle as described in Section 4.3.2. Tables 4.9 to
4.11 describe in details the safety case pattern for arguing su±ciency of safety condition.
4.4 Conclusions
We believe that formal methods such as formal software safety certi¯cation can provide
the highest level of assurance of the code's safety. However, neither the methods by
themselves nor the formal proofs they entail are a panacea, and it is important to make
explicit which claims are actually proven, and on which assumptions and reasoning prin-
ciples both the claim and the proof rest. Therefore, in this chapter, we have described
an approach to construct safety cases demonstrating the code`s compliance with a spec-
i¯ed safety property, using information collected during the automated construction of
the logical annotations necessary for a Hoare-style veri¯cation. The safety case argues
both the safety of the applied framework and the program. For the latter, the under-
lying argumentation structure is derived from the course the annotation inference has
taken through the code. We also have constructed safety case patterns that are generic
wrt. a given safety property. Each pattern addresses a decomposition step of the safety
argument for the property-oriented safety cases.
In our work, we show that assurance is not implied by the trust in the generator but fol-
lows from an explicitly constructed argument for the generated code. We illustrate our
approach on code generated by AutoFilter system [153] and use initialization-before-use
safety as a running example, but our approach in principle is independent of the under-
lying generator and program. The same technique can be applied to other generators
as the underlying annotation inference algorithm has also been applied to code gen-
erated from Simulink models using Real-Time Workshop. However, safety of program
wrt. a given safety property only is insu±cient, as some requirements cannot easily be
expressed as safety property. Therefore, in the next chapter, we extend our work to
construct safety cases from a given safety requirement.Chapter 5
Requirement-Oriented Safety
Cases
Chapter 5 describes an approach to systematically construct safety cases that show
safety of a program wrt. a given safety requirement. This chapter also presents the
argument patterns for the safety requirement. In contrast to Chapter 4, the structure of
the safety argument here is driven by a user-speci¯ed set of formal safety assumptions
and requirements rather than a ¯xed safety property, but the information for the safety
case construction still comes from the same formal analysis of automatically generated
code.
5.1 Introduction
In our work, we use Hoare-style program veri¯cation as the underlying veri¯cation ap-
proach. It can handle not only the safety properties considered in the previous chapter
but other types of requirements as well. In this chapter, we exploit this and use the
AutoCert system (i.e., the same system as in Chapter 4) to formally verify that the gen-
erated program is safe wrt. a given set of safety requirements and we construct safety
cases that correspond to this more general veri¯cation style. We use two requirements
on the components of a spacecraft guidance, navigation, and control (GN&C) subsys-
tem as our running example here and in the next chapter. We thus next brie°y describe
the GN&C domain and the requirements before we discuss the di®erence between the
property-oriented and the requirement-oriented veri¯cation approach.
Guidance, Navigation, and Control Systems. Spacecraft are typically decom-
posed into a number of di®erent systems such as the power, thermal protection, or
GN&C systems [114, 148]. Figure 5.1 illustrates the decomposition of the spacecraft
into systems. The GN&C system is a necessary element of every spacecraft. Here, we
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Figure 5.1: Spacecraft Decomposition (adapted from [114, 148])
focus on the navigation subsystem within the GN&C system. It is used to determine a
spacecraft's orientation and position. The navigation subsystem contains, among of oth-
ers, three sub-subsystems or components, a decision logic that computes a status value
irrelevant to the requirements considered here, a frame conversion and a state determi-
nation component. The frame conversion ¯rst converts the frames of reference of the
incoming signals from a vehicle-based coordinate system to an earth-based coordinate
system. The transformations of the coordinate systems are usually done by converting
quaternions to direction cosine matrices (DCMs), applying some matrix algebra, and
then converting them back to quaternions [114, 148]. The state determination then per-
forms the calculations to determine the vehicle state (position, attitude, attitude rate,
etc.) from these signals. It is de¯ned in terms of the relevant physical equations.
Code generators typically allow users to choose between \°at" and \structured" out-
puts, i.e., to choose whether the components' code is inlined into the main program, or
wrapped to separate functions or modules. Here we ignore any internal structure that
the navigation subsystem might have, and we assume that all components are \inlined".
We defer the handling of model structure to Chapter 6.
Formalization of the Requirements. In our example, we consider the navigation
subsystem of the GN&C system as part of an overall spacecraft system. We assume
that a hazard analysis of the overall system has identi¯ed the system hazards and that
a fault tree analysis has attributed them to the corresponding subsystems, for example
uncovering that the spacecraft can get into an unsafe state if the signal vel2 is not
representing a velocity measurement in the right frame (i.e., ECI). Based on the results of
the fault tree analysis, the safety requirements on the subsystem can then be formulated;
however, in this thesis we assume the safety requirements as given. Here and in the next
chapter we concentrate on the following two safety requirements:
1. Signal quat3 is a quaternion representing a transformation from the Earth-Centered
Inertial (ECI) frame to the body ¯xed frame; and
2. Signal vel2 is a velocity in the ECI frame.Chapter 5 Requirement-Oriented Safety Cases 75
Since we are working with a formal, logic-based analysis framework, we need to formalize
these requirements using a domain theory, as follows:
1.'quat3 :: quat(ECI;Body)
2.'vel2 :: vel(ECI)
Here, ECI and Body are constants denoting the respective frames, quat and vel are
functions denoting transformations of or quantities in those frames, and :: is a predicate
that asserts that the signal represents a transformation between (resp. quantity in) the
required frame(s).
Obviously, the formalization of the safety requirements is safety-relevant: a wrong for-
malization can invalidate the assurance provided by the proofs [26, 100]. It thus needs
to be called out and justi¯ed in the safety case.
Here, the safety requirements result from the hazard analysis of the system. The safety
requirements can also be considered as requirements on the system/software boundary.
Therefore, the use of fault tree analysis is more suitable with respect to this situation
than software fault tree analysis (SFTA). SFTA [94, 96, 97] is an approach to trace
behavior in the code logic and identify whether a path exists that could cause hazardous
output. SFTA is only concerned with the safety of the internal code logic which is not
su±cient here as we also need to ensure that the safety requirements hold at a particular
location in the program.
Safety Property vs Safety Requirement. A safety property is an invariant that
needs to hold everywhere in the program. In contrast, a safety requirement is an assertion
that needs to hold at particular location in the program (typically at the end), and thus
has more of a liveness \°avor". Safety properties typically also apply to all variables
(or at least to all variables of a given type) in a program (cf. the de¯nition of the
initialization-before-use property), while safety requirements are usually formulated over
a single variable, as in our running examples. In order to ensure that a program is safe,
we usually need to show that it satis¯es a set of both safety properties and safety
requirements.
The validity of the safety requirement on each variable typically depends on the safety
requirements of other variables (see example in Figure 5.2), in contrast to the situation
for safety properties. Therefore, in the safety cases we need to construct an argument
that re°ects this dependency. Moreover, the requirements on some variables are not
established by the program but are given as external assumptions which have to be relied
on in showing program safety, and the safety case needs to call out this dependency as
well.Chapter 5 Requirement-Oriented Safety Cases 76
In addition, the correct formalization of a safety property can be inspected and accepted
o®-line, i.e., independently of the programs, but the formalization of the safety require-
ment depends on the structure of the actual requirement itself. Therefore, we need
to construct an argument that shows the transition from the informal representation
to the formalized safety requirement. This argument helps in showing that the formal
veri¯cation runs over the correct requirement, based on the right formula and variable,
and thus provides a relevant proof of the program. However, the certi¯cation of safety
requirements does not require a dedicated safety policy, because all safety-relevant infor-
mation is re°ected in the annotations, so the safety cases do not need to argue that its
formalization of safety policy is adequate (cf. GP1 in the safety case pattern described in
Section 4.3.1). Note that the annotations still remain untrusted, as any errors in them
will make it impossible to prove the ¯nal VCs, and thus to show that the requirement
holds.
5.2 Constructing Safety Cases for Demonstrating a Safety
Requirement
We consider the safety requirements as given, and consider each violation of any given
safety requirement as a hazard. The constructed safety case will argue that the safety
requirement is in fact not violated at the given location. The core argument structure of
these requirement-oriented safety cases is driven by the same formal program analysis
as used for the property-oriented safety cases and thus similar. The main di®erence
in the argument structure is in showing the validity of the safety requirement, i.e., in
terms of formalization of the requirement, and in showing the dependency on the safety
requirements of other variables. In particular, the validity of each safety requirement
typically relies on the validity and consistency of a given set of external assumptions in
the input variables, which is not the case in the property-oriented safety cases.
Similar to the overall approach in Chapter 4, we construct a generic, requirement-
oriented safety case that makes explicit the formal and informal reasoning principles,
and reveals the top-level assumptions and external dependencies that must be taken into
account in demonstrating program safety wrt. a given safety requirement. We instantiate
the generic safety case to code generated for NASA's Project Constellation, which uses
Real-Time Workshop for its GN&C systems, and focus on the ¯rst requirement given
on page 78 as an example, but our framework can handle other safety requirements as
well. We again use the GSN [86] as technique to explicitly represent the linkage between
evidence (i.e., formal proofs) and safety claims.Chapter 5 Requirement-Oriented Safety Cases 77
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Figure 5.2: Arguing over Formalization of Safety RequirementChapter 5 Requirement-Oriented Safety Cases 78
5.2.1 Arguing over Formalization of Safety Requirement
Figure 5.2 shows a safety case that argues over safety of the program wrt. all safety
requirements as identi¯ed during the hazard analysis of the overall navigation system.
The main di®erence in the argument of the safety requirements in comparison to the
safety property is the need to argue over the formalization of the requirement and the
properties of all variables on which the formalized requirement relies upon. However, the
overall argument is still based on the Hoare-style argument, as in the property-oriented
safety case.
The requirement-oriented safety case starts with the primary safety goal that the pro-
gram (i.e., Nav.cpp) satis¯es all safety requirements, given a set of external assumptions
on the input variables, by providing formal proof as evidence. The key argument strat-
egy here is to argue separately over each individual requirement that contributes to
the program safety. The additional information that is required for the strategy to be
understood and valid is identi¯ed and explained. This concerns the independent va-
lidity of the safety requirements and the logical consistency of the given external and
any derived internal assumptions, which are both key to the strategy of arguing the
requirements independently. We thus assume that no safety requirement is available for
use as a (logical) assumption in the safety proofs, which prevents vacuous proofs based
on mutually recursive dependencies between requirements and assumptions. We further
assume that the given and derived assumptions together are consistent, again to prevent
vacuous proofs. Each of these assumptions on the strategy is described by a context
(e.g., the consistency of the assumptions can be checked by theorem prover and the use
of the requirements by a requirement inspection). Context nodes with hyperlinks out-
line additional evidence in the form of documents, containing, for example, a detailed
description of the system and requirement, and also the result of the hazard analysis. As
a result of this strategy we now get as many subgoals as there are safety requirements
that have been identi¯ed during the hazard analysis. Here we focus on the goal (R1)
corresponding to the ¯rst requirement, i.e., that quat3 is a quaternion representing a
transformation from the Earth-Centered Inertial (ECI) frame to the body ¯xed frame.
The argument over each individual requirement is then split into two branches, ¯rst
showing the correct formalization and localization of the requirement, and second, ar-
guing over a formal proof of the requirement. The second branch is in some sense the
main branch, since its argument structure is close to the program. Here, the ¯rst branch
is a backing evidence to the second branch, which could be represented as an away goal.
However, we again choose to represent the argument as shown in Figure 5.2 since the
validity of the formal proofs depends crucially on the correct formalization and localiza-
tion of the requirement. The ¯rst branch describes the transition from the informal level
to a formalized safety requirement. This argument helps in showing that the formal ver-
i¯cation runs over the correct requirement, based on the right formula and variable, andChapter 5 Requirement-Oriented Safety Cases 79
thus provides a relevant proof of the program. It also justi¯es that the identi¯ed hazard
E1 (see Figure 3.4, page 53) has been controlled. We use an explicit strategy to describe
this transition, which spawns two subgoals. The ¯rst subgoal (F1) demonstrates that the
formal proof is based on an appropriate formalization of the requirement, and the safety
case points to the documentation of the logical domain theory as evidence of this. The
second subgoal (L1) \glues together" the model level and the code level, which describes
the localization of the requirement, i.e., the mapping process between the variable name
in the program to the corresponding signal in the model. The correctness of the name
mapping information can easily be checked in the source code by the reviewer.
Once the correct formalization and localization of the requirement has been shown, the
further argument is to show that the formalized requirement (e.g., Quat3::quat(ECI,
Body) is the appropriate formalization of R1) holds for Nav.cpp. This can be achieved
by an argument based on a formal proof of the safety requirement using the minimum
set of external certi¯cation assumptions relevant to the requirement. Since not all given
assumptions of the program are used in deriving the proofs of each requirement, a list
of the used external assumptions is given with each requirement. The purpose of the
argument is to justify that all assumptions that are relevant and su±cient in showing
the program safety wrt. a given requirement have been considered (i.e., correct list of
external assumptions). This is also helps in identifying external assumptions that are
entirely irrelevant, i.e., do not contribute to any of the given safety requirements.
Assuming that the argument has correctly identi¯ed all relevant external assumptions
related to the formalized requirement, the further argument is to show that relevant
properties of all variables on which the formalized requirement directly or indirectly
depends, are valid. Here, the argument strategy relies on the assumptions that the
calculus is sound, that its implementation is correct, that no variables are missing, and
that the list of the dependent variables given is correct. The latter two assumptions
(i.e., no missing variables and correct list of dependent variable) can be checked easily
by the program inspection, which thus eliminate doubts about the incomplete program
coverage (i.e., E2, E2.1, E2.2 and E2.3 in Figure 3.4, page 53) of the program veri¯cation.
However, they are also discharged implicitly, along the way of the Hoare-style argument,
since any omissions and errors in these lists will lead to unprovable VCs (assuming the
soundness of the calculus and the correctness of its implementation). Note that the
number of subgoals of the strategy S3 corresponds to the number of the variables on
which the requirement directly and indirectly depends. In our example, Quat3 is the
main variable of the given safety requirement R1, while Quat2 is a variable on which
Quat3 relies in showing its requirement holds in the program. Due to the dependency
relation between Quat3 and Quat2, any inconsistency in showing the safety requirement
of Quat2 can invalidate the argument showing the safety requirement on Quat3, which
is described as a justi¯cation that is attached to the goal GD2. Note that in this
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assumption (i.e., to the system) to the previous strategy S2, so the argument below GD2
can appeal to this and only needs to show that the program maintains it through to the
relevant occurrences. Subsequently, the safety requirement for each individual variable,
for example Quat3, is then shown by arguing over its all relevance occurrences in the
program, Nav.cpp. This reduces the original safety argument to a program veri¯cation
problem, showing that a speci¯c property holds of a speci¯c locations in the program.
Note that the number of subgoals of this strategy is corresponds to the number of
variable occurrences as identi¯ed during the course the annotation construction takes
through the program. The further argument is shown in the next section.
5.2.2 Su±ciency of Safety Conditions for Individual Variables
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single location, lines #65-67 
 
Assumption: Complete list of 
VCs 
Assumption: Complete list of 
paths  
Goal: Conditions from all paths 
together imply required property 
 
Goal: Sufficient conditions are 
established on all paths to this location 
 
Goal: Sufficient conditions are 
maintained on all paths to this location 
 
Strategy: Argument over 
establishment, maintenance 
and sufficiency of conditions 
 
Strategy: Argument over 
establishment of 
conditions on each path  
 
Strategy: Argument over 
maintenance of 
conditions on each path   
 
A 
Goal: quat(ECI, Body) is 
established for Quat3 at 
line #288 
 
Strategy: Proof of 
VCs corresponding 
to line #288 
 
Goal: VC #12 is proven  Goal: VC #17 is proven 
Model: Annotation 
schema dcm_to_quat 
Goal: quat(ECI, Body) is 
established with for 
Quat3 at line #320 
 
Goal: VC #4 is 
proven 
 
Goal: quat(ECI, 
Body) is 
maintained for 
Quat3 on path #1 
Goal: quat(ECI, 
Body) is 
maintained for 
Quat3 on path #2 
Goal: VC #29 is proven 
Context: def-use-paths =  
get the variable safety information 
from definitions to uses 
 
Strategy: Proof of 
VCs over 
conjunction of all 
paths  
 
Strategy: Proof 
of VCs for   
#1 
 
Figure 5.3: Arguing over Su±ciency of Safety Conditions for Individual Variables
The further argument for showing the safety requirement for each variable (i.e., Quat3
and Quat2) is focused on showing that su±cient conditions on the variables are es-
tablished and maintained on all paths to the location and that the conditions from all
paths together establish the stated safety requirement. Typically, each path establishes
the complete safety requirement, so that the last goal becomes trivial, but this is not
necessarily the case. Figure 5.3 shows an example of a safety case that argues safety
of variable Quat3 in Nav.cpp. We concentrate on Quat3 as an example as the same
underlying argument structure can be applied for Quat2 as well. The overall argument
structure for this safety case follows the \Su±ciency of Safety Condition" pattern as de-
¯ned in Section 4.3.3. The safety case can be derived systematically and automatically
as the argument structure directly re°ects the course the annotation inference has takenChapter 5 Requirement-Oriented Safety Cases 81
through the code, as already described in Section 4.3.3.
The argument for the variable Quat3 proceeds accordingly, as described in the pattern,
which thus leads to a number of VCs. Here, the VCs are used to demonstrate that
the conditions are established and maintained on all paths leading to the appropriate
location and that the conditions from all paths imply the safety requirement. If (and
only if) all VCs can be shown to hold, then the requirement holds for the given location.
Each branch thus ends again with a goal to prove a set of VCs, which reduces the
program veri¯cation argument to a purely logical proof argument.
5.3 Safety Case Patterns for Requirement-Oriented Safety
Cases
Similar to the approach taken for safety properties, we can now de¯ne safety case pat-
terns that generalizes the structure of the requirement-oriented safety case. The patterns
are generic and customizable for arguing safety of program wrt. all given safety require-
ments (i.e., for arguing that the software satis¯es all given safety requirements). The
information for the safety case construction in these patterns can be derived by a formal
program analysis. Some of the texts in the patterns are ¯xed and some of them need to
be further instantiated.
5.3.1 Safety Case Pattern: Formalization of Safety Requirement
The pattern generalizes the safety case for showing the safety of the program wrt. all
given requirements as identi¯ed during the hazard analysis of the overall system. The
key argument strategy is to argue program safety wrt. each individual safety requirement
by showing that the formalization and localization of the requirement is correct and by
providing formal proofs as evidence. The structure of the argument remains the same
as shown in the example in Figure 5.2, but we generalize the contents of the safety
case nodes. The argument pattern can be customized for other programs and safety
requirements by changing certain information labelled in h i, which can be derived from
the formal program analysis such as the information about the safety requirement (i.e.,
hreq-xi) and its formal representation (i.e., hformalreq-xi), the program (i.e., hmodule-
xi) and the safety requirement to be shown for the program (i.e., hformalproperty-
xi). The contents of some of the pattern nodes are ¯xed (i.e., can be reused in new
contexts or applications) but some of them need to be further instantiated (labelled
with a triangle 4) and further development (labelled with a diamond §). The link
model with ² describes a node that can be solved by zero or more instances. The
subgoals and strategies here are requirement-speci¯c (i.e., re°ect the number of the
safety requirements as identi¯ed during the hazard analysis of the system). Tables 5.1Chapter 5 Requirement-Oriented Safety Cases 82
to 5.5 describe in details the safety case pattern for arguing safety of program wrt. all
given safety requirements.
5.3.2 Safety Case Pattern: Su±ciency of Safety Conditions for Indi-
vidual Variables
The motivation for the argument on individual variables is the need to show that suf-
¯cient conditions on each variable are established and maintained on all paths to the
identi¯ed location and that this is strong enough to imply the safety requirement. This
pattern identi¯es three main claims which must be satis¯ed, i.e., the conditions are es-
tablished on all paths, the conditions are maintained on all paths, and the conditions
from all paths imply the safety requirement. The overall argument structure here fol-
lows the same lines of the safety case pattern as described in Section 4.3.3 with small
modi¯cations; in particular, the notion of safety condition is replaced by that of safety
requirement.
5.4 Conclusions
In order to ensure that the program is safe, we usually need to show that the program
satis¯es both, general safety properties and speci¯c safety requirements. In the previous
chapter, we have developed safety cases that argue along safety of the generated code wrt.
a given safety property. In addition, in this chapter, we have constructed safety cases for
showing safety of the generated code wrt. a set of externally given safety requirements.
We use the same underlying Hoare-style program veri¯cation as in Chapter 4 to verify
the program safety. Here, the formal program veri¯cation analyzes the system structure
on the code level to identify where the requirements are ultimately established, and so
checks the code, providing independent assurance. We have also constructed a safety
case pattern that is generic wrt. a given set of safety requirements.
The overall argument of the requirement-oriented safety cases is focused on showing the
correct formalization of the safety requirement (i.e., the transition from the informal
representation of the requirement to the formalized safety requirement) and the validity
of the safety requirements for each dependent variable. We make explicit the formal and
informal reasoning principles, and reveal the top-level assumptions and external depen-
dencies (i.e., between the requirement and the given external assumptions) that must
be taken into account in demonstrating the program safety, and use formal proofs as
evidence. We illustrated our approach using the veri¯cation of a safety requirement for
a spacecraft navigation system that was generated from a Simulink model by Real-Time
Workshop [4]. However, since each system safety requirement induces a slice of the sys-
tem architecture, it is also important to identify how the system safety requirements areChapter 6
Architecture-Oriented Safety
Cases
Chapter 6 presents an approach to systematically derive safety cases that argue along the
hierarchical structure of systems in model-based development. The underlying analysis
used in the previous chapter can also be used to recover the system structure and
component hierarchy from the code, which is then turned into a safety case providing
independent assurance of both code and model.
6.1 Introduction
Model-based development and automated code generation are increasingly used for ac-
tual production code, in particular in mathematical and engineering domains. However,
since code generators are typically not quali¯ed, there is no guarantee that their output
is correct or even safe, and additional evidence of its safety is required. In the pre-
vious chapter, we have constructed requirement-oriented safety cases from information
collected during the formal veri¯cation of the generated code. In this chapter, we ex-
tend that work to an approach to systematically derive safety cases that argue along
the hierarchical structure of systems in model-based development. The safety cases
are constructed mechanically using the same underlying formal analysis such as in the
requirement-oriented safety cases. This is driven by a set of formal safety requirements
on the model which express as logical formulas of the properties that the (software sub-)
system's output signals must satisfy for the (overall) system to be safe. The original
analysis is extended to recover and record the system structure and component hierarchy
from the code. It identi¯es how the system safety requirements are broken down into
component requirements, and where they are ultimately established, thus establishing
a hierarchy of requirements that is aligned with the hierarchical model structure. The
derived safety cases re°ect the results of the analysis, and provide a high-level argument
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Figure 6.1: High-level Architecture of Navigation System
that traces the requirements on the model via the inferred system structure to the code,
and hence, providing independent assurance of both code and model. We illustrate
our work using the veri¯cation information of two safety requirements of a spacecraft
navigation system that was generated from a Simulink model by Real-Time Workshop
[4].
Navigation Subsystem. As already sketched in Chapter 5, the Navigation subsystem
is comprised of three sub-subsystems or components, a decision logic, frame conversion
and state determination. Here we consider the frame conversion and state determination
components only, since the decision logic is irrelevant to our requirements. However, we
left it in the model to show that the analysis identi¯es it as such. Note that there are
no individual blocks within the Navigation subsystem, but only within the components
and thus all computation happens there. Hence, we assume now (in contrast to Chapter
5) that the code generator keeps the hierarchical model structure in the code. We give a
much simpli¯ed description of the subsystem; in particular, we have changed the names
of components and signals. However, it should become clear that the navigation domain
is challenging from a safety perspective, due to its complex and mathematical nature.
In the following we simplify the description by denoting Navigation as a \system" rather
than a \subsystem" and Frame Conversion and State Determination as \components"
rather than \sub-subsystems". However, both components are speci¯ed by independent
models, so that we indeed work with a proper model hierarchy.
The Navigation system (cf. Figure 6.1 for the system architecture) takes several input
signals, representing various physical quantities, and computes output signals represent-Chapter 6 Architecture-Oriented Safety Cases 90
ing quantities, such as Mach number, angular velocity, position in the Earth-Centered
Inertial (ECI) frame, and so on. Signals are generally represented as °oating point num-
bers or as quaternions and have an associated physical unit and/or frame of reference.
However, the units and frames are usually not made explicit in the model, and instead
are expressed informally in comments and identi¯er names.
Architecture Recovery. We concentrate on the same safety requirements (i.e., signal
quat3 is a quaternion representing a transformation from the the Earth-Centered Inertial
(ECI) frame to the body ¯xed frame, and signal vel2 is a velocity in the ECI frame) as
described in Chapter 5, page 78. In order to certify these requirements on the Navigation
system, and to build a comprehensible safety case, we need to know where in the system
they are established, and which parts of the system contribute to them. Intuitively,
we can see in the system architecture (cf. Figure 6.1) that the ¯rst requirement should
be established by Frame Conversion, since the signal quat3 comes straight out of that
component (and similarly for vel2 and State Determination in the case of the second
requirement). However, this too simplistic view is not su±cient. First, without looking
into the models corresponding to the components it is not clear whether the requirement
is indeed established within a component, or simply passed through it (as it is for example
the case with alt), and which of the component's input signals (if any), or more precisely
which assumptions on them, are used in establishing the requirement. However, simply
expanding the component models destroys the hierarchical structure of the system. More
importantly, the safety of the system ultimately depends on the safety of the code rather
than the model, but because we cannot trust the code generator to translate the model
correctly we cannot derive any trust from the model.
Instead, AutoCert analyzes the code and recovers the slice of the system architecture that
is relevant to a given safety requirement. AutoCert records when the control °ow based
analysis enters respectively leaves a component (implemented by RTW as a parameter-
free procedure), and then remove the part of the requirements-de¯nition chain that is
contained within the component. The key to obtaining precise architecture slices is
to identify situations in which the control °ow path just passes through a component,
without encountering a de¯nition. In these cases, we can ignore the component alto-
gether. AutoCert then assembles the slices from the signals involved in the recorded
requirements-de¯nitions chains and from the retained component. Note that the recov-
ered architecture slices are not based on the call graph (even though the analysis follows
the control °ow graph) but on the implicit data°ow. They are thus very similar to
the also data°ow-based Simulink models from which the code was originally generated.
The main di®erence is that the slices use the generated variable names (here simpli¯ed
to capitalized versions of the corresponding signal names) while the model of course
uses the signal names. This analysis is integrated into AutoCert's annotation inference
algorithm, and the safety cases we construct require this information as input.
Figure 6.2 shows the architecture slices recovered for both requirements. In both cases,Chapter 6 Architecture-Oriented Safety Cases 91
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Figure 6.2: Architecture Slices Recovered for Example Requirements
the irrelevant Decision Logic component has been removed by the analysis. For the ¯rst
requirement, it has further identi¯ed that Quat3 is una®ected by the call to the State
Determination procedure, and consequently removed that component as well. For the
second requirement, the analysis has identi¯ed Quat4 as the (global) variable through
which the two components communicate. In addition, (although not shown in Fig-
ure 6.2), it has derived the property placed as an assumption on this variable by State
Determination, i.e., Quat4 :: quat(NED;Body). This becomes a subordinate require-
ment to the original safety requirement, re°ecting the hierarchical model structure. The
requirements hierarchy is completed by the assumptions placed on the variables i.e.,
Vel1 and i.e., Quat2 corresponding to the components' input signals.
The property derived for Quat4 also becomes part of the interfaces of both components
that are connected through this link, as assumption on the target end (i.e., State De-
termination) and as safety requirement on the source end (i.e., Frame Conversion). By
regrouping the analysis results by component rather than by original safety requirement,
we thus obtain full component interfaces. They give a complete functional speci¯cation
of the component, including all assumptions, as far as it is required to satisfy the given
system-level safety requirements. The interfaces also serve as starting point for verify-
ing the components independently, hence allowing a compositional veri¯cation of the
system which makes it easier to scale the approach to larger systems. Currently, we
only consider nominal component behavior, but our approach could also be applied to
the o®-nominal case, provided that appropriate safety requirements for the o®-nominal
modes can be identi¯ed.
The recovered system architecture and requirements hierarchy already constitute a core
safety argument: Navigation satis¯es the safety requirement (2') if the components
Frame Conversion and State Determination satisfy their respective interfaces, and the
requirements for Vel1, Quat2, and Quat4 hold. This argument can serve as blueprint for
a full-°edged safety case. In addition, the derived component interfaces serve as starting
points for the construction of independent safety cases for the components, yielding a
hierarchy of safety cases that is aligned with the system's hierarchy of models.Chapter 6 Architecture-Oriented Safety Cases 92
6.2 Constructing Safety Cases from the Formal Analysis
of Hierarchical Systems
We now describe (in simpli¯ed form) the safety cases derived from the information pro-
vided by the formal analysis of hierarchical systems. Their root goal is to show that
the system satis¯es the given safety requirements. The safety cases represent knowledge
about the system's architecture and tracing information between code and model. This
structural information needs to be passed down to and processed by the formal veri-
¯cation phase, because it can directly in°uence the construction of the core argument
of the safety case. We then describe the hierarchical structure of the safety cases and
show how they are derived systematically from information uncovered by the analysis
phase. The resulting safety cases provide a traceable safety argument that shows in
particular where the code, subsystem, and system depend on any internal and external
assumptions. As before, we use the GSN [86] as technique to explicitly represent the
logical °ow of the safety argument.
6.2.1 Arguing from System-Level Safety Requirements to Component-
Level Safety Requirements
The key argument strategy remains the same as in the non-hierarchical case, i.e., we
still argue over each individual requirement that contributes to the program safety.
The top level argument of the safety case thus follows the same lines as the top level
argument strategy (SR1) in Figure 5.2, page 81. However, here we focus on the goal
(R2) corresponding to the second requirement, i.e., showing that vel2 is a velocity in the
ECI frame, because this induces a more interesting slice of the system architecture (cf.
Figure 6.3).
As described in Section 5.2.1, the next step of the argument uses two strategies, ¯rst,
arguing the transitions from the informal level to a formalized safety requirement (SF2)
which spawns two subgoals and second, arguing over a formal proof of the requirement
(S2) which leads to one subgoal. The ¯rst leg of the argument (i.e., SF2) is the backing
evidence for the second leg of the argument (i.e., S2) which in turn could be represented
as away goal. The ¯rst subgoal (F2) of strategy (SF2) demonstrates that the formal proof
is based on an appropriate formalization of the requirement, and the second subgoal (L2)
of strategy (SF2) combines the model level and the code level, which allows us to build
a safety case for the model based on the analysis of the code. In particular, as discussed
in the paragraph describing the architecture recovery (page 95), we need to show the
mapping between the signal names used in the model and the corresponding variable
names used in the source code, which cannot be recovered by our analysis but must
be given externally. Here, the safety case points to the mapping information given in
the source code, and that it has been checked by a reviewer, as evidence. In addition,Chapter 6 Architecture-Oriented Safety Cases 93
at this goal we also have to show the mapping between the model and code ¯les, and
in particular, in which code ¯le the property formalized in (F2) has to be shown. In
our example, the localization mapping is straightforward, but for larger systems this
localization needs more evidence.
With the assumption that the results of (F2) and (L2) are the appropriate formalization
of the requirement, we can now construct the subgoal (FR2) of the strategy (S2), which
states that the fully formalized safety requirement Vel2:: vel (ECI) holds after execu-
tion of the code in Nav.cpp. This requirement eventually needs to be proven formally,
which can be achieved by compositional veri¯cation based on the Navigation system
architecture. However, at this level of abstraction, the safety case does not contain an
argument based on the full formal proofs. Instead, and in contrast to Chapter 5, we
use an argument based on the system architecture, or more precisely, on the recovered
system architecture slices. It shows how the system-level requirements are broken down
into the component-level requirements i.e., into properties of the part of the system that
is relevant to satisfy the requirement (FR2). This is based on an assumption to the
strategy that the formal analysis has identi¯ed all relevant components and signals.
We thus reduce (FR2) to a number of (delayed) subgoals for the components and signals
in the architecture slice. For each component, we need to show that it satis¯es the safety
requirements speci¯ed in its inferred interface (cf. subgoals (C1) and (C2)). This induces
a further assumption on the strategy, namely that the interface is strong enough to show
the requirement (FR2). Delaying the subgoals allows us to reuse the component-level
safety cases. This way, we achieve a hierarchical structure for the system safety case
that mirrors the hierarchy embedded in the system architecture. If the system contains
top-level blocks in addition to the components (which is not the case in our example), we
need to reason about their properties as well. This is indicated by the dashed subgoal
(TLB). For each variable representing a signal, we need to show that it satis¯es the
safety requirements derived by the analysis (cf. subgoals (S1) to (S5)). This guarantees
that the components' assumptions are met.
These subgoals are delayed here as well, to keep the safety case compact. Their expanded
structure again follows the lines of Chapter 4, and in particular uses the argumentation
shown in Figure 4.4 (Tier III) of the safety case there with small modi¯cations; in partic-
ular, the notion of safety condition needs to be replaced by that of safety requirement.
Note that we make no distinction at this level between subgoals that are established
by the components, such as (S2), and those that are reduced to assumptions about the
system's input signals and thus have trivial formal proofs, e.g., (S4).Chapter 6 Architecture-Oriented Safety Cases 94
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Figure 6.3: Arguing from System-Level Requirements to Component-Level Require-
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6.2.2 Arguing from Component-Level Safety Requirements to Source
Code
In the next step of our hierarchical development, we argue about the safety of the
components wrt. their identi¯ed interfaces. The component-level safety cases also argue
about a set of requirements, but there are two signi¯cant di®erences to the system-level
safety cases. First, the component-level requirements are already formalized, due to
the use of the formal analysis, so that we do not need to argue about the safety of the
formalization and localization any more. Second, the argument will generally go down
to the level of the generated code, with the proofs of the VCs as evidence; obviously,
however, another layer of hierarchy is introduced if a component contains further (sub-
system) components.
Figure 6.4 shows the safety case for the Frame Conversion component. For each com-
ponent, the strategy is to argue over each individual safety requirement stated in its
interface. Here, we have two requirements, (FC1) and (FC2). They serve di®erent
purposes in the system-level safety case|(FC1) is used to discharge the (essentially
identical) system-level goal (FR1) via (C1), while (FC2) is used to discharge the signal
subgoal (S2)|but at the component level we treat them the same. We focus on (FC2)
here.
The component interfaces also list the assumptions that the component itself makes
about the environment. However, not all assumptions are used for all requirements, so
we use an explicit strategy to argue only using the minimal set of external assumptions,
i.e., those on the system's input signals. Note that the use of internal assumptions (e.g.,
on Quat4), which have been identi¯ed as subgoals in the system-level safety case (cf.
subgoal (S2) in Figure 6.3) will be made explicit further down in the component-level
safety case.
The next strategy ¯nally transitions from the safety argument to a program correctness
proof, using a Hoare-style argument over all relevant occurrences of the variable. In this
case, it leads to a single subgoal, proving that the safety requirement holds at the given
source location. This is predicated on the assumption that the applied Hoare-calculus is
sound, and that the VCG is implemented correctly, which need to be justi¯ed elsewhere
(cf. Figure 4.2 Tier I of the safety case presented in Chapter 4). The structure of the
Hoare-style argument is determined by the structure of the program. Since the rest of
the safety case is constructed as described in Chapter 4 Section 4.2.4, we do not expand
here the ¯nal goal any further. Showing the safety of the component is thus reduced
to formally showing the validity of the VCs associated with each requirement in the
interface: a program is considered safe wrt. a given safety requirement if proofs for the
corresponding VCs can be found. If (and only if) all VCs can be shown to hold, then the
property holds for the entire program. The argument for proving the VCs is described
in Chapter 7.Chapter 6 Architecture-Oriented Safety Cases 97
in the component-level safety case, where they are discharged by the assumptions. The
subgoals on the connecting signals (here only (S2)) will be replaced by the root goals
of the corresponding branches in the component-level safety case (i.e., (FC2)) at the
appropriate position in the Hoare-style argument for the client component (i.e., State
Determination).
6.3 Safety Case Patterns: Architecture-Oriented
We again de¯ne safety case patterns to generalizes the structure of the safety cases, now
for arguing along the hierarchical structure of systems in model-based development.
The patterns are used as a way of abstracting the fundamental strategies from the
architecture-oriented safety case. The hierarchical system structure argument represents
the system structure and component hierarchy from the code, providing independent
assurance of both code and model. In principle, the patterns described in the following
subsections are generic as the general safety considerations at each tier are unchanged.
Some of the texts are ¯xed and some of them need to be further instantiated.
6.3.1 Safety Case Pattern: Arguing System-Level Safety Requirements
to Component-Level Safety Requirements
The pattern generalizes the safety case for arguing how the system safety requirements
are broken down into component requirements. The structure of the argument remains
the same as shown in the example in Figure 6.3, but we generalize the contents of the
safety case nodes. The argument pattern can be customized for other systems by chang-
ing certain information labelled in h i. This information can be derived from a formal
program analysis of the hierarchical system and also from the system model such as the
information about the safety requirement (i.e., hreq-xi) and its formal representation
(i.e., hformalreq-xi) and information about the architecture slices recovered for the re-
quirement. Tables 6.1 to 6.4 describe in details the safety case pattern for arguing the
hierarchical decomposition of the requirement in the system.
6.3.2 Safety Case Pattern: Arguing from Component-Level Safety Re-
quirements to Source Code
The pattern generalizes the safety case for arguing over each individual safety require-
ment of the component and demonstrates how the component safety requirements are
moved down to the level of the code. The structure of the argument remains the same
as shown in the example in Figure 6.4, but we generalize the contents of the safety case
nodes. The argument pattern can be customized for other components by changingChapter 6 Architecture-Oriented Safety Cases 98
certain information such as the information about the component (i.e., hcomp-xi), the
program (i.e., hmodule-xi) and information about the architecture slices recovered for
the component requirement (i.e., hformalsignal-xi). Tables 6.5 to 6.7 describe in details
the safety case pattern for arguing the hierarchical decomposition of the requirement in
the component.
6.4 Conclusions
With the increased use of model-based development in safety-critical applications, the
integration of safety cases into such approaches has become important, especially in pro-
viding safety assurance in the system design. Hence, in this chapter, we have described
an approach whereby the hierarchical structure of systems in model-based development
drives the construction of architecture-oriented safety cases for the generated code. Here,
the safety cases are constructed mechanically using information about the structure and
component hierarchies recovered from the code by a formal program analysis. The safety
cases thus provide independent assurance of both code and model. We show how the
system safety requirements are broken down into component requirements and where
they are ultimately established. We believe greater con¯dence in the assurance claim
can be placed if the rationale behind the the transition from the system architecture
and model to the program can be shown. We thus make an explicit argument over the
correct transition from the model level representation to the source-level representation,
including an argument over correctness of the formalization of the requirement. We
show how the external assumptions on the system's input signals are used in establish-
ing the safety of the program wrt. the given safety requirement. Like Rushby [126], we
believe that a safe design will have ensured that the assumptions are valid. Currently, we
only consider nominal component behavior, but our approach could also be applied to
the o®-nominal case, provided that appropriate safety requirements for the o®-nominal
modes can be identi¯ed. So far, we have illustrated our approach to °ight code gener-
ated by Real-Time Workshop from hierarchical Simulink models. We are con¯dent that
the same approach can be applied to other modelling systems and generators as well.Chapter 7
Proof-Oriented Safety Cases
Chapter 7 presents an approach to develop safety cases that correspond to formal proofs
found by automated theorem provers. Their goal is to reveal the proof's underlying
argumentation structures and top-level assumptions.
7.1 Introduction
Demonstrating the correctness of large and complex software-intensive systems requires
marshalling large amounts of diverse information, including models, code, speci¯cations,
mathematical equations and formulas, and tables of engineering constants. Tools sup-
ported by automated analyzes can be used to produce a traceable safety argument [48]
that shows in particular where the code, veri¯cation artifacts, and the argument itself
depend on any external assumptions.
Many tools commonly applied to ensure software safety rely on black-box techniques
such as static analysis [18] or model checking [37] that produce only opaque claims
about the safety of the software but not enough evidence to justify their claim. They
can thus not provide any further insights or arguments. In contrast, in formal software
safety certi¯cation [45], as in other formal software development methods [27, 28], formal
proofs can in principle be used as evidence. Such proofs use mathematical and logical
reasoning to show that the software satis¯es certain requirements, as discussed in the
previous three chapters. However, in practice there are reservations about the use of
formal proofs as evidence (let alone arguments) in safety-critical applications. Concerns
that the proofs may be based on assumptions that are not valid, or may contain steps
that are not justi¯ed, can undermine the reasoning used to support the assurance claim.
Moreover, these proofs are typically constructed automatically by automated theorem
provers (ATPs) based on machine-oriented calculi such as resolution [134] which are
often too complex and too di±cult to understand by engineers, because the formalisms
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spell out too many low-level details. In this chapter, we address these issues by sys-
tematically constructing safety cases that correspond to formal proofs found by ATPs
and explicitly call out the use of external assumptions. The safety cases highlight the
argument structure underlying the proof construction, and help showing how the truth
of the theorem follows from the di®erent assertions and subgoals.
The approach presented here combines abstraction and visualization to reveal and
present the proofs underlying argumentation structure and top-level assumptions. We
work with natural deduction (ND) style proofs, which are goal-directed (i.e., start with
original theorem to be proven, and decompose it into subgoals) and closer to human
reasoning than resolution proofs, and we show how the approach can be applied to the
proofs found by the Muscadet ATP [118]. However, the approach is indirectly applicable
to more powerful resolution provers as well, because resolution proofs can in principle
be converted to ND-proofs [25, 79]. We explain how to construct the safety cases by
covering the ND proof tree with corresponding safety case fragments. The argument
is built in the same top-down way as the proof: it starts with the original theorem to
be proved as the top goal and follows the deductive reasoning into subgoals, using the
applied inference rules as strategies to derive the goals. However, we abstract away the
ATPs book-keeping steps, which reduce the size of the constructed safety cases. The
safety cases thus provide a \structured reading guide" for the proofs that allows users
to understand the claims without having to understand all the technical details of the
formal proof machinery.
7.2 Converting Natural Deduction Proofs into Safety Cases
Natural deduction [83] systems consist of a collection of proof rules that manipulate
logical formulas and transform premises into conclusions. A conjecture is proven from
a set of assumptions if a repeated application of the rules can establish it as conclusion.
Here, we focus on some of the basic rules; a full exposition of the ND calculus can be
found in the literature [83]
7.2.1 Conversion Process
Natural deduction proofs are simply trees that start with the conjecture to be proven
as root, and have given axioms or assumed hypotheses at each leaf. Each non-leaf node
is recursively justi¯ed by the proofs that start with its children as new conjectures. The
edges between a node and all of its children correspond to the inference rule applied
in this proof step. The proof tree structure is thus a representation of the underlying
argumentation structure. We can use this interpretation to present the proofs as safety
cases [86], which are structured arguments as well and also represent linkage betweenChapter 7 Proof-Oriented Safety Cases 108
evidence (i.e., the deductive reasoning of the proofs from the assumptions to the derived
conclusions) and claims (i.e., the original theorem to be proved). The general idea of the
conversion from ND proofs to safety cases is thus fairly straightforward. We consider the
conclusion as a goal to be met and the premise(s) as a subgoal(s); we further consider
the applied inference rule as the strategy that shows how the conclusion is met. For each
inference rule, we de¯ne a safety case template that represents the same argumentation.
The underlying similarity of proofs and safety cases has already been indicated in [86]
but as far as we know, this idea has never been fully explored or even been applied to
machine-generated proofs.
The conversion we present here preserves the inferences and formulas of the original
proof, but avoids overloading the constructed arguments with trivial proof steps. We
identify repeated identical inferences that can be abstracted away in order to construct
a more concise argument. We also specify which inferences are semantically related and
thus can be grouped together. In the following we describe the safety case templates for
the base rules of the calculus. We use the Goal Structuring Notation [86] to explicitly
represent the logical °ow of the proofs argumentation structure.
7.2.1.1 Conjunctions
The rules for conjunction introduction and elimination directly represent the intuitive
interpretation of conjunctions: if A is true and B is true, then evidently A ^ B is true
as well (^-i), and if A^B is true, then both A and B must be as well (^-e1 resp. ^-e2).
A B
A ^ B
(^-i) A ^ B
A
(^-e1) A ^ B
B
(^-e2)
(7.1)
￿
￿
H |= A 
H |= (A Ù B) 
Argument over 
each conjunct (Ù-i) 
H |= B 
Argument over a 
stronger goal (Ù-e1)  
H |= (A Ù B) 
H |= A 
Figure 7.1: Safety Case Templates for ^-Rules
The hypotheses (H) that are available to show A ^ B true are also available to show A
(resp. B) true as well. Similarly, in the case of ^-e1 (resp. ^-e2) the available hypotheses
to show each conjunct true are also available to show A ^ B true.
The ^-rules can be directly converted into safety cases. In the case of ^-introduction, theChapter 7 Proof-Oriented Safety Cases 114
In order to minimize the number of hypotheses tracked by the safety case, we need
to analyze the proof tree from the leaves up, and propagate the used hypotheses to-
wards the root. By revealing only the used hypotheses as assumptions, the validity
of their use in deriving the proof can be checked more easily. In our work, we also
highlight the use of the external certi¯cation assumptions that have been formulated in
isolation by the safety engineer. For example in Figure 7.9, the use of the hypothesis
has unit(0:7;ang vel), meaning that this particular °oating point number represents an
angular velocity, which has been speci¯ed as external assumption, is tracked properly in
the safety case. Muscadet turns this external hypothesis (given in a ¯le containing the
certi¯cation assumptions) into an axiom, and the use of this axiom can be justi¯ed and
tracked properly, and can be checked easily.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Axiom) 
ang_vel_7_0e_mi
nus_1 is valid 
C1: As given in 
cert-file 
f |= has_unit (0.7, ang_vel) is valid 
Argument using 
given external 
hypothesis  
J1: The conclusion 
is valid if the 
hypothesis is valid 
J1: has_unit (0.7, 
ang_vel) given as 
external hypothesis 
Figure 7.9: External Hypothesis
7.4 Application to Muscadet Prover
We illustrate our approach by converting proofs by the Muscadet [118] theorem prover
during the formal program veri¯cation of the initialization safety of a component of
an attitude control system. Muscadet is based on natural deduction, but to improve
performance, it implements a variety of derived rules in addition to the basic rules of
the calculus. This includes rules for dedicated equality handling, as well as rules that the
system builds from the de¯nitions and lemmas, and that correspond to the application
of the given de¯nitions and lemmas.
The Muscadet prover is based on an inference engine, which interprets and executes the
rules of the calculus for the theorem to be proved. The inference engine manages an
interval state for each theorem or sub-theorem to be proved which consists of:
² objects that were created,
² hypotheses that are used,
² conclusion to be proved,
² active rules that are used,Chapter 7 Proof-Oriented Safety Cases 115
￿
Goal: Conclusion (i.e., theorem 
to be proved) 
Subgoal: New conclusion (i.e., 
sub-theorem to be proved) 
Justification: Hypothesis 
or new object created 
Context: Explanation 
provided on each proof step 
Strategy: Muscadet’s 
rule 
Figure 7.10: Generic Safety Case Template to Handle Muscadet Book Keeping Rules
² explanations of the strategy, and
² new conclusions or sub-theorems.
Muscadet's proof strategy starts with the initial statement of the theorem to be proved.
Each rule may add new hypotheses, modify the conclusion, create objects, create sub-
theorems or build new rules which are local for (sub)theorems. We de¯ned a dedicated
safety case template for the Muscadet \book-keeping" rules (e.g., the elimination of
function applications known as the elifun-rule and initialization of the theorem known
as the ini-rule). The template is customizable and can be applied to other Muscadet
rules as well (i.e., these rules are represented by a generic strategy node). Figure 7.10
shows the generic template to represent the book-keeping rules.
We then use the customizable Muscadet template together with ND safety case templates
as de¯ned in Section 7.2.1 to transform and represent the resulting proof found by the
Muscadet prover into a safety case. For a ¯rst example, let us consider the proof of the
transitivity of inclusion (as given in [118]),
8A8B8C(A ½ B ^ B ½ C ) A ½ C)
In order to prove this theorem, Muscadet creates three objects a;b and c by applying
the 8-elimination rule
Rule 8: if the conclusion is 8Xp(X), then create a new object x and the new
conclusion is p(x)
three times and thus, the new conclusion is a ½ b ^ b ½ c ) a ½ c. Then the )-
introduction rule
Rule ): if the conclusion is H ! C, then add the hypothesis H and the
new conclusion is CChapter 7 Proof-Oriented Safety Cases 116
replaces the conclusion by a ½ c and adds two hypotheses a ½ b and b ½ c.
Figure 7.11 shows the corresponding safety case after these steps. The theorem to be
proved (i.e., the transitivity of inclusion) is the top goal of the safety case, the new
conclusion of each proof step occurs as a sub-goal of the argument and the applied
inference rule as the strategy. The new object created in each proof step is considered
as a justi¯cation to the strategy.
Returning to our certi¯cation example, we construct a safety case for the proof of a
VC from showing the initialization-before-use safety property of some code generated
by the AutoFilter system (see Figure 7.12). The same conversion process as described
for proving the transitivity of inclusion above was applied in this example. In order to
¯t the safety case to the page size, we use labels to represent the actual theorem and
hypotheses. For example, Á1 indicates the ¯rst conclusion or theorem and h1 indicates
the ¯rst hypothesis. We preserve the name of the applied inference rules as used by
Muscadet. In Figure 7.12, the theorem to be proved (labelled as Á with empty set of
hypothesis) is:
(0 ≤ pv5) Ù (pv5 ≤ 0) Ù (pv5 ≤ 998) Ù (pv5 > 0) Ù "[A,B] : ((0 ≤A) Ù (0 ≤ B) Ù (A ≤5) Ù (B ≤ 0))  
⇒ a _select3(xhatmin_ds1, A,B) :: init) Ù  " [C,D] : ((0 ≤C) Ù (0 ≤ D) Ù (C ≤ 5) Ù (D ≤ 0))  
⇒ a_select3(xhatmin_ds1, C,D) :: init) Ù " [E, F] : ((0 ≤ E) Ù (0 ≤F) Ù (E ≤ 2) Ù (F ≤ 2) )  
⇒ a _select3 (r _ds1, E, F) :: init) Ù " [G,H] : ((0 ≤ G) Ù (0 ≤ H) Ù (G ≤ 5) Ù (H ≤ 5))  
⇒ a _select3 (q_ds1, G,H) :: init) Ù " [I, J] : ((0 ≤ I) Ù (0 ≤ J) Ù (I ≤ 5) Ù (J ≤ 5))  
⇒ a _select3 (pminus_ds1,  I, J) :: init)  Ù " [K,L] : ((0 ≤ K) Ù (0 ≤ L) Ù (K ≤ 5) Ù (L ≤ 5))  
⇒ a _select3 (pminus_ds1, K,L) :: init) Ù " [M,N] : ((0 ≤ M) Ù (0 ≤ N) Ù (M ≤ 5) Ù (N ≤ 5))  
⇒ a _select3 (phi_ds1, M,N) :: init) Ù " [O] : ((0 ≤ O) Ù (O ≤ 5) ) " [P] : ((0 ≤ P) Ù (P ≤ 5) )  
⇒ a _select3 (id_ds1, O, P) :: init)) Ù " [Q,R] : ((0 ≤ Q) Ù (0 ≤ R) Ù (Q ≤ 2) Ù (R ≤ 5))  
⇒ a _select3 (h_ds1, Q,R) :: init) Ù ((pv5 ≤ 0) Ù (pv5 > 0)) ⇒ " [S,T] : ((0 ≤ S) Ù (0 ≤ T ) Ù (S ≤ 5) Ù (T ≤ 0)) 
⇒ a _select3 (xhatmin_ds1,  S, T ) :: init)) Ù ((pv5 ≤ 0) ) ⇒ " [U, V ] : ((0 ≤ U) Ù (0 ≤ V ) Ù (U ≤ 5) Ù (V ≤ 0)) 
⇒ a_select3(xhatmin_ds1, U, V ) :: init)) Ù ((pv5 > 0) ) ⇒ " [W,X] : ((0 ≤ W) Ù (0 ≤ X) Ù (W ≤ 5) Ù (X ≤ 0))  
⇒ a_select3(xhatmin_ds1, W,X) :: init))) ⇒ a_select3(xhatmin_ds1, 3, 0) :: init 
The proof consists of seventeen rule applications. We add another strategy (i.e., show
hypotheses are valid) to communicate the °ow of the argument. To prove that the the-
orem holds, the theorem is decomposed into sub-theorems (or sub-goals), based on the
natural deduction rules. In the safety case, contexts explain additional information for
the proof strategy such as the proofs are natural deduction proofs and found by the
Muscadet prover. Table 7.1 shows the details of each label as used in Figure 7.12. Here
leq and gt represent · and ¸, respectively, and a select3 represents array indexing, with
its ¯rst argument the array and the other two the index, :: represents the equality com-Chapter 7 Proof-Oriented Safety Cases 117
G1: "A"B"C (AÌB Ù BÌC => AÌC) 
S1: Argument over all 
domain elements ("-e) 
G2: "B"C (aÌB Ù BÌC => aÌC) 
S2: Argument over all 
domain elements ("-e) 
G3: "C (aÌb Ù bÌC => aÌC) 
S3: Argument over all 
domain elements ("-e) 
G4: aÌb Ù bÌc => aÌc 
J1: A can be 
replaced by a 
J2: B can be 
replaced by b 
J3: C can be 
replaced by c 
S4: Suppose premise is 
true (=>-i) 
J4: aÌb and bÌc can 
be used as hypotheses 
to prove aÌc 
G5: {aÌb Ù bÌc} |= aÌc 
Figure 7.11: Example of Muscadet ND Proof Safety Case
bined with function application, initialization and elifun represent internal Muscadet's
book-keeping rules for initialization of the theorem and elimination of the functional
symbols of the theorem. A link from G19 to G7 indicates the validity of G19 can be
shown by the argument of G7.
7.5 Proof Abstraction
The example in Figure 7.12 shows that directly converting the Muscadet-proofs into
safety cases is unfeasible in most practical cases because the proofs contain too many
elementary and book-keeping steps. It is thus necessary to abstract the proof. Here, we
can apply di®erent approaches. Several Muscadet book keeping rules such as elifun (i.e.,
elimination of functional symbols of the conclusion) and return proof (i.e., the theorem
has been proved) do not a®ect the underlying proof reasoning strategy and are not
central to the overall argumentation structure, so that they can be removed from the
safety case (see Figure 7.15. Similarly, we can collapse sequences of identical rules into
a single node and represent them in the proof argument as a single strategy, without
loosing any insights into the structure and readability of the proof. We can label the
consecutive occurrences of these rules in the proof safety case by (¤N) where N is an
integer that indicates N rule occurrences, as shown in Figure 7.13.
In general, however, we try to restructure the resulting proof presentation to help in
emphasizing the essential proof steps. In particular, we can group sub-proofs that apply
only axioms and lemmas from certain obvious parts of the domain theory (e.g., ground
arithmetic or partial order reasoning) and represent them as a single strategy application.Chapter 7 Proof-Oriented Safety Cases 118
Table 7.1: Detail of Labels as used in Figure 7.12
Label  Theorem or Hypothesis 
 
f f f f1, f f f f2  (0 ≤ pv5) Ù (pv5 ≤ 0) Ù (pv5 ≤ 998) Ù (pv5 > 0)  
Ù "[A,B] : ((0 ≤A) Ù (0 ≤ B) Ù (A ≤5) Ù (B ≤ 0)) ⇒ a _select3(xhatmin_ds1, A,B) :: init)  
Ù  " [C,D] : ((0 ≤C) Ù (0 ≤ D) Ù (C ≤ 5) Ù (D ≤ 0)) ⇒ a_select3(xhatmin_ds1, C,D) :: init)  
Ù " [E, F] : ((0 ≤ E) Ù (0 ≤F) Ù (E ≤ 2) Ù (F ≤ 2) ) ⇒ a _select3 (r _ds1, E, F) :: init)  
Ù " [G,H] : ((0 ≤ G) Ù (0 ≤ H) Ù (G ≤ 5) Ù (H ≤ 5)) ⇒ a _select3 (q_ds1, G,H) :: init)  
Ù " [I, J] : ((0 ≤ I) Ù (0 ≤ J) Ù (I ≤ 5) Ù (J ≤ 5)) ⇒ a _select3 (pminus_ds1,  I, J) :: init)   
Ù " [K,L] : ((0 ≤ K) Ù (0 ≤ L) Ù (K ≤ 5) Ù (L ≤ 5)) ⇒ a _select3 (pminus_ds1, K,L) :: init)  
Ù " [M,N] : ((0 ≤ M) Ù (0 ≤ N) Ù (M ≤ 5) Ù (N ≤ 5)) ⇒ a _select3 (phi_ds1, M,N) :: init)  
Ù " [O] : ((0 ≤ O) Ù (O ≤ 5) ) " [P] : ((0 ≤ P) Ù (P ≤ 5)) ⇒ a _select3 (id_ds1, O, P) :: init))  
Ù " [Q,R] : ((0 ≤ Q) Ù (0 ≤ R) Ù (Q ≤ 2) Ù (R ≤ 5)) ⇒ a _select3 (h_ds1, Q,R) :: init)  
Ù ((pv5 ≤ 0) Ù (pv5 > 0)) ⇒ " [S,T] : ((0 ≤ S) Ù (0 ≤ T ) Ù (S ≤ 5) Ù (T ≤ 0)) ⇒ a _select3 (xhatmin_ds1,  S, T ) :: init)) 
Ù ((pv5 ≤ 0) ) ⇒ " [U, V ] : ((0 ≤ U) Ù (0 ≤ V ) Ù (U ≤ 5) Ù (V ≤ 0)) ⇒ a_select3(xhatmin_ds1, U, V ) :: init))  
Ù ((pv5 > 0) ) ⇒ " [W,X] : ((0 ≤ W) Ù (0 ≤ X) Ù (W ≤ 5) Ù (X ≤ 0) ) ⇒ a_select3(xhatmin_ds1, W,X) :: init)))  
⇒ a_select3(xhatmin_ds1, 3, 0) :: init 
f f f f3  a_select3(xhatmin_ds1, 3, 0) :: init 
f f f f4  only (a_select3(xhatmin_ds1_filter_init, 3, 0) :: A, A=init) 
f f f f5  z1=init 
f f f f6  init=init 
h1  leq(0, pv5) 
h2  leq(pv5, 0) 
h3  leq(pv5, 998) 
h4   gt(pv5, 0) 
h5  ![A,B]: leq(0,A) & leq(0,B) & leq(A, 5) & leq(B, 0) => a_select3(xhatmin_ds1_filter_init, A, B)::init) 
h6  ![A,B]: leq(0,A) & leq(0,B) & leq(A, 5) & leq(B, 0) => a_select3(xhatmin_ds1_filter_init, A, B)::init) 
h7  ![A,B]: leq(0,A) & leq(0,B) & leq(A, 2) & leq(B, 2) => a_select3(r_ds1_filter_init, A, B)::init) 
h8  ![A,B]: leq(0,A) & leq(0,B) & leq(A, 5) & leq(B, 5) => a_select3(q_ds1_filter_init, A, B)::init) 
h9  ![A,B]: leq(0,A) & leq(0,B) & leq(A, 5) & leq(B, 5) => a_select3(pminus_ds1_filter_init, A, B)::init) 
h10  ![A,B]: leq(0,A) & leq(0,B) & leq(A, 5) & leq(B, 5) => a_select3(pminus_ds1_filter_init, A, B)::init) 
h11  ![A,B]: leq(0,A) & leq(0,B) & leq(A, 5) & leq(B, 5) => a_select3(phi_ds1_filter_init, A, B)::init) 
h12  ![A]: leq(0,A) & leq(A, 5) => ![B]: leq(B, 5) & leq(B, 5) => a_select3(id_ds1_filter_init, A, B)::init) 
h13  ![A,B]: leq(0,A) & leq(0,B) & leq(A, 2) & leq(B, 5) => a_select3(h_ds1_filter_init, A, B)::init) 
h14  leq(pv5,0) & gt(pv5,0) => ![A,B]: leq(0,A) & leq(0,B) & leq(A,5) & leq(B,0) 
=> a_select3(xhatmin_ds1_filter_init, A, B)::init) 
h15  leq(pv5,0) => ![A,B]: leq(0,A) & leq(0,B) & leq(A,5) & leq(B,0) => a_select3(xhatmin_ds1_filter_init, A, B)::init) 
h16  gt(pv5, 0)=>![A, B]: (leq(0, A)&leq(0, B)&leq(A, 5)&leq(B,0) => a_select3(xhatmin_ds1_filter_init, A, B)::init) 
h17  a_select3(xhatmin_ds1_filter_init, 3, 0)::z1 
h18  leq(0, 0) 
h19  gt(5, 4) 
h20  leq(4, 5) 
h21  gt(3, 0) 
h22  leq(0, 3) 
h23  gt(4, 3) 
h24  leq(3, 4) 
h25  leq(3, 5) 
h26  a_select3(xhatmin_ds1_filter_init, 3, 0)::init 
h27  z1=init 
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G1: "A"B"C (AÌB Ù BÌC => AÌC) 
S1: Argument over all 
domain elements ("-e) 
G2: "B"C (aÌB Ù BÌC => aÌC) 
S2: Argument over all 
domain elements ("-e) 
G3: "C (aÌb Ù bÌC => aÌC) 
S3: Argument over all 
domain elements ("-e) 
G4: aÌb Ù bÌc => aÌc 
J1: A can be 
replaced by a 
J2: B can be 
replaced by b 
J3: C can be 
replaced by c 
S4: Suppose premise is 
true (=>-i) 
J4: aÌb and bÌc can 
be used as hypotheses 
to prove aÌc 
G5: {aÌb Ù bÌc} |= aÌc 
Abstraction  G1: "A"B"C (AÌB Ù BÌC => AÌC) 
S1: Argument over all 
domain elements ("-e) (*3) 
G4: aÌb Ù bÌc => aÌc 
J1: A, B, C can be 
replaced by a, b, c 
S2: Suppose premise is 
true (=>-i) 
J4: aÌb and bÌc can 
be used as hypotheses 
to prove aÌc 
G5: {aÌb Ù bÌc} |= aÌc 
Figure 7.13: Abstraction of Consecutive Rules (concl only)
Figure 7.14 shows an example of this. Here, the ¯rst abstraction step collapses the
sequences rooted in G14 and G15, noting the lemmas which had been used as strategies
as justi¯cations, but keeping the branching that is typical for the transitivity. A second
step then abstracts this away as well. Figure 7.15 shows the resulting safety case of the
initialization-before-use proof for Figure 7.12 after abstraction.
The purpose of the abstraction is to reduce size and complexity of the overall proof
presentation and to make the constructed safety cases more readable. We represent the
deductive reasoning with a collapsible structured proof. We generalized the commonal-
ity of the low-level inferences and grouped them together. We also have made a decision
as to how far to take the proof details. In our work, we classify the proof tiles into
two categories, obvious and essential; and derive the safety case from the essential tiles.
Obvious rules include Muscadet book keeping rules such as the elifun and return proof
rules. These rules can be abstracted away (i.e., the strategies can be removed in the
safety case) if the goals can be directly achieved and understood without a®ecting un-
derstandability of the presentation of the underlying arguments. Essential rules are rules
that should remain in the proof argument as they are essential in showing the correctness
of the underlying the proofs. So far, we decide manually which rules are essential by
looking at the overall proof presentation, and restructure the argument to make it more
simpli¯ed and readable. However, we still keep the actual proofs argument for validity
checking purposes.
7.6 Conclusions
Greater con¯dence can be placed in the assurance claims provided by proofs if the
rationale behind the validity of the proofs can be shown. The probability of a claim,
which has been shown by a formal proof, being false, is very low, when the assumptionsChapter 7 Proof-Oriented Safety Cases 121
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstraction 
Abstraction 
S11: Partial order 
reasoning 
So4: 
(axiom) 
gt_5_4 
is valid 
So5: 
(axiom) 
gt_4_3 
is valid 
G12: leq (3, 5) 
J6: Based on 
transitivity_leq, 
leq_gt1, gt_5_4 
and gt_4_3 rules 
G12: leq (3, 5) 
G14: leq (4, 5)  G15: leq (3, 4) 
G16: gt (5, 4)  G17: gt (4, 3) 
S14: leq_gt1 
rule 
S13: leq_gt1 
rule 
S11: transitivity_leq rule 
 
So4: 
(axiom) 
gt_5_4 is 
valid 
So5: 
(axiom) 
gt_4_3 is 
valid 
S16: gt_4_3 
rule 
S15: gt_5_4 
rule 
S11: Partial order 
reasoning 
So4: 
(axiom) 
gt_5_4 
is valid 
So5: 
(axiom) 
gt_4_3 
is valid 
S14: Partial 
order 
reasoning 
S13: Partial 
order 
reasoning 
G14: leq (4, 5)  G15: leq (3, 4) 
G12: leq (3, 5) 
J6: Based on 
transitivity_leq 
rule 
J8: Based 
on leq_gt1, 
gt_5_4 rules 
J7: Based 
on leq_gt1, 
gt_4_3 rules 
Figure 7.14: Abstraction of Partial Order Reasoning RulesChapter 8
Heterogenous Safety Cases
Chapter 8 focuses on merging the di®erent safety cases described in the previous chapters
into a single integrated safety case. It also shows how to add additional veri¯cation and
validation information from heterogenous sources into that safety case.
8.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters, we have described an approach to construct di®erent styles
of safety cases (i.e., property-oriented, requirement-oriented, architecture-oriented and
proof-oriented safety cases) from a formal analysis, based on automated theorem prov-
ing, of the automatically generated code. However, the main focus of the argument in
each safety case is slightly di®erent in terms of the safety aspect considered. For exam-
ple, the property-oriented safety cases are focused on ensuring safety of the program wrt.
a given safety property (such as initialization-before-use safety), while the architecture-
oriented safety cases are concentrated on arguing along the hierarchical structure of
the system. Therefore, in this chapter, we describe an approach to combine these dif-
ferent safety cases as well as diverse types of information from other veri¯cation and
validation activities such as testing into a single integrated or heterogenous safety case,
in order to provide comprehensive assurance of the program safety. This heterogenous
safety case integrates additional information into the existing core argument structure
of the previous safety cases representing the purely formal reasoning on the safety of the
program. This additional veri¯cation and validation information represents background
knowledge that cannot be produced directly by the formal veri¯cation phase (e.g., a jus-
ti¯cation that the formalizations of the properties that are veri¯ed correctly encode the
requirements, or links to applicable standards and project documentation), and which
thus needs to be speci¯ed in the form of contexts, assumptions, justi¯cations, and con-
straints in the safety case. It can also represent additional forms of evidence which can
be derived from other veri¯cation activities, such as testing. This information needs
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to be spliced into the core argument structure of the heterogenous safety case at the
appropriate locations to provide a traceable and comprehensive safety argument.
8.2 Constructing Heterogenous Safety Cases
In this section, we describe how to integrate the property-oriented, requirement-oriented,
architecture-oriented and proof-oriented safety cases into a single integrated safety case,
i.e., the heterogenous safety case. As described above, each of these safety cases fo-
cuses on arguing di®erent safety aspects of the software such as safety properties, safety
requirements, proofs, and system architecture. However, to achieve a comprehensive
program veri¯cation argument, an integration of these di®erent arguments should be
described in a single view to strengthen the assurance provided. Moreover, the integra-
tion can also highlight the relation between the individual arguments and thus reduces
repetition in the arguments. The main purpose of the heterogenous safety case is to
provide a minimal but consistent safety case representing a combination of di®erent
categories of information.
Here, we also describe how we can combine the diverse types of information from aux-
iliary veri¯cation and validation sources (e.g., veri¯cation tool information or testing
results) and splice them into the heterogenous safety case. However, we keep the tiered
structure, and describe the overall heterogenous safety argument in its four di®erent
tiers, to help in showing the high-level structure of the argument. We provide a simpli-
¯ed overview of the safety case and describe it in a context of template instead of a full
pattern, concentrating on its generic structure. As before, all texts highlighted in red in
the heterogenous safety case need to be instantiated; the concrete text can be derived
from the certi¯cation information, generator, software model and from the speci¯ed cer-
ti¯cation information such as requirement documents and testing results. All texts in
black are boiler-plate which can be reused as is. Nodes labelled with triangle (4) or
with diamond (§) need to be further instantiated or developed. Links with (±) describe
the nodes that are optional and links with (²) describe nodes that can be solved by zero
or more instances.
8.2.1 Tier I of Heterogenous Safety Case: Explaining the Safety No-
tion
Tier I of the heterogenous safety case (see Figure 8.1) is adapted from the pattern
\Explaining the Safety Notion" described on page 65 but with some minor modi¯cations
as pointed out here. In the previous chapters, the main focus of our argument was on
assuring safety of the program wrt. the safety properties and the safety requirements
respectively. Therefore, in the top level of the combined safety case, we explicitly describeChapter 8 Heterogenous Safety Cases 125
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
G1: The software <sw-id> 
satisfies all given requirements  
 
Con1: The software consists 
of the following modules: 
<module-x> 
C2: Certification works on 
source level representation only 
Con2: The software was 
generated by <generator> 
<version> from the following 
model: <model-x> using this 
<config- set> 
Con3: The software 
continuously maintains all 
required safety properties 
during execution 
C1: Focus on given 
requirements only  
G2: Formal proof that the <sw-id> 
satisfies all given requirements 
G3: Certification provides valid 
safety proofs 
M1: Hoare-style program 
verification using specific 
proof rules 
As2: Proof of correctness 
ensures that safety properties 
are satisfied during execution  
S1: Argument 
based on proof of 
partial correctness 
wrt. the given 
requirements￿
Con4: The software 
establishes all safety 
requirements  
C3: Partial correctness proof only 
(no termination)  As1: Proof of correctness 
ensures that safety 
requirements are established 
during execution  
￿
As3: Constraints do not 
compromise safety claim  
C4: No real-time process 
scheduling reasoning 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
G(SP1): Formal proof that the 
<sw-id> is safe to execute wrt. all 
given safety properties 
G(SR1): Formal proof that the 
<sw-id> satisfies all given safety 
requirements 
C5: Idealized arithmetic 
reasoning 
S(CR1): Argument based on the 
safety certification mechanism 
G(SCR2): Soundness of calculus  G(SCR3): VCG constructed 
correct VCs 
G(SCR1): Formalization of 
safety polices are adequate 
￿￿
Figure 8.1: Tier I of the Heterogenous Safety Case: Explaining the Safety Notion
the context of the safety veri¯cation, i.e., de¯ne the meaning of the text \all given
requirements" in the root goal (G1). Hence, the contexts Con3 and Con4 explicitly
describe that the focus of the argument is on assuring software safety as speci¯ed by
two categories of requirements, i.e., safety properties and safety requirements. Further
to this, limitations to which extent the veri¯cation strategy can show the software safety
are made explicit in form of the constraints C1 and C2. Con1 and Con2 describe the
provenance of the software under certi¯cation.
The \proof of partial correctness" strategy, which is applied here is predicated on two
assumptions, ¯rst, that the proof of correctness ensures that the safety requirements areChapter 8 Heterogenous Safety Cases 126
established during execution and second, that it ensures that the safety properties are
satis¯ed during execution. Both of these assumptions can be justi¯ed by the goal (G3).
The model underlying the argument (i.e., Hoare-style veri¯cation) is made explicit, as
are the limitations of this model (C3-C5). An explicit assumption is made that these
limitations do not compromise the safety claims; arguing the validity of this assumption
is outside the scope of the work described here.
The strategy (S1) is then reduced to two subgoals, (G2) and (G3). The strategy's ¯rst
subgoal (G2) is the \glue" of the overall argument is further elaborated into two sub-
goals, showing that the program is safe wrt. all given safety properties and safe wrt. all
given safety requirements. The further argument structure of each subgoal is described
in detail in tier II of the heterogenous safety case. The strategy's second subgoal is to
show that the certi¯cation provides valid safety proofs which then spawns three sub-
goals, showing ¯rst, that G(SCR1): the formalization of the safety policy is adequate
(which needs to be repeated for each of the safety properties considered), second, that
G(SCR2): the calculus is sound to represent the safety of the requirements, and third,
that G(SCR3): the VCG provides correct implementation of the VCs. However, these
three subgoals are not elaborated further in this safety case but lead to the complemen-
tary safety case for the safety logic which is left for future work.
8.2.2 Tier II of Heterogenous Safety Case: Arguing over Safety of
Program
The key argument strategy at tier II of the heterogenous safety case is to argue software
safety to safety wrt. all given requirements. In order to show this, the argument is
decomposed into two subgoals i.e., safety wrt. all given safety properties and safety wrt.
all given safety requirements. Basically, the overall argument structure for showing the
safety wrt. both styles of requirements follows the same structure as described in the
\Safety of Program Variables" and \Formalization of Safety Requirement" safety case
patterns, on page 70 and page 87, respectively.
Figure 8.2 shows the safety case pattern for arguing over all safety properties, which
proceeds properly by property. For each individual property, the argument remains as
described in the \Safety of Program Variables" pattern (see page 70), but some contexts
(e.g., Con5, Con6 and Con7) and constraints (e.g., C6) have been moved from the original
top tier to here, because there are speci¯c to the (generic) notion of a safety property.
The purpose of the safety case remains to reduce the program safety to the safety of
all program variables, based on the fact that safety properties are de¯ned on individual
variables. The argument proceeds accordingly as in the pattern, until it reaches the
argument on the establishment of the safety condition which is further described in tier
III of the heterogenous safety case.Chapter 8 Heterogenous Safety Cases 127
G(SP2): The <sw-id> is safe to 
execute wrt. <property-x>   
J1: Justify the strategy: why 
argument over variable  
As4: Complete list of 
variables  
G(SP3): <var-x> is safe  
J2: Justify the strategy: why 
argument over occurrences 
As5: Complete list of 
occurrences  
G(SP4): <var-x> is safe in <sw-
id> at location <loc-x>   
G(SP5): <safety-condition-x> 
holds in <sw-id> at line <loc-x> 
J4: Safety condition is derived by 
instantiation of the safety 
predicate over occurrences  
J3: Soundness and 
completeness of safety 
policy 
S4: Argument over all 
occurrences of <var-x> 
S3: Argument over 
each variable 
individually 
G(SP1): Formal proof that the <sw-id> is safe 
to execute wrt. all given safety properties 
S2: Argument over each 
individual safety property  
￿￿
M2: Semantic safety 
definition of the 
safety property 
Con8: Describe how the safety 
policy demonstrates the software 
safety 
Con9: Safety relevant information 
of the software 
￿￿
￿￿
Con5: safe= code does not violate 
given safety property during 
execution 
C6: Focus on given safety 
property only  
Con10: Complete list 
of the variables can be 
shown by program 
inspection 
Con6: safety property = 
requirement to be maintained 
continuously by the program 
Con7: Explicit definition of the 
given safety property <property-x>   
Con11: Complete list 
of the variables can be 
shown by program 
inspection 
Figure 8.2: Tier II of the Heterogenous Safety Case: Arguing over Safety Property
Figure 8.3 shows the safety case pattern for safety requirements. The overall argument
remains the same as described in the \Formalization of Safety Requirement" pattern,
(see page 87), except that the branch argument over the formalization and localization
of the requirement has been removed from the pattern in here. This is further described
in the architecture-oriented safety case, which is provided as justi¯cation (J5) to the
strategy (S6). This justi¯cation is \glue" that links the safety requirement argument
to the architecture argument. The architecture-oriented safety case identi¯es how the
system safety requirements are broken down into component safety requirements, and
where they are ultimately established, thus deriving a hierarchy of requirements that
is aligned with the hierarchy of the components in the system. In some sense, the
architecture-oriented safety case can be considered as a \subroutine" or away goal to
S6: it takes a system-level requirement, and returns a list of formalized component-level
requirements, which are then shown in G(FC1). Below this, the argument proceeds as
described in the \Formalization of Safety Requirement" pattern (see page 87).
The purpose of the architecture-oriented safety case is to show a compositional veri¯ca-
tion of the software based on the system architecture and thus provide an independentChapter 8 Heterogenous Safety Cases 128
￿
￿
￿
￿ ￿
S7: Argument using 
minimum set of 
external assumptions 
G(FCA1): Formal proof that <formalreq-
x> holds for <module-x>, given external 
assumptions 
G(FC1): Formal proof that <formalreq-x> 
holds for <module-x> 
As8: External certification assumptions  ￿￿
S9: Hoare-style argument 
over all relevant 
occurrences of <var-x> 
As14: Complete list of occurrences 
G(FCO1): <safety condition-x> holds for 
<module-x>, at line <loc-x> 
￿￿
A11: Soundness of calculus 
A12: Correctness of 
implementation 
S6: Argument based on 
formal proof of the 
formalized requirement 
J5: Architecture-oriented safety case 
 
￿￿
G(R1): <req-x>    
Con13: Hazard Analysis of the 
system 
A 
G(SR1): Formal proof that the <sw-id> 
satisfies all given safety requirements 
As7: Consistency of given external and 
derived internal assumptions 
As6: No requirement is used as 
an assumption 
S5: Argument over 
each requirement 
individually 
Con12: Requirement inspection 
Con14: Check by theorem prover 
Con15: Additional documents that 
describe the requirement 
￿￿
￿￿
G(FCA1): Formal proof that 
<formalproperty-x> holds for <module-x>, 
given external and internal assumptions 
S8: Hoare-style 
argument over properties 
of all variables on which 
the formalized 
requirement directly and 
indirectly depends￿
￿￿
As9: Complete list of variables 
As10: Correct list of requirements for 
dependent variables 
Con17: <var-x> relies on the safety of 
the following variables: <var-y> based 
on the applied annotation schema 
A13: Formal proof that 
<formalproperty-y> holds for <module-
x> 
￿￿
￿￿
￿ ￿￿
￿￿
￿￿
J6: Safety requirement 
on <var-y> contributes to 
validity and safety on 
<var-x> 
Con16: Program inspection 
Con18: Program inspection 
Figure 8.3: Tier II of the Heterogenous Safety Case: Arguing over Safety Requirement
assurance of both code and model. The overall argument structure on the architecture-
oriented safety case (see Figure 8.4) follows the same argument structure as described
in the pattern \Arguing System-Level Safety Requirements to Component-Level Safety
Requirements" on page 104. However, the architecture safety case now only serves as
abstraction of the actual arguments in the \full" safety case shown in Figure 8.3, provid-
ing an additional view on and structuring of the same underlying information. This also
subsumes the combination of system-level and component-level safety cases described inChapter 8 Heterogenous Safety Cases 129
￿ ￿
G(R1): <req-x>    
S10: Formalization 
and localization of 
the requirement 
GFR1: Formal proof 
that <formalreq-x> 
holds for <sw-id> 
 
GF1: Given a <signal-
type> X, X::<formula-
x> is the appropriate 
formalization of <req-
x> 
Con19: 
<model-x>  
Con15: Additional document 
that describe the requirement 
GL1: Variable <var-x> 
in <sw-id> represents 
the signal <signal-x> 
in the <model-x> 
(localization) 
E1: Name 
mapping 
information in 
the source code 
checked by <Y> 
E2: 
Documenta-
tion of 
domain 
theory 
As15: Interface of 
<comp-x> is strong 
enough to establish 
the property 
<formalreq -x> 
As16: All components 
and signals relevant to 
the requirement are 
identified through 
formal analysis 
S11: Argument 
based on the 
system 
architecture slices 
GC1: Component 
<comp-x> satisfies its 
formal safety 
requirements 
GS1: Formal proof that 
<formalsignal-x> holds 
at <module-x> 
 
GTLB1: Block <block-
x> satisfies its formal 
safety requirements  
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
As(P1): <formalreq-
x> is the appropriate 
formalization of <req-
x> 
SP1: Argument based 
on formal proof of the 
formalized requirement  Justification 
￿￿
Figure 8.4: Tier II of the Heterogenous Safety Case: Arguing over Architecture Slices
Section 6.2.3.
8.2.3 Tier III of Heterogenous Safety Case: Arguing over Su±ciency
of Safety Condition
The structure of the argument on tier III of the heterogenous safety case (see Fig-
ure 8.5) follows the same lines as shown in the "Su±ciency of Safety Condition" safety
case pattern described on page 73 both for safety properties and safety requirements.
However, there are some minor modi¯cations to the argument structure in the case that
the requirement is established by a library function. This is conceptually similar to the
architectural decomposition but since library functions have no corresponding model,
we cannot apply our architectural reasoning to gain assurance about their correctness.
Instead, we rely on other means, such as testing, to show that the function is correctly
speci¯ed. We thus add a further argument (G(SC9)) that argues the correctness of the
library functions in order to justify that the undesired event E7.1.1 (as identi¯ed on
page 53) has been controlled and mitigated in the formal program veri¯cation. The evi-
dence to show that the library functions are correctly speci¯ed against the speci¯cation
can be attained from the testing results. A reference implementation document that
can be used to support the testing processes is described and denoted as a model to the
testing strategy. The testing evidence can be double-checked and inspected by subjectChapter 8 Heterogenous Safety Cases 130
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
￿￿
￿￿
As17: Complete list of paths  
As18: Complete list of VCs  
G(SC3): Conditions from 
each path imply required 
property 
G(SC1): Sufficient conditions 
are established on all paths to 
this location <loc-x> 
G(SC2): Sufficient conditions 
are maintained on all paths to 
this location <loc-x> 
S12: Argument over 
establishment, maintenance 
and sufficiency of conditions 
S13: Argument over 
establishment of 
conditions on each 
path  
S14: Argument over 
maintenance of 
conditions on each 
path   
G(SC4): <condition-
x> is established at 
line <defloc-x> 
S15: Proof of VCs 
corresponding to 
line <defloc-x> 
G(SC9): Library 
function <lib-x> is 
correctly specified 
G(SC6): <vc-
x> is proven 
S16: Test library 
function <lib-x> 
against specification￿
M3: Annotation 
schema <schema-x> 
M4: Reference 
Implementation 
G(SC10): Library function 
<lib-x> has been tested￿
G(SC8): <vc-x> is 
proven 
G(SC5): <condition-
x> is maintained on 
<path-x> 
Con20: def-use-paths= 
get the variable safety 
information from 
definitions to uses￿
G(SC7): <vc-
x> is proven 
E3: Inspection of test 
results by SME 
G(SP5)  or G(FCO1): <safety condition-x> holds for <sw-id> or 
<module-x> at line <loc-x> 
S17: Proof of 
VCs for <path-x> 
￿
S18: Proof of 
VCs over 
conjunction of 
all paths  
Figure 8.5: Tier III of the Heterogenous Safety Case: Arguing over Su±ciency of
Safety Condition
matter experts (SME). Note that our formal veri¯cation approach now depends on the
validity of a non-formal argument, but this can be integrated seamlessly into a single
safety case.
8.2.4 Tier IV of Heterogenous Safety Case: Arguing over Soundness
of Formal Proof
In formal program veri¯cation, automated theorem provers are typically used to auto-
matically prove the VCs. The soundness, correct con¯guration, and correct installation
of the prover should be justi¯ed in order to establish trust in the proofs provided. How-
ever, the most likely source of invalid proofs are errors in the axiomatization of the
domain theory, either logical inconsistencies or inadequate formalizations, and the useChapter 8 Heterogenous Safety Cases 131
￿ ￿
G(SC6) or G(SC7) or G(SC8): 
<vc-x> is proven 
S19: Proof 
correctness of the 
VCs using 
automated theorem 
proving 
Con21: The proofs are 
discharged by <prover-x> 
G(SPR1): Axiom <axiom-x> 
is valid 
S20: Test correctness 
of the axiom <axiom-
x>￿
M5: Reference 
Interpretation 
As19: Certification 
assumption that is used 
in the proof of <vc-x> 
J7: Rationale for the use 
of the certification 
assumption 
J8: Correctness of theorem 
prover 
G(SPR2): Axiom <axiom-x> 
has been tested 
J9: Correct configuration and 
installation of theorem prover 
￿￿
￿￿
￿￿
E4: Inspection by SME  
Figure 8.6: Tier IV of Derived Safety Case: Arguing over Soundness of Formal Proof
of invalid certi¯cation assumptions. In Chapter 7, we have described an approach to
construct safety case that correspond to natural deduction (ND) proofs found by the
Muscadet prover [118]. However, these safety case quickly grow very large, despite a
number of possible abstraction. Here, we instead simplify the overall proof argument by
a single strategy (S19) that represents the deductive reasoning of the VCs into further
subgoals until it leads to the axioms. We also highlight the use of the external certi¯ca-
tion assumptions in order to check the validity of their use in deriving the proofs. The
validity of the proofs can then be argued by assuring that the certi¯cation assumptions
hold (cf. As19 and J7 in Figure 8.6), and by showing that the axioms that are used
to prove the VCs are valid. The validity of the axioms can be shown by the testing
activities such as described in [21]. The reference interpretation document that is used
as a guidance in proving the soundness of the axioms can be speci¯ed as a model that
is linked to the strategy. The validity of the axioms can also be double checked and
inspected by SME. The structure of this argument is shown in Figure 8.6; this justi¯es
that the undesired event E7.1.2 (see FTA Figure 3.4) has been controlled and mitigated.
8.3 Safety Case Evidence
In building convincing safety arguments it is important to demonstrate the suitability of
the evidence for satisfying a claim. When selecting the required evidence, it is important
to identify di®erent types of evidence so that the requirement or claim can be satis¯ed
with con¯dence; it is also necessary to demonstrate that enough evidence has beenChapter 8 Heterogenous Safety Cases 132
presented. Showing the suitability of evidence can be made by assessing how well the
evidence assures the claim. Evidence attributes can be used to measure the degree of
con¯dence provided by the evidence [87, 146, 147]. There are three evidence attributes
that have been de¯ned to show the su±ciency of the evidence presented. The attributes
are as follows [87, 146, 147]:
² relevance, i.e., the extent to which an item of evidence entails the claim;
² trustworthiness, i.e., the perceived ability to rely on the character, ability, strength
or truth of the evidence;
² independence, i.e., the extent to which complementary items within a set of evi-
dence ful¯l the claim.
We use the evidence attributes as a guideline to assess the su±ciency and relevancy of
the evidence selected. We identify any other additional evidence or documents that are
potentially relevant to support and describe the evidence. In our work, formal proofs
are provided as the ultimate evidence for the assurance claims. However, there is a
non-zero probability that these proofs are not in fact valid [100]. Greater con¯dence
in the assurance claim can be placed if the rationale behind validity of these proofs
can be shown. Therefore, in order to raise the degree of con¯dence that can be placed
in the evidence presented in our safety cases, additional forms of supporting evidence
are provided. This supporting evidence retrieved from other veri¯cation activities, such
as testing, and additional documents such as architecture and design document. The
evidence has been spliced in to the core argument structure of our safety cases at the
appropriate locations. This additional evidence not only increases con¯dence in the
claim provided, but also represents knowledge about the system and the certi¯cation
approach presented. For example, the believe in the soundness of the formal proofs can
be increased if the axioms that are used to prove the theorems are shown to be valid
which can be achieved by providing the appropriate testing results. Here, the testing
results can be used as supporting evidence to the soundness of the formal proofs. In our
work, we categorize the evidence into two types:
² formal evidence, e.g., veri¯cation conditions, formal proofs, and axioms; and
² informal evidence, e.g., testing, documentation and manuals, or expert judgments.
Both types of evidence can be used as direct evidence to the claim or as supporting
evidence. For example, DO-178B states that formal methods are complementary to
testing, and hence indirectly implies that evidence generated from formal methods can-
not be used as the sole means for compliance with veri¯cation objectives [61]. However,Chapter 8 Heterogenous Safety Cases 133
di®erent software standards have di®erent preferences and Defence Stan 00-56 [113] con-
siders formal methods to o®er the strongest form of evidence. In our work, we follow
the lines of the latter. We thus provide testing and inspection results as a means to sup-
port the evidence provided by the formal analysis. However, our focus is on the formal
argument, and we explicitly do not integrate it with an argument based on testing of
the software; this work remains for future research.
The use of formal analysis in showing software safety has been investigated in the lit-
erature. Habli et al. [69] discuss the complementary role of formal mathematical ar-
guments in achieving con¯dence in the safety and reliability of software systems. In
addition, Habli and Kelly [68] present a generic safety case that can be instantiated
to facilitate the presentation and justi¯cation of formal analysis. Galloway et al. [62]
present a meta-approach for generating arguments for substituting testing with more
cost-e®ective processes, in particular proof-based veri¯cation.
Our work falls into the same context but we justify the use of formal program analysis
by constructing the safety case to establish trust in the formal proofs as evidence on
the safety of the code. We make clear the interactions underlying the proofs of the code
which gives us greater con¯dence in the assurance claim. We provide explicit arguments
on the use of the Hoare-style program veri¯cation in demonstrating software safety and
have successfully applied our framework to NASA applications.
8.4 Conclusions
Demonstrating the correctness of large and complex software-intensive systems in certi¯-
cation requires marshalling large amounts of diverse information, including requirement
documents, system architecture, models of the system, source code, and veri¯cation and
validation artifacts such as VCs, formal proofs and testing results. An integration of
these diverse artifacts is essential to explicitly represent the rationale underlying the
certi¯cation process of the program and thus, establish trust and con¯dence on the
assurance provided.
In this chapter, we have described the overall structure of a heterogenous safety case.
We show how we can systematically combine diverse types of information from hetero-
geneous sources into a single integrated safety case. The core argument structure of the
safety case is generated from a formal analysis of automatically generated code, based on
automated theorem proving, and driven by a set of formal requirements and assumptions.
This is then extended by separately speci¯ed auxiliary information giving contexts, as-
sumptions, justi¯cations, and constraints, or additional forms of evidence derived from
other veri¯cation activities, such as testing. So far we have automatically constructed
property-oriented, requirement-oriented, architecture-oriented and proof-oriented safety
cases. For future work, we plan to automatically construct the heterogenous safety caseChapter 8 Heterogenous Safety Cases 134
described here. We hope our work will promote the use of formal mathematical ar-
guments in achieving con¯dence in the software safety. We also hope it will increase
con¯dence in the use of formal methods and also in the use of code generators in safety-
critical applications. However, as the integration of all safety cases produces larger
safety cases and increases the complexity, we plan to use an abstraction mechanisms to
highlight di®erent aspects of the integrated safety case. In particular, we plan to derive
a safety case for a speci¯c requirement or a speci¯c subsystem. We also plan to use
abstractions to construct minimal but consistent safety case slices that start from all
nodes representing speci¯c categories of information, e.g., veri¯cation tool information,
or testing results. So far, we have introduced an abstraction mechanism to handle proof
arguments but left an abstraction of the whole safety cases for future work.Chapter 9
Implementation and Preliminary
Assessment of the Approach
Chapter 9 describes the implementation and preliminary assessment of our approach
and summarizes our experience in applying it to code generated by an academic and
a commercial code generator, respectively. A checklist is described for whether the
constructed safety cases provide a convincing and valid argument that the program is
adequately safe for a given context in a given environment.
9.1 Introduction
In our thesis proposition (cf. Section 1.4, page 6) we stated our goal as \to develop
an approach to automatically construct safety cases from a formal analysis, based on
automated theorem proving, of the automatically generated code". In order to assess to
which extent we have achieved our goal, we need to assess
² whether it is feasible to automatically construct the safety cases based on the
formal program veri¯cation information;
² whether the claim-argument-evidence structure is acceptable; and
² whether the approach is applicable to industrial settings.
We demonstrate the principal feasibility of the approach by an implementation, and we
describe this in Section 9.2. To conclude that the claims deserve su±cient con¯dence
and are convincing, the arguments has to be well-structured, the right evidence has to be
used, the assumptions have to be acceptable and the reasoning has to be consistent. We
demonstrate this by a means of a safety case checklist, which is described in Section 9.3.
Further evidence is given by the acceptance of our safety case in the research community.
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So far, we have presented our work in several conferences, workshops and during the
GSN User Club Meeting and Adelard ASCE Meeting and also during the internship
at NASA Ames Research Center. Our approach has also been successfully applied to
AutoFilter Program Synthesis Tool [153] and MathWorks Real-Time Workshop [52] code
generators based on the information provided by the AutoCert system that has been
developed at NASA Ames.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to completely demonstrate the practical application of
our approach in wide areas within the timescale of a doctoral programme, so the answer
to this question remains somewhat inconclusive. However, we have demonstrated the
feasibility of the approach to a certain level by applying it to industrial applications
(i.e., to code generated by the AutoFilter system and Real-Time Workshop for NASA
projects) and by checking whether all undesired events as identi¯ed during the fault tree
analysis have been reasoned and argued. We also have successfully applied our safety
case patterns to automatically generate the safety cases for di®erent property-oriented,
requirement-oriented, architecture-oriented and proof-oriented safety cases.
9.2 Automating the Safety Case Generation
The development and acceptance of a safety case is a key element of safety regulation
in most safety-critical sectors [113, 145]. However, to the best of our knowledge, safety
cases are largely constructed manually (see for example [56, 99]) as no advance tool is
available to support a more automatic safety case construction: most existing safety case
construction tools only provide basic drawing support in a \boxes and arrows" style. For
example, GSN: ASCE v3.5 from Adelard [9] is a graphical tool for creating the nodes
and links of a safety argument based on a \drag-and-drop" interface. Similarly, the
University of York's Freeware Visio Add-on and the GSNCaseMaker [10] are Microsoft
Visio based software application that are compatible and compliant with the Microsoft
standard \drag-and-drop" interface. Cockram and Lockwood in [38] have described
several problems that arise in using a traditional, manual construction of safety cases.
This is an obviously time-consuming and expensive process, which will dramatically
slow down the construction of the safety case when we are dealing with large amounts
of artifacts. Obviously, tools supported by automated analyses are needed to deal with
a complex and huge safety argument. An automated safety case construction is also
needed when we are dealing with iterative software development and code generation,
as it can help to reduce time and cost in constructing the safety case.
As to be expected, the safety cases described in Chapter 4-8 quickly become too large
for manual development, even if all abstractions are applied. Fortunately, the bulk of
the argument is based on information provided by AutoCert system's formal program
analysis, and the argument structure follows the program and analysis structure, so thatChapter 9 Implementation and Preliminary Assessment of the Approach 137
a largely automated safety case construction is possible, and we integrate the analysis
with an existing commercial safety case tool to do so. However, some information
cannot be provided by the program analysis, such as environment constraints, external
assumptions, lists of related documents, or model names. This information must be
speci¯ed externally by a safety engineer. This also applies to the formalization of the
top-level safety requirements that drive AutoCert's analysis, and their integration with
the system-wide hazard analysis and safety case.
In order to support the automated safety case construction, we integrated AutoCert's
formal program analysis with Adelard's ASCE v3.5 tool [9]. AutoCert has been extended
to extract the manually speci¯ed information from its own input and to structure this
together with all information derived by the analysis into an XML format. The XML
¯le records all the relevant information needed for the safety case construction. Sub-
sequently, an XSLT program is used to transform the XML information into a second
XML format called GSN-XML that logically represents the structure of the safety case
as de¯ned by safety case patterns described in the previous chapters. The patterns were
speci¯cally designed so that the same argument structure can easily be adapted to other
programs and systems. Finally, we use a custom Java program to present the safety case
using GSN. The Java program helps to set the position of the nodes in the safety case
which involved some mathematical calculations and to represent the argument to follow
the standard Adelard ASCE ¯le format. This architecture avoids a tight integration of
the analysis (i.e., AutoCert) and presentation (i.e., ASCE) tools, and provides enough
°exibility to change the latter with little e®ort. Figure 9.1 summarizes the framework of
our safety case generation process. Unfortunately, the print quality of these large safety
cases is insu±cient for presentation, so we choose to recreate them in Microsoft Word
in this thesis.
￿
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9.2.1 Architecture of the Safety Case Generation
￿
Figure 9.2: Extended FSSC System Architecture
The Hoare-approach to safety certi¯cation is more °exible than special-purpose static
analysis tools such as PolySpace [18] that can only handle the comparatively simple
language-speci¯c properties. It also provides explicit evidence in the form of proofs,
which static analysis tools typically lack. In our work, we use the Hoare-style program
veri¯cation, in particular the formal software safety certi¯cation system (FSSC) to verify
the program safety. FSSC relies on annotations, i.e., logical assertions of program prop-
erties, at key locations in the code which are constructed by an annotation inference
algorithm. We construct the safety cases based on information from the annotation
inference algorithm and let it drive their core argument structure. Therefore, in the
existing architecture of the FSSC (cf. Figure 2.4), we integrate the safety case gener-
ator with the annotation inference engine in order to receive the annotation inference
information. In the extension, the inference engine will supply the information to the
safety case generator in form of an XML ¯le. The safety case generator will identify each
part of the program that can draw attention to potential certi¯cation problems and se-
lect appropriate evidence to demonstrate the correctness of the underlying safety claims
and the certi¯cation process. Figure 9.2 shows the FSSC system [43, 46, 47] extended
with the safety case construction. The overall architecture of the safety case generation
follows the same line as the FSSC system with the trusted components (in pink) and
untrusted components (in light blue). Here, the safety case generator is considered a
trusted component: while errors in the safety cases cannot invalidate the proofs (as theyChapter 9 Implementation and Preliminary Assessment of the Approach 140
construction of the logical annotations. For example, Figure 9.3 describes the safety
information of the variable Quat3. The formal proof for this variable requires that the
formalized safety requirement Quat3 :: quat(ECI;Body) holds for Nav.cpp at a single
location, lines 65-67, based on the applied annotation schema compute dcm ned body.
The validity of safety requirement for Quat3 relies on the safety requirements of vari-
ables Quat2, Azimuth, Heading, Geolat, Geoheight and Long. This list of dependent
variables are recorded as \dvar" in the XML document. Information about the paths
and the generated VCs is described similarly.
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Figure 9.4: XML: Proof Information
The XML document shown in Figure 9.4 describes the proof information derived from
the Muscadet prover. Here, the universal quanti¯er (i.e., which is represented as ! in
Muscadet) and implication elimination rules are used in proving the soundness of the
theorem 8[A;B;C] : (A ½ B) ^ (B ½ C) ) (A ½ C). In the XML document, objectChapter 9 Implementation and Preliminary Assessment of the Approach 141
refers to the arbitrary object used in 8 rule, id refers to the current proof step and
formula refers to the derived sub-theorem of the current proof step. These XML ¯les
are produced by a simple extension of Muscadet's existing proof output routines. Note
that the argumentation represented in these ¯les is much less abstract.
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Figure 9.5: XSLT: Transforming Program Certi¯cation Information into GSN-XML
XSLT Program. The XSLT program in Figure 9.5 extracts the particular data
from the formal program analysis and proof information ¯les as shown in Figure 9.3,
and transforms them into another XML document representing the logical struture of
the safety case. For example, the command xsl:apply-templates select=\hotvar/hotvar-
entry/hotvar-basevar-name" will select the speci¯c child element (i.e., hotvar-basevar-
name) and write the matching value (i.e., Quat3) to the respective location in the speci¯c
¯eld (i.e., goal) in the GSN-XML ¯le. The XSLT program in some sense implements
the generic safety case patterns described in Section 4.3, 5.3, and 6.3. Any changes toChapter 9 Implementation and Preliminary Assessment of the Approach 142
this boiler-plate texts can be done easily by changing the texts in these rules, while
structural changes would require new rules.
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Figure 9.6: XSLT: Transforming Proof Information into GSN-XML
In the proof-oriented case (see Figure 9.6), the transformation from XML to the GSN-
XML structure highly relies on the natural deduction rules and Muscadet rule templates
as described in Chapter 7. Here, each proof step will be transformed into a number of
goal, strategy, subgoal, justi¯cation, context or assumption nodes as de¯ned in the proof
templates, and each XSLT rule implements one of these transformations.
GSN-XML Document. GSN-XML logically represents the structure of safety cases
as de¯ned in the safety case patterns in Chapter 4-8. The GSN-XML in Figure 9.7 and
Figure 9.8 show the result of the transformation from XML document to GSN-XML
document through XSLT program. In our work, the GSN-XML document will be usedChapter 9 Implementation and Preliminary Assessment of the Approach 143
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿!"￿!#￿!￿"￿￿￿￿"￿￿ "￿!￿"￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿"￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿!￿￿
￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿!￿￿
￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ "!￿￿$%&’%(￿￿
￿ ￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿#￿￿￿
)￿￿￿!’￿￿￿￿!￿￿￿￿￿￿!"￿￿￿￿!￿￿￿￿￿￿￿!￿!￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿!"￿!￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿#￿￿
￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿!*￿￿￿*"!￿*+￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿!￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
Figure 9.7: GSN-XML: Program Certi¯cation Information
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Figure 9.8: GSN-XML: Proof Information
as an input to automatically generate the safety cases using a Java program.
Java Program. A Java program reads the GSN-XML document and structures the
GSN-XML information to follow the standard Adelard ASCE ¯le format. The mainChapter 9 Implementation and Preliminary Assessment of the Approach 144
reason to use Java rather than XSLT for this ¯nal transformation step is that it requires
the computation of layout information that is tedious to implement in XSLT. The posi-
tion of each node on the ASCE canvas is set based on the calculation of the horizontal
and vertical position.
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Figure 9.9: Code: Printing ASCE Node
For example, Figure 9.9 illustrates a program to print the ASCE node. Here, the ¯rst
statement of the code, i.e., getElementsByTagName(\argument") returns all child and
nested child elements within the speci¯ed tag name (i.e., argument). The for-loop state-
ment continues to run until the number of nodes (i.e., goal) in the argument is complete.
Each ASCE node requires a value for the node reference, layout, type of node, user-id,
user-title, status-¯elds and HTML-annotation, as described in ASCE's GSN schema [7].
In ASCE, the di®erent nodes have di®erent node types. For example 1-goal, 2-solution,
3-strategy, 4-assumption, 5-justi¯cation, 6-context, 7-model, 8-nodes and 9-option. We
introduce constraint as a new node type (i.e., 10-constraint) on top of the existing ASCE
node types. Figure 9.10 shows the output generated by this program.
Figure 9.11 shows a program to create a link between ASCE nodes. Each link should
contain information about the link reference, type of the link (e.g., 1-issolvedby, 2-
incontextof, 3-interation0to1 and 4-iterationn), strength, source-reference, destination-Chapter 9 Implementation and Preliminary Assessment of the Approach 145
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Figure 9.10: ASCE Node Information
reference and attachment position [7]. Figure 9.12 shows the output generated by this
program.
9.3 Evaluation through Safety Case Checklist
We provide a safety case checklist for checking
² whether we have shown that all faults as identi¯ed during the fault tree analysis
in Chapter 3 have been reasoned and argued in the safety cases;
² whether we have constructed a convincing argument and provided valid evidence
for the software safety;
² whether we have not violated any safety case rules.
In the safety case checklist, we identify the locations where the di®erent safety cases (i.e.,
property-oriented, requirement-oriented, architecture-oriented and proof-oriented) have
dealt with these three issues (i.e., the location on where the issues have been shown to be
reasoned and controlled). We have shown that we have provided a convincing and valid
argument that the program is adequately safe for a given context in a given environmentChapter 9 Implementation and Preliminary Assessment of the Approach 146
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Figure 9.12: ASCE Link Information
based on the formal program analysis proofs or other veri¯cation and validation evidence.
We also check the argument structure of the safety cases to ensure they follow the
standard guidelines as described in [86]. Table 9.1 shows the safety case checklist to
audit the completeness and consistency of the safety cases wrt. the fault tree analysis
and Table 9.2 illustrates the safety case checklist to audit the structure of the safety
cases.Chapter 9 Implementation and Preliminary Assessment of the Approach 147
Table 9.1: Safety Case Checklist: Fault Tree Analysis (adapted from [55])
 
  Description  Yes  No  Example  Page 
Fault Tree Analysis 
Have all undesired events that might invalidate the safety claim construction been cleared? 
F1  Missed potentially unsafe location in the program 
E1  Incomplete or incorrect 
formalization and localization  
of requirement 
Show evidence on correct formalization 
and localization of the requirement 
√    S10: Arguing over  formalization 
and localization of the 
requirement 
135 
 
 
E2  Incomplete program coverage 
E2.1  Missing variables  Assume complete list of variables 
 
√    As4: Complete list of variables  133 
E2.2  Missing variable occurrences  Assume complete list of  occurrences  √    As5: Complete list of 
occurrences   
133 
E2.3  Missing paths  Assume complete list of  paths  √    As17: Complete list of paths    136 
E3  Missing VCs  Assume complete list of VCs  √    As18:  Complete list of VCs    136 
E4  Missing or incorrect critical 
annotation 
Correct annotation is constructed at key 
program locations 
√    S12: Argument over 
establishment, maintenance and 
strength of variable safety) 
136 
F2  Erroneous conclusion that all locations in the program are safe   
E6  Incorrect hypotheses at the 
particular location 
Show the validity of establishment, 
maintenance and sufficiency of 
hypotheses in deriving the proofs  
√    S12: Argument over 
establishment, maintenance and 
sufficiency of safety conditions 
136 
E6.1  Incorrect hypothesis form 
definition 
Show hypothesis is correctly established 
on the correct path 
√ 
 
  G(SC1):  Sufficient conditions 
are established on all paths 
136 
E6.1.1  Definition on incorrect path  Show the correct definition from the 
correct path is used 
E6.1.2  Definition has incorrect 
annotation 
Show definition is constructed correctly at 
the correct location  
 E6.2  Hypotheses not maintained 
correctly along paths 
Show hypotheses are maintained from 
def-location to use-location 
√    G(SC2): Sufficient conditions 
are maintained on all paths  
136 
E6.3  Hypotheses for different paths 
inconsistent 
Show  consistency of the hypotheses in 
all paths 
√    G(SC3): Conditions from each 
path imply required property 
136 
E7  Invalid proof  Show validity of the proof found by 
automated theorem prover 
√    S19: Prove correctness of the 
VCs using automated theorem 
proving 
137 
 
E7.1  Invalid domain theory - show correctness of domain theory 
E7.1.2   Invalid axioms  Show correctness of the axioms  √    S20: Test correctness of the 
axiom <axiom-x> 
137 
E7.1.1  Incorrect library function  Show library function is correctly specified   √    S16: Test library function <lib-x> 
against specification 
136 
E7.1.3   Invalid certification assumptions  Highlight and justify assumptions that are 
actually used 
√    S7: Argument using minimum 
set of external certification 
assumptions 
134 
E7.2  Incorrect mechanism - show correctness of certification mechanism 
E7.2.1  Unreliable ATP  Show validity of the proofs found by 
automated theorem prover 
√    S19: Prove correctness of the 
VCs using automated theorem 
proving 
137 
 
E7.2.2  Unreliable proof checker  Show validity of the proofs found by 
automated theorem prover 
√    S19: Prove correctness of the 
VCs using automated theorem 
proving  
137 
 
E8  Incorrect safety obligation  Show that safety condition holds at 
particular location 
√    S12: Argument over 
establishment, maintenance and 
sufficiency of safety conditions 
136 
E8.2  Incorrect formalization of safety 
policy 
Prove soundness and completeness of 
safety policy 
  √  G(SCR1): Formalization of 
safety policies are adequate 
131 
E8.3  Incorrect safety predicate  Justified that safety condition is derived 
by instantiation of the safety predicate 
over occurrences 
√    J4: Safety condition is derived 
by instantiation of the safety 
predicate over occurrences 
133 
E8.1   Incorrect critical annotation  Correct annotation is constructed at key 
program locations 
√    S12: Argument over 
establishment, maintenance and 
sufficiency of safety conditions 
136 
E8.4  VCG constructed incorrect VCs  Prove correctness of each individual VC 
by automated theorem proving 
√    S19: Prove correctness of the 
VCs using automated theorem 
proving 
137 
9.4 Industrial Applications
Two real industrial applications have been chosen as examples throughout the course
of this research. The ¯rst application uses the formal program veri¯cation informationChapter 9 Implementation and Preliminary Assessment of the Approach 148
Table 9.2: Safety Case Checklist: Argument Structure (adapted from [55])
 
 
 
  Description  Yes  No  Example  Page 
Argument Structure 
Is the argument structure easy to follow and convincing? 
1.    Is the overall claim clear and 
unambiguous statement? 
Uses Noun-Phrase Verb-Phrase form  √    GL1: Variable <var-x> in 
<sw-id> represents the 
signal <signal-x> in the 
<model-x> (localization) 
 
135 
2.    Is each strategy set out a simple 
predicate? 
Uses standard forms:  
“Argument over <approach>” 
“Argument based <approach>” 
“Argument using <approach>” 
“Argument of <approach>” 
  
√    S1: Argument based on 
proof of partial 
correctness wrt. the 
given requirements 
 
131 
3.    Is the strategy necessary and sufficient 
to show the claim is true? 
Consider all undesired events that might 
invalidate the safety claim construction  √    S5: Argument over each 
requirement individually 
 
134 
4.    Is each branch of argument structure 
terminated in evidence? 
No claim or argument without evidence 
in the safety case  √    E1: Name mapping in 
information in the source 
code checked by <Y> 
 
135 
5.    Is all evidence clear, relevant and 
conclusive in showing the argument to 
be true? 
The validity of formal proof is supported 
by other verification and validation 
activities such as testing (i.e., different 
forms of evidence to give sufficient 
confidence) 
 
√    E3: Inspection of test 
results  by Subject 
Matter Expert (SME) 
 
136 
6.    Is the context clear and sufficient to 
support the attached node? 
Context is used in two forms: 
“Reference to contextual information” 
“Statement of contextual information” 
√    Con1: The software 
consists of the following 
modules: <modules> 
 
131 
 
 
 
 
 
7.    Have all assumptions been clearly 
stated?  
Support the claim, strategy and solution.  √    As6: No requirement is 
used as an assumption  
 
134 
8.    Have all justifications to justify the 
rationale for the use of particular 
goal/strategy/evidence been clearly 
stated? 
Describe rationale for the adoption or 
establishment of goal, strategy and 
evidence. 
√    J3: Soundness and 
completeness of safety 
policy 
 
133 
9.    Have all restrictions imposed in which 
argument can be achieved been clearly 
stated? 
 
Limitation of the approach or claim.  √    C2: Certification works 
on source level 
representation only 
131 
10.   Is the level of decomposition of the 
argument is appropriate? Can it be 
simplified? 
 
Restructure the resulting safety case to 
help in emphasizing the essential 
information. 
√    J5: Architecture-oriented 
safety case 
134 
11.    Is the model explicitly described?  Reference to strategy, goal or solution.  √    M1: Hoare style program 
verification using specific 
proof rules 
131 
12.   Any violation of the safety case approach? 
 
Strategies have direct solution  Strategies cannot have direct link to 
solution. Only subgoals or goals can 
have direct link to solution. 
  √     
Solutions supported by other elements  Solutions should be the last node of the 
argument without any further “is-solved-
by” link. 
  √     
Missing links (in-context of, is-solved by)  All nodes are linked either with “In-
context-of” or “Is-solved-by” links.    √     
for the code that has been automatically generated by the AutoFilter system developed
at NASA Ames Research Center. The second application uses the formal program ver-
i¯cation information for code that has been automatically generated for NASA Project
Constellation uses Real-Time Workshop for its GN&C systems. In both cases, we use
the AutoCert system [52] to support the subsequent certi¯cation of the codes created by
the code generators. We only concentrate on natural deduction style proofs found for
the subsequent certi¯cation of both generated codes. The applications of the approach
have been described in detail in Chapter 4-8. The list below describes the reasons of
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² Generator - two di®erent generators in order to show that our approach is in-
dependent of the underlying code generator and program. We use an academic
(i.e., AutoFilter) and a commercial (i.e., Real-Time Workshop) code generator to
assess the °exibility of the approach from a small and simple code to the large and
complicated one. Both generators produce code that is substantially di®erent in
style.
{ AutoFilter: Synthesis of State Estimation Software. AutoFilter is a generator
that automatically generates implementations in C or Modula-2 that solves
state estimation problems using Kalman ¯lters algorithm.
{ Mathworks Real-Time Workshop. Real-Time Workshop is a commercial model-
based code generator that generates executable C code from Simulink or Mat-
lab models.
² Certi¯cation Context - two types of requirements, i.e., safety properties and safety
requirements in order to show that our approach is independent of the given cer-
ti¯cation requirements.
{ Safety Property. A safety property is a property stating that \something bad
does never happens" during the execution of the program. A safety property is
an invariant that needs to hold everywhere in the program. Two general types
of safety properties are considered in this work, language-speci¯c properties
and domain-speci¯c properties. However so far, we only implement the work
to language speci¯c properties. We hope the same derivation can be applied to
domain speci¯c properties as well. Language-speci¯c properties concern the
safety aspects of the code which depend on the semantics of the programming
language, while domain-speci¯c properties concern the use of the code in a
particular domain.
{ Safety Requirement. A safety requirement is usually related to the functional
requirements of the system. It has usually been identi¯ed during the hazard
analysis of the overall system. Safety requirements are assertions that need
to hold at particular occurrence in the program, initially at the end of the
program, and thus have more of a liveness \°avor".
² Formal Program Veri¯cation Approach and Evidence - we use a formal program
analysis, in particular AutoCert system that is based on the Hoare-style program
veri¯cation approach in order to provide the highest level of assurance for code
safety. We believe that formal program veri¯cation can provide the highest level
of assurance when they are combined with explicit safety arguments as the one we
derived here.
{ AutoCert System. AutoCert is implemented as a generator-independent plug-
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veri¯es that the auto-generated code is free of certain safety violations and
complies wrt. all given safety requirements and safety properties. AutoCert
approach is independent of the particular generator used, and need only be
customized by the appropriate set of annotation patterns.
² Natural Deduction Proofs. We concentrate on natural deduction style proofs, which
are closer to human reasoning than resolution proofs, and show how to construct
the safety cases by covering the natural deduction proof tree with corresponding
safety case fragments. Moreover, the conversion from ND proofs to safety cases is
fairly straightforward. In our work, we show how the safety case approach can be
applied to the natural deduction proofs found by the Muscadet prover.
9.5 Conclusions
This chapter has described steps that have been used to assess the feasibility of the work
presented in Chapter 4-8. It starts with an explanation about the architecture of the
safety case generation and shows some pieces of executable code in Java and XSLT that
are used to automatically generate the safety cases. We also explain the justi¯cations
for why we chose particular industrial applications and tools in the research. Safety case
checklists to assess the consistency of the generated safety cases toward the identi¯ed
hazards in fault tree analysis and to inspect the correctness of the argument structure
presented are discussed in this chapter as well. Although it is not possible to evaluate
the feasibility of approach more explicitly in wider areas, due to time limitations, we
believe the approach of constructing the safety cases from the formal program veri¯ca-
tion information has been successfully shown to be feasible for arguing the safety of a
program. The following chapter summarizes the work presented in this thesis and lists
future works related to the research.Chapter 10
Conclusions
Chapter 10 describes the conclusions, main contributions, and areas of future work.
10.1 Main Contributions
The thesis has described an approach to systematically and automatically derive safety
cases from formal program veri¯cation information of automatically generated code. The
approach has been developed from a conceptual basis to a practical implementation of
the concepts using the Goal Structuring Notation. The approach has been successfully
illustrated on code generated by the AutoFilter system and the Real-Time Workshop,
i.e., ranging from the small and less complicated to large and complicated code. The
purpose of the constructed safety cases is to gain con¯dence in the claims of the formal
program veri¯cation process by providing a defensible argument for the safety of the
software. The contributions of the research presented in this thesis are as follows:
² Analysis of the possible events that might invalidate the assurance claims provided
by proofs of the safety of the program.
² Development of the safety cases from information collected during a formal analysis
of automatically generated code.
² Introduction of an approach to combine diverse types of information from hetero-
geneous veri¯cation and validation sources into a single, integrated safety case.
² Development of software safety argument patterns which will guide in the con-
struction of the safety cases.
² Introduction of an approach to construct safety cases automatically by integrating
the AutoCert formal program veri¯cation system with one of the most widely used
commercial safety case tools, i.e., Adelard ASCE v3.5.
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The following sections elaborate the contributions and draw conclusions related to each
of them. They also discuss our contributions in relation to other research.
10.1.1 Fault Tree Analysis
Leveson et al. [94, 96, 97] claim that a detailed and dedicated software safety analysis
and veri¯cation procedure is required to provide extra assurance on the system-safety
level. Therefore, they have introduced software fault tree analysis (SFTA) as a method
to analyze the safety aspects of software. For example, SFTA has been applied to
analyzing the software safety aspects in the product lines [41] and in the assembly
language program written in Ada [96]. However, Leveson et al. state that SFTA is not
a substitute for the veri¯cation and validation procedures. Static analysis of the code is
thus required for a better assurance [96]. Unlike in other SFTA applications, our work
uses a fault tree analysis to identify the hazards that can lead to failures in the program
veri¯cation system and thus can invalidate its claims about the system safety.
In our work, we need to make the simpli¯ed but conservative assumption that every
violation of the given requirement is a \potential condition that can cause harm to
personnel, system, property or environment" or a hazard because we try to provide some
safety assurance already before the full application context of the software is known. A
fault tree demonstrates the interaction logic between the undesired events in the program
and the certi¯cation system, and how this could lead to an undetected violation of the
given requirements (i.e., safety requirements and properties). The fault tree analysis
focuses on the interaction between the code generator and the certi¯cation system. It
removes all doubts concerning the correctness (i.e., whether each proof step is legal
in the underlying calculus) and validity of the proofs or the correctness of any other
certi¯cation tools involved in the construction of the assurance claim. Results from the
analysis are presented in a tree structure with the undesirable event (i.e., an undetected
violation of a safety property or safety requirement) at the root and the causing events
at the bottom of the tree.
10.1.2 Approach to Construct Safety Case for the Formal Program
Veri¯cation of Auto-Generated Code
Nowadays, the development and acceptance of safety argument or safety case is a key
element of safety regulation in most of safety-critical sectors [113, 145]. For example,
Weaver [146] in his thesis presents arguments that re°ect the contribution of software to
the safety-critical system and Reinhardt [123] presents arguments over the application of
the C++ programming language in the safety-critical systems. Similarly, our approach
works in the same context, i.e., presents arguments over the safety of the generated
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et al. [26] present arguments over the correctness of the speci¯cation mapping, i.e., a
translation from the system speci¯cations into a model and subsequently into a code.
This is similar to our approach of showing the correct formalization and localization of
the requirement.
With the increased use of model-based development in safety-critical applications, the
integration of safety cases into such approaches have become an important research
topic. For example, Chen et al. [35] introduce an integration of model-based engineering
with safety analysis and safety cases to help in assessing decisions in system design of
automotive embedded systems. Similarly, Wu [157] introduces a framework to facilitate
the safe architectural design in safety-critical applications. Hause and Thom [71] de-
scribe how SysML and UML can be used to model system requirements and how the
safety requirement and other system elements identi¯ed in the system design were used
to construct the safety case. However, the focus in this research is on extending the
modelling framework to represent safety cases using the applied notation. In contrast,
in our work, we construct a safety case that argues along the hierarchical structure of
systems in model-based design and show how the hierarchy of requirements is aligned
with the hierarchical model structure. Rushby [126] also uses automated theorem prov-
ing technology (based on the Yices SMT solver) to make a safety argument, but does
not construct a detailed safety case. Moreover, his analysis starts with a manually con-
structed logic-based model of the system, where the connection to the underlying code
remains unclear while our approach works directly on the code.
In order to demonstrate a compelling argument on software safety assurance, Hawkins
and Kelly in [72] provide a framework for justifying the arguments and evidence required
to demonstrate su±cient assurance in the software. Littlewood and Wright [100] state
that the probability of a claim, which has been shown by a formal proof, being false, is
very low, when the assumptions and evidence are valid. As pointed out by Littlewood
and Wright [100], we believe substantial con¯dence can be placed if the validity of the
underlying proof construction can be shown. We also believe a proof-based veri¯cation
is su±cient to provide assurance on safety of the program. Other work supports our
view. Galloway et al. [62] present arguments for technology substitution, i.e., argue over
substitution of testing with a proof-based veri¯cation technique in the context of the
certi¯cation standards such as DO-178B [61], and Habli and Kelly [66, 67, 68] carried out
research in constructing a safety argument to facilitate the justi¯cation and presentation
of formal analysis in supporting testing techniques as presented in the software standards.
Similarly, our work falls into the same context, i.e., to justify the application of a formal
program analysis method in providing assurance for the software safety and the use
formal proofs as an evidence.
However, all of these works [62, 66, 67, 68] remain completely generic and do not take
the actual code into account. Our work in contrast focuses on constructing a defensi-
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requirements and safety properties) and how the code can be concluded to be su±-
ciently safe and correct based on the evidence (i.e., formal proofs and others veri¯cation
and validation artifacts) available. The core argument structure of the safety case is
derived from a formal analysis of automatically generated code, based on automated
theorem proving, and driven by a set of requirements and assumptions. We also con-
struct safety cases that recover the system structure and component hierarchy from the
code, providing independent assurance of both code and model. This is then extended
by separately speci¯ed auxiliary information giving contexts, assumptions, justi¯cations,
and constraints, or additional forms of evidence derived from other veri¯cation activities,
such as testing. In addition, we also construct safety cases that correspond to formal
proofs found by automated theorem provers and reveal their underlying argumentation
structure and top-level assumptions.
10.1.3 Software Safety Argument Patterns
The software safety argument patterns presented in this thesis are a generalization of
the detailed arguments for arguing the safety and correctness of software based on a for-
mal analysis of the program. The patterns provide reusable goal structures that can be
used for the construction of the property-oriented, requirement-oriented, architecture-
oriented and proof-oriented safety cases for concrete programs. Each pattern tackles only
one aspect of the overall structure of the safety argument contained within a heteroge-
neous safety case. Weaver in [146] provides patterns for arguing selection of evidence in
assuring safety of the software wrt. the system safety requirements. In his thesis, Weaver
distinguishes system safety requirements into safety feature requirements and hazard-
based requirements. Safety feature requirements relate to either software safety function
and safety property while hazard-based requirements are de¯ned as a system behavior
at the system-environment boundary that can lead to unsafe actions (e.g., hardware,
software or human failure). The main focus of the arguments in his thesis [146] is on
arguing over safety of software wrt. hazard-based requirements. Our work is based on
the same objective, i.e., to provide patterns for arguing acceptability of the software
safety, but we focus on safety of the program wrt. safety feature requirements, in partic-
ular safety property and safety requirement. Moreover, our patterns focus on showing
how we can establish trust, from the evidence available (i.e., formal proofs), that the
software is safe and correct wrt. all given safety requirements. Our safety case patterns
are generic as they can be used as templates in the automatic safety case construction.
Some of nodes in the safety case patterns are ¯xed (i.e., can be reused in new contexts
or applications without being changed much from the original). In principle, our safety
case patterns are independent of the given requirements and program, and consequently
also independent of the underlying code generator, as the general safety considerations
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10.1.4 Automatic Safety Case Generation Approach
Manual safety case construction is impractical, especially when demonstrating the safety
and correctness of large and complex software-intensive systems as it requires mar-
shalling large amounts of diverse information, e.g., models, code, speci¯cations, math-
ematical equations and formulas. The resulting safety cases might consist of various
arguments and auxiliary types of evidence and thus, it is hard to trace the relation be-
tween the claim, argument and the evidence presented. Cockram and Lockwood in [38]
have described several problems in using traditional (manual) safety case construction.
Issues such as coordinating and maintaining the complex safety case especially when
dealing with iterative software development might weaken the motivation to use the
safety case technique. Therefore, tools supported by automated analyses are needed to
help in the development of a complex safety case.
Several e®orts have been made to improve the safety case construction and to manage
the artifacts used in the safety case. For example, eSafety Cases [38] build by Praxis
HIS is a tool to automate the creation of a link from the safety case to the related
material (in Adobe Acrobat Reader and HTML browsers) by a means of hypertext.
This tool uses an intranet technology to provide a hyperlink to the safety case's relevant
documents. Fararooy [13] introduces the ISCaDe software package as a means to help
in the development and maintenance of a safety case. This software package, however,
requires the goals, strategies, justi¯cations and other argument elements to be de¯ned
in the safety case module before it can be automatically transformed into the safety case
diagram. Our approach, in contrast, not only provides hypertext links to the related
resources but also automatically generates the safety case without requiring any of the
argument's elements to be de¯ned in advance.
In our work, we introduce an approach to automatically construct the safety case from
the formal program veri¯cation information. We integrate the AutoCert [52] formal
program veri¯cation system with an existing safety case construction tool i.e., Adelard's
ASCE v3.5 tool [9]. The integration allows us to automatically derive safety cases from
the information collected during the formal program veri¯cation phase together with
some speci¯ed veri¯cation and validation information, such as testing results.
10.2 Limitations
While the presented work has successfully been applied to the formal program veri¯ca-
tion of automatically generated code, it has several limitations that must be acknowl-
edged as below.
1. We assume that the calculus is sound and the formalization of the safety policy is
adequate, as we have not yet expanded the corresponding arguments in this work.Chapter 10 Conclusions 156
Similarly, we assume that the implementation of the VCG, ATP and all auxiliary
components used for constructing and proving VCs are correct.
2. We construct the argument based on the safety requirements and external assump-
tions as given only. Hence, missing safety requirements or invalid assumptions can
weaken or invalidate the assurance claims.
3. We rely on the AutoCert system to provide the information underlying the safety
case construction. Any limitations (e.g., in the expressiveness) or failures of the
AutoCert also limit the applicability and practicability of our approach.
4. We rely on o®-the-shelf ATPs to prove the constructed VCs. The full safety case
can only be constructed of these do not fail. If they fail to prove some of the
VCs, these VCs become assumptions to the safety case. We do not handle the
case where the ATPs refute VCs as invalid, which would indicate a violation of
the stated safety property respectively safety requirement.
5. We have not yet performed an intensive evaluation of the approach, e.g., using
questionnaires.
10.3 Future Work Directions
The future work directions we intend to pursue are outlined below.
1. A complementary safety case that argues the safety of the certi¯cation framework,
in particular the safety of the underlying safety logic (i.e., the soundness of Hoare-
calculus, the language semantic and safety policy) should be constructed.
2. An additional structuring mechanism to manage and present the structure of the
generated safety cases, for example, a plug-in to exploit the abstraction feature
in the ASCE v3.5 tool, should be developed. As the safety cases are generated
automatically, their sizes are highly dependent on the given formal program ver-
i¯cation information and the safety cases can easily get too large and complex,
i.e., the scalability issue. In order to reduce the complexity and also for a better
understanding, a simplify structure should be introduced (such as an away goal to
support the backing evidence of the argument) and a plug-in to support the ab-
straction mechanism should also be provided. The abstraction mechanism should
be able to derive safety cases that highlight di®erent safety aspects and construct
minimal but consistent safety case of a particular requirement or a particular sub-
system.
3. A prototype of the automatic safety case generation for the heterogeneous safety
case should be implemented.Chapter 10 Conclusions 157
4. More tools such as other commercial code generators and formal program veri¯-
cation systems should be integrated with the approach.
5. The approach should be evaluated in more detail, e.g., by integration with any
safety case evaluation systems [39] or via questionnaires that assess the clarity and
completeness of the safety cases presented and by using a bottom-up analysis to
check the completeness of the fault tree analysis results.
10.4 Concluding Remarks
Based on formal proofs, formal methods can in principle provide the highest level of
assurance of the code's safety. However, the formal proofs by themselves are no panacea
in software safety assurance, and it is important to make explicit which claims are
actually proven, and on which assumptions and reasoning principles both the claim and
the proof rest. We believe that purely technical solutions such as proof checking [156] fall
short of the assurance provided by our safety case, since they do not take into account
the reasoning that goes into the construction of the VCs. We also believe that a purely
manual construction of the safety cases is too slow and too expensive to cope with the
challenges posed by iterative and model-based software development approaches. We
believe that our approach to automatically instantiate safety case patterns strikes the
right balance.
We consider the safety cases as a ¯rst step towards a fully-°edged software certi¯cate
management system [45]. We believe that the result of this research, that is, a combined
safety case (i.e., for the program being certi¯ed, an integration with other veri¯cation
and validation information, as well as the safety logic and the certi¯cation system), will
clearly communicate the safety claims, key safety requirements, and evidence required
to trust the program. We also believe that our approach helps to begins establish trust
in the application of proof-based veri¯cation in safety-critical systems. We hope that
the interest expressed in some of the concepts within this research will lead to industrial
application of the ideas, and improvements in the development and assessment of safety-
critical software.Appendix A
Roles and Principles of FSSC
Components
158Bibliography
[1] Code Smith Tool. http://www.codesmithtools.com, First Accessed: 13th June
2008.
[2] DBOW - The Database Object Generator http://dbow.sourceforge.net/, First Ac-
cessed: 13th June 2008.
[3] dbQwikSite http://www.dbqwiksite.com, First Accessed: 13th June 2008.
[4] Real-Time Workshop Embedded Coder 5.1. http://www.mathworks.com/products
/rtwembedded/, First Accessed: 13th June 2008.
[5] Web Application Code Generator. http://www.gigaframe.com/software/ webap-
plicationgeneratornet/tabid/83/default.aspx, First Accessed: 13th June 2008.
[6] Wrapper Code Generator for MS SQL Server Databases.
http://www.codeproject.com/kb/database/csharp wrapper.aspx, First Accessed:
13th June 2008.
[7] Adelard ASCE-GSN 1.2 Schema, First Accessed: 15th April 2008.
[8] NI MATRIXx 8.1. http://www.ni.com/matrixx/, First Accessed: 18th August
2009.
[9] ASCE v3.5 from Adelard. http://www.adelard.co.uk, First Accessed: 1st October
2007.
[10] CET GSNCaseMaker. http://www.esafetycase.com, First Accessed: 1st October
2007.
[11] eSafetyCase from Praxis High Integrity Systems. http://www.esafetycase.com,
First Accessed: 1st October 2007.
[12] Failure Analysis Methods, Tools and Services.
http://www.aldservice.com/en/fracas/failure-analysis-methods-and-tools.html,
First Accessed: 1st October 2007.
[13] ISCaDE (Integrated Safety Case Development Environment) from RCM2.
http://www.iscade.co.uk, First Accessed: 1st October 2007.
162163
[14] SpecTRM:Speci¯cation Tools and Requirements Methodology.
http://www.safeware-eng.com, First Accessed: 1st October 2007.
[15] Template-Based Code Generation with Apache Velocity.
http://onjava.com/pub/a/onjava/2004/05/05/cg-vel1.html?page=2, First Ac-
cessed: 1st October 2007.
[16] Uni¯ed Modeling Language http://www.uml.org/., First Accessed: 1st October
2007.
[17] SCADE suite KCG- DO-178B Code Generator http://www.esterel-
technologies.com/products/scade-suite/do-178b-code-generation, First Accessed:
1st October 2009.
[18] PolySpace Technologies. http://www.polyspace.com, First Accessed: 5th Febru-
ary 2008.
[19] J.R. Abrial. The B-Method - Assigning Programs to Meanings. Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1996.
[20] National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Mars Climate Orbiter
Crash. Mars Climate Orbiter Mishap Investigation Board Phase I Report, Novem-
ber 1999.
[21] K.Y. Ahn and E. Denney. Testing First-Order Logic Axioms in Program Veri¯ca-
tion. To appear in Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Tests and
Proofs (TAP'10), LNCS, Malaga, Spain, July 2010. Springer.
[22] J. Aldrich. Lecture Notes: Hoare Logic. School of Computer Science, Carnegie
Mellon University, 2007.
[23] B. Alpern and F.B. Schneider. De¯ning Liveness. Technical report, Cornell Uni-
versity, Ithaca, NY, USA, 1984.
[24] A.R. Anderson and N. Belnap. Entailment: The Logic of Relevance and Necessity.
Princeton University Press, 1975.
[25] P.B. Andrews. Transforming Matings into Natural Deduction Proofs. In Proceed-
ings of the 5th Conference on Automated Deduction, LNCS 87, pages 281{292.
Springer, 1980.
[26] N. Audsley, I. Bate, and S. Crook-Dawkins. Automatic Code Generation for
Airborne Systems. In Proceedings of the IEEE Aerospace Conference, volume 4,
pages 8{15. IEEE, 2003.
[27] J. Barnes. High Integrity Software: The SPARK Approach to Safety and Security.
Addison-Wesley, Boston, MA, USA, 2003.164
[28] J.C. Bicarregui, J.S. Fitzgerald, P.A. Lindsay, R. Moore, and B. Ritchie. Proof in
VDM: A Practitioner's Guide. Springer, New York, USA, 1994.
[29] P. Bishop and R. Bloom¯eld. A Methodology for Safety Case Development. In
Industrial Perspectives of Safety-critical Systems: Proceedings of the Sixth Safety-
Critical Systems Symposium, pages 194{203, Birmingham, 1998. Springer.
[30] P. Bishop, R. Bloom¯eld, L. Emmet, C. Jones, and P. Froome. Adelard Safety
Case Development Manual. Adelard, London, 1998.
[31] R.G. Brown and P.Y.C. Hwang. Introduction to Random Signals and Applied
Kalman Filtering. John Wiley and Sons, 3rd edition, 1997.
[32] J-L. Camus and B. Dion. E±cient Development of Airborne Software with SCADE
Suite - DO-178B White Paper. Esterel Technologies, 2003.
[33] A. Cawsey. Explanation and Interaction. MIT Press, 1992.
[34] S. Chaki, A. Gur¯nkel, K. Wallnau, and C. Weinstock. Assurance Cases for Proofs
as Evidence. In Proceedings of the Workshop on Proof-Carrying Code and Software
Certi¯cation (PCC'09), pages 23{28, 2009.
[35] D.-J. Chen, R. Johansson, H. LÄ onn, Y. Papadopoulos, A. Sandberg F. TÄ orner,
and M. TÄ orngren. Modelling Support for Design of Safety-critical Automotive
Embedded Systems. In Proceedings of the 29th International Conference on Com-
puter Safety, Reliability and Security (SAFECOMP'08), LNCS 5219, pages 72{85.
Springer, 2008.
[36] D. Chester. The Translation of Formal Proofs into English. Arti¯cial Intelligence,
7(3):261{278, 1976.
[37] E.M. Clarke and J.M. Wing. Formal Methods: State of the Art and Future
Directions. ACM Computing Survey, 28(4):626{643, 1996.
[38] T. Cockram and B. Lockwood. Electronic Safety Cases: Challenges and Oppor-
tunities. In Proceedings of Safety Critical Systems Symposium. Springer, 2003.
[39] L. Cyra and J. Grski. Expert Assessment of Arguments: A Method and Its
Experimental Evaluation. In Proceedings of the 27th International Conference on
Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security (SAFECOMP'08), LNCS 5219, pages
291{304. Springer, 2008.
[40] K. Czarnecki and U.W. Eisenecker. Generative Programming: Methods, Tools,
and Applications. Addison-Wesley, 2000.
[41] J. Dehlinger and R.R. Lutz. Software Fault Tree Analysis for Product Lines. In
Proceedings of the 8th IEEE International Symposium on High-Assurance Systems
Engineering (HASE'04), pages 12{21. IEEE Computer Society, 2004.165
[42] E. Denney and B. Fischer. Explaining Veri¯cation Conditions. In Proceedings of
the 12th International Conference on Algebraic Methodology and Software Tech-
nology (AMAST'08), LNCS 5140, pages 145{159.
[43] E. Denney and B. Fischer. Correctness of Source-Level Safety Policies. In Pro-
ceedings of the Formal Methods (FM'03), LNCS 2805, pages 894{913. Springer,
2003.
[44] E. Denney and B. Fischer. Certi¯able Program Generation. In Proceedings of the
Generative Programming and Component Engineering (GPCE'05), LNCS 3676,
pages 17{28. Springer, 2005.
[45] E. Denney and B. Fischer. Software Certi¯cation and Software Certi¯cate Man-
agement Systems (position paper). pages 1{5, Long Beach, California, USA, 2005.
[46] E. Denney and B. Fischer. Annotation Inference for Safety Certi¯cation of
Automatically Generated Code (extended abstract). In Proceedings of the
21st IEEE/ACM International Conference on Automated Software Engineering
(ASE'06), pages 265{268. IEEE Computer Society, 2006.
[47] E. Denney and B. Fischer. A Generic Annotation Inference Algorithm for the
Safety Certi¯cation of Automatically Generated Code. In Proceedings of the Gen-
erative Programming and Component Engineering (GPCE'06), pages 121{130.
ACM Press, 2006.
[48] E. Denney and B. Fischer. A Veri¯cation-driven Approach to Traceability and
Documentation for Auto-generated Mathematical Software. In Proceedings of
the 24th International Conference on Automated Software Engineering (ASE'09),
pages 560{564. IEEE/ACM, 2009.
[49] E. Denney, B. Fischer, and J. Schumann. Adding Assurance to Automatically
Generated Code. In Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on High-
Assurance Systems Engineering (HASE'04), pages 297{299. IEEE Press, 2004.
[50] E. Denney, B. Fischer, J. Schumann, and J. Richardson. Automatic Certi¯cation
of Kalman Filters for Reliable Code Generation. In Proceedings of the IEEE
Aerospace Conference, Big Sky, Montana, March 2005. IEEE.
[51] E. Denney, J. Power, and K. Tourlas. Hiproofs: A Hierarchical Notion of Proof
Tree. In Proceedings of the 21st Annual Conference on Mathematical Foundations
of Programming Semantics (MFPS XXI), ENTCS 155, pages 341{359, 2006.
[52] E. Denney and S. Trac. A Software Safety Certi¯cation Tool for Automatically
Generated Guidance, Navigation and Control Code. In IEEE Aerospace Confer-
ence, Big Sky, MT, USA, 2008.166
[53] G. Despotou. Managing the Evolution of Dependability Cases for Systems of Sys-
tems. PhD thesis, University of York, 2007.
[54] R.V. Engelen, L. Wolters, and G. Cats. CTADEL: A Generator of Multi-Platform
High Performance Codes for PDE-Based Scienti¯c Applications. In Proceedings of
the 10th International Conference on Supercomputing, pages 86{93, Philadelphia,
USA, May 1996. ACM Press.
[55] EUROCONTROL. Safety Case Development Manual. Technical report, October
2006.
[56] EUROCONTROL. Preliminary Safety Case for Enhanced Air Tra±c Services in
Non-Radar Areas using ADS-B Surveillance. Technical report, December 2008.
[57] N. Fenton. The Role of Measurement in Software Safety Assessment. In Safety
and Reliability of Software Based Systems - Twelfth Annual CSR Workshop, pages
217{248, Bruges, Belgium, 1997. Springer.
[58] A. Fiedler. P.rex: An Interactive Proof Explainer. In Proceedings of the 1st
International Joint Conference on Automated Reasoning (IJCAR'01), LNAI 2083,
pages 416{420, Siena, Italy, 2001.
[59] B. Fischer, T. Pressburger, G. Rosu, and J. Schumann. The AutoBayes Program
Synthesis System - System Description. In Symposium on the Integration of Sym-
bolic Computation and Mechanized Reasoning, pages 168{172, Siena, June 1990.
[60] M. Fitting. First-order Logic and Automated Theorem Proving. Springer, Secau-
cus, NJ, USA, 2nd edition, 1996.
[61] EUROCAE (European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment). ED-12B/DO-
178B: Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certi¯cation,
1994.
[62] A. Galloway, R.F. Paige, N.J. Tudor, R.A. Weaver, I. Toyn, and J.A. McDermid.
Proof vs Testing in the Context of Safety Standards. In Proceedings of the 24th
Digital Avionics Systems Conference (DASC'05), volume 2, page 14, 2005.
[63] M. Garnacho and M. Prin. Convincing Proofs for Program Certi¯cation. In
Proceedings of the International Workshop on the Certi¯cation of Safety-Critical
Software Controlled Systems (SafeCert'08), ENTCS 238, pages 41{56, 2008.
[64] G. Gentzen. Investigations into Logical Deduction. American Philosophical Quar-
terly, 1(4):288{306, 1964.
[65] W.S. Greenwell, E.A. Strunk, and J.C. Knight. Failure Analysis and the Safety
Case Lifecycle. In Proceedings of the 7th Working Conference on Human Error,
Safety, and Systems Development, Toulouse, France, August 2004.167
[66] I. Habli and T.P. Kelly. Process and Product Certi¯cation Arguments: Getting
the Balance Right. ACM SIGBED Review, 3(4):1{8, 2006.
[67] I. Habli and T.P. Kelly. Achieving Integrated Process and Product Safety Argu-
ments. In Proceedings of the 15th Safety Critical Systems Symposium (SSS'07),
pages 55{68, Bristol, UK, 2007. Springer.
[68] I. Habli and T.P. Kelly. A Generic Goal-Based Certi¯cation Argument for the
Justi¯cation of Formal Analysis. Electronic Notes Theoratical Computing Science,
238(4):27{39, 2009.
[69] I. Habli, Z. Stephenson, T.P. Kelly, and J.A. McDermid. Software Assurance
Arguments vs. Formal Mathematical Arguments: A Complementary Role. In
Proceedings of the 20th IEEE International Symposium on Software Reliability
Engineering (ISSRE'09), Mysuru, India, November 2009.
[70] A. Hall. Seven Myths of Formal Methods. IEEE Software, 7(5):11{19, 1990.
[71] M.C. Hause and F. Thom. Integrated Safety Strategy to Model Driven Develop-
ment with SysML. In Proceedings of the 2nd IET International Conference on
System Safety 2007, CP532, pages 124{129, 2007.
[72] R.D. Hawkins and T.P. Kelly. Software Safety Assurance - What is Su±cient? In
Proceedings of the 4th IET International Conference on System Safety, London,
UK, 2009.
[73] C.L. Heitmeyer. Formal Methods: A Panacea or Academic Poppycock? In Pro-
ceedings of the 10th International Conference of Z Users (ZUM'97), LNCS 1212,
pages 3{9. Springer, 1997.
[74] C.L. Heitmeyer. On the Need for Practical Formal Methods. In Proceedings of the
5th International Symposium Formal Techniques in Real-Time and Fault-Tolerant
Systems (FTRTFT'98), LNCS 1486, pages 18{26. Springer, 1998.
[75] C.L. Heitmeyer, M. Archer, E.I. Leonard, and J. McLean. Formal Speci¯cation and
Veri¯cation of Data Separation in a Separation Kernel for an Embedded System.
In Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications
Security (CCS '06), pages 346{355, New York, NY, USA, 2006. ACM.
[76] C.L. Heitmeyer, M.M. Archer, E.I. Leonard, and J.D. McLean. Applying Formal
Methods to a Certi¯ably Secure Software System. IEEE Transactions on Software
Engineering, 34(1):82{98, 2008.
[77] C.A.R. Hoare. An Axiomatic Basis for Computer Programming. Communications
of the ACM, 12(10):576{580, 1969.
[78] T. Hoare. The Verifying Compiler: A Grand Challenge for Computing Research.
Journal ACM, 50(1):63{69, 2003.168
[79] X. Huang. Translating Machine-Generated Resolution Proofs into ND-Proofs at
the Assertion Level. In Proceedings of the of Paci¯c Rim International Conferences
on Arti¯cial Intelligence (PRICAI'96), LNCS 1114, pages 399{410. Springer, 1996.
[80] X. Huang and A. Fiedler. Proof Verbalization as an Application of NLG. In
Proceedings of the 15th International Joint Conference on Arti¯cial Intelligence
(IJCAI'97), pages 965{970. Morgan Kaufmann, 1997.
[81] W. Hughes. Critical Thinking. Broadview Press, Petersborough, 1992.
[82] A. Hussey and B. Atchison. Safe Architectural Design Principles. Technical Report
00-19, Software Veri¯cation Research Centre, The University of Queensland, July
2000.
[83] M. Huth and M. Ryan. Logic in Computer Science Modelling and Reasoning about
Systems. Cambridge University Press, 2nd edition, 2004.
[84] C.B. Jones. Speci¯cation and Design of (Parallel) Programs. In Proceedings of the
9th World Computer Congress Information Processing (IFIP'83), pages 321{332,
1983.
[85] N.D. Jones and A.J. Glenstrup. Program Generation, Termination, and Binding-
time Analysis. In Proceedings of the Generative Programming and Component
Engineering (GPCE'02), LNCS 2487, pages 1{31. Springer, 2002.
[86] T.P. Kelly. Arguing Safety - A Systematic Approach to Managing Safety Cases.
PhD thesis, University of York, 1998.
[87] T.P. Kelly. Reviewing Assurance Arguments { A Step-by-Step Approach. In
Proceedings of Workshop on Assurance Cases for Security - The Metrics Challenge,
Dependable Systems and Networks. IEEE, July 2007.
[88] T.P. Kelly and J.A. McDermid. Safety Case Patterns { Reusing Successful Argu-
ments. In Proceedings of IEE Colloquium on Understanding Patterns and Their
Application to System Engineering, Digest No. 1998/308, pages 3/1{3/9. Institute
of Electrical Engineers, 1998.
[89] T.P. Kelly and R. Weaver. The Goal Structuring Notation - A Safety Argument
Notation. In Proceedings of the DSN Workshop on Assurance Cases: Best Prac-
tices, Possible Outcomes, and Future Opportunities, Florence, Italy, July 2004.
[90] S. Kinnersly. Whole Airspace ATM System Safety Case: Preliminary Study. Tech-
nical report, EUROCONTROL, November 2001.
[91] C. Lacave and F. Diez. A Review of Explanation Methods for Bayesian Networks.
Technical report, Dept. Inteligencia Arti¯cial, UNAD, Madrid, 2000.169
[92] C. Lacave and F.J. Diez. A Review of Explanation Methods for Heuristic Expert
Systems. The Knowledge Engineering Review, 19(2):133{146, 2004.
[93] T. Lelievre, J. Lapie, R. Beaulieu, and R. Rattier. AFI RVSM Programme Func-
tional Hazard Assessment. Technical report, ALTRAN Technologies CNS/ATM
Division, May 2005.
[94] N.G. Leveson. Safeware: System Safety and Computers. Addison-Wesley, 1995.
[95] N.G. Leveson. The Role of Software in Spacecraft Accidents. AIAA Journal of
Spacecraft and Rockets, 41:564{575, 2004.
[96] N.G. Leveson, S.S. Cha, and T.J. Shimeall. Safety Veri¯cation of ADA Programs
using Software Fault Trees. IEEE Software, 8(4):48{59, 1991.
[97] N.G. Leveson and P.R. Harvey. Analyzing Software Safety. IEEE Transactions
Software Engerineering, 9(5):569{579, 1983.
[98] N.G. Leveson and C.S. Turner. An Investigation of the Therac-25 Accidents. IEEE
Computer, 26(7):18{41, 1993.
[99] Tube Lines Limited. Tubes Lines Contractual Safety Case. Technical report, May
2004.
[100] B. Littlewood and D. Wright. The Use of Multilegged Arguments to Increase
Con¯dence in Safety Claims for Software-Based Systems: A Study Based on a
BBN Analysis of an Idealized Example. IEEE Transactions Software Engineering,
33(5):347{365, 2007.
[101] W. McCune and O. Shumsky-Matlin. Ivy: A Preprocessor and Proof Checker for
First-Order Logic. Computer-Aided Reasoning: ACL2 Case Studies, Advances in
Formal Methods, 4:265{282, 2000.
[102] J. Moore. Participating in Explanatory Dialogues: Interpreting and Responding
to Questions in Context. MIT Press, 1994.
[103] J. Moore and W. Swartout. Pointing: A Way Toward Explanation Dialogue. In
Proceedings of the 8th National Conference on Arti¯cial Intelligence, pages 457{
464, Boston, MA, 1990.
[104] B. Moulin, H. Irandoust, M. Belanger, and G. Desbordes. Explanation and Argu-
mentation Capabilities: Towards the Creation of More Persuasive Agents. Arti¯-
cial Intelligence Review, pages 169{222, 2002.
[105] J. Murdoch. PSM Safety Measurement White Paper, PSM Safety and Security
TWG, January 2006.170
[106] G.C. Necula. Proof-Carrying Code. In Proceedings of the 24th ACM SIGPLAN-
SIGACT Symposium on Principles of Programming Langauges (POPL '97), pages
106{119, Paris, France, Jan 1997. ACM.
[107] G.C. Necula. Translation Validation for an Optimizing Compiler. SIGPLAN
Notes, 35(5):83{94, 2000.
[108] C. O'Halloran. Issues for the Automatic Generation of Safety Critical Software.
In Proceedings of the 15th IEEE International Conference on Automated Software
Engineering (ASE'00), pages 277{280, Washington, DC, USA, 2000. IEEE Com-
puter Society.
[109] C. O'Halloran. Model Based Code Veri¯cation. In Proceedings of the 10th Inter-
national Conference on Formal Engineering Methods (ICFEM'03), LNCS 2885,
pages 16{25. Springer, 2003.
[110] P. O'Hearn, J. Reynolds, and H. Yang. Local Reasoning About Programs that
Alter Data Structures. In Proceedings of Computer Science Logic, LNCS 2142,
pages 1{19. Springer, 2001.
[111] Department of Defence. MIL-STD-882D Standard Practice For System Safety,
February 2000.
[112] Ministry of Defence. 00-56 Safety Management Requirements for Defence System,
June 2007.
[113] UK Ministry of Defence. 00-56 Safety Management Requirements for Defence
Systems, 2007.
[114] E. Ong. Fault Protection in a Component-Based Spacecraft Architecture. MSc
thesis. Massachusetts Institute of Technolgy, 2003.
[115] New York Independent System Operator. NYISO Interim Report August 14, 2003
Blackout. 2004-01-08. Technical report, 2004.
[116] M. Ouimet. Formal Software Veri¯cation: Model Checking and Theorem Prov-
ing. Technical Report Embedded Systems Laboratory Technical Report ESL-TIK-
00214, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
[117] S. Owicki and D. Gries. An Axiomatic Proof Technique for Parallel Programs I.
Acta Informatica, 6(4):319{340, 1976.
[118] D. Pastre. MUSCADET 2.3: A Knowledge-Based Theorem Prover Based on
Natural Deduction. In Proceedings International Joint Conference on Automated
Reasoning (IJCAR'01), LNCS 2083, pages 685{689. Springer, 2001.
[119] A. Pnueli. The Temporal Logic of Programs. In Proceedings of the 18th Annual
Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS'77), pages 46{57. IEEE
Computer Society, 1977.171
[120] A. Pnueli. System Speci¯cation and Re¯nement in Temporal Logic. In Proceed-
ings of the Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science
(FSTTCS'92), LNCS 652, pages 1{38. Springer, 1992.
[121] A. Pnueli, M. Siegel, and E. Singerman. Translation Validation. In Proceedings of
the 4th International Conference on Tools and Algorithms for Construction and
Analysis of Systems, LNCS 1384, pages 151{166. Springer Berlin, 1998.
[122] W. Reif, J. Ruf, G. Schellhorn, and T. Vollmer. Do You Trust Your Model
Checker? In Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Formal Methods
in Computer-Aided Design (FMCAD '00), LNCS 1954, pages 179{196, London,
UK, 2000. Springer.
[123] D.W. Reinhardt. Use of the C++ Programming Language in Safety Critical Sys-
tems. MSc thesis. University of York, 2004.
[124] J.A. Robinson. A Machine-oriented Logic Based on the Resolution Principle.
ACM, 12(1):23{41, 1965.
[125] J. Rushby. Systematic Formal Veri¯cation for Fault-Tolerant Time-Triggered
Algorithms. IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, 25(5):651{660, 1999.
[126] J. Rushby. A Safety-Case Approach for Certifying Adaptive Systems. In:AIAA
Infotech@Aerospace Conference, 2009.
[127] D. Sannella and A. Tarlecki. Toward Formal Development of Programs from
Algebraic Speci¯cations: Implementations Revisited. Acta Informatica, 25:233{
281, 1988.
[128] K. Schloegel, D. Oglesby, E. Engstrom, and D. Bhatt. Composable Code Genera-
tion for Model-Based Development. In Proceedings of the Software and Compilers
for Embedded Systems, LNCS 2826, pages 211{225. Springer, 2003.
[129] M. Schroeder. Towards a Visualization of Arguing Agents. Future Generation
Computer Systems, 17(1):15{26, 2000.
[130] A. Prasad Sistla. Safety, Liveness and Fairness in Temporal Logic. Formal Aspects
of Computing, 6(5):495{512, 1999.
[131] D.R. Smith. (KIDS): A Semiautomatic Program Development System. IEEE
Transactions on Software Engineering, 16(9):1024{1043, 1990.
[132] System Safety Society. System Safety Analysis Handbook. Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration, 2nd edition, 1997.
[133] J.M. Spivey. The Z Notation: A Reference Manual. Prentice Hall International
Series in Computer Science, 2nd edition, June 1992.172
[134] Z. Stachniak. Resolution Proof Systems with Weak Transformation Rules. In Pro-
ceedings of the International Symposium on Symbolic and Algebraic Computation
(ISSAC'90), pages 38{43, New York, NY, USA, 1990. ACM.
[135] Z. Stephenson, T.P. Kelly, and J-L. Camus. Developing an Argument for Def
Stan 00-56 from Existing Quali¯cation Evidence. To appear in Proceedings of the
Embedded Real-Time Software and Systems (ERTS^ 2'10), Toulouse, France, 2010.
[136] M.E. Stickel, R.J. Waldinger, M.R. Lowry, T. Pressburger, and I. Underwood. De-
ductive Composition of Astronomical Software from Subroutine Libraries. In Pro-
ceedings of the 12th International Conference on Automated Deduction (CADE-
12), pages 341{355, London, UK, 1994. Springer.
[137] L. Strigini. Formalism and Judgement in Assurance Cases. In Workshop on
Assurance Cases: Best Practices, Possible Obstacles, and Future Opportunities,
Florence, Italy, 2004. IEEE.
[138] I. StÄ urmer and M. Conrad. Test Suite Design for Code Generation Tools. In
Proceedings of the 18th IEEE International Conference on Automated Software
Engineering (ASE'03), page 286, Los Alamitos, CA, USA, 2003. IEEE Computer
Society.
[139] I. StÄ urmer, D. Weinberg, and M. Conrad. Overview of Existing Safeguarding Tech-
niques for Automatically Generated Code. In Proceedings of the 2nd International
ICSE Workshop on Software Engineering for Automotive Systems (SEAS'05), vol-
ume 30, pages 1{6, New York, NY, USA, 2005. ACM.
[140] G. Sutcli®e. Semantic Derivation Veri¯cation: Techniques and Implementation.
International Journal on Arti¯cial Intelligence Tools, 15(6):1053{1070, 2006.
[141] S.N. Thomas. Practical Reasoning in Natural Language. Prentice-Hall, 1981.
[142] S. Trac, Y. Puzis, and G. Sutcli®e. An Interactive Derivation Viewer. In Proceed-
ings of the 7th Workshop on Workshop on User Interfaces for Theorem Provers,
ENTCS 174, pages 109{123, 2006.
[143] A.C. Tribble, S.P. Miller, and D.L. Lempia. Software Safety Analysis of a Flight
Guidance System. In Proceedings of the 21st Digital Avionics Systems Conference
(DASC'02), volume 2, pages 13C1{1{13C1{10, Irvine, California, October 2002.
[144] E.D. Vries, K. Lund, and M. Baker. Computer-Mediated Epistemic Dialogue:
Explanation and Argumentation as Vehicle for Understanding Scienti¯c Notions.
The Journal of Learning Sciences, 11(1):63{103, 2002.
[145] J. Wang. O®shore Safety Case Approach and Formal Safety Assessment of Ships.
Journal of Safety Research, 33(1):81{115, 2002.173
[146] R.A. Weaver. The Safety of Software Constructing and Assuring Arguments. PhD
thesis, University of York, 2003.
[147] R.A. Weaver, J.A. McDermid, and T.P. Kelly. Software Safety Arguments: To-
wards a Systematic Categorisation of Evidence. In Proceedings of the 20th Inter-
national System Safety Conference, Denver, USA, 2002.
[148] K.A. Weiss. Component-Based Systems Engineering for Autonomous Spacecraft.
MSc thesis. Massachusetts Institute of Technolgy, 2003.
[149] M. Wenzel. Isar - A Generic Interpretative Approach to Readable Formal Proof
Documents. In Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Theorem Prov-
ing in Higher Order Logics, LNCS 1690, pages 167{184. Springer, 1999.
[150] M. Wenzel. Isabelle/Isar - A Versatile Environment for Human-Readable Formal
Proof Documents. PhD thesis, Institut fÄ ur Informatik, Technische UniversitÄ at
MÄ unchen, 2002.
[151] M.W. Whalen and M.P.E. Heimdahl. An Approach to Automatic Code Gener-
ation for Safety-Critical Systems. In Proceedings of the 15th IEEE International
Conference on Automated Software Engineering (ASE'00), pages 315{318, Cocoa
Beach, FL, USA, Oct 1999. IEEE Computer Society.
[152] M.W. Whalen and M.P.E. Heimdahl. On the Requirements of High-Integrity Code
Generation. In Proceedings of the Fourth High Assurance in Systems Engineering
Workshop, 4th IEEE International Symposium, pages 217{224, Washington DC,
1999.
[153] J. Whittle and J. Schumann. Automating the Implementation of Kalman Filter
Algorithms. ACM Transactions on Mathematical Software, 30(4):434{453, 2004.
[154] J. Wielemaker. SWI-Prolog 5.2.9 Reference Manual. Amsterdam, 2003.
[155] S. Wilson, T.P. Kelly, and J.A. McDermid. Safety Case Development: Current
Practice, Future Prospects. In Safety and Reliability of Software Based Systems -
Twelfth Annual CSR Workshop, Bruges, Belgium, 1997. Springer.
[156] W. Wong. Validation of HOL Proofs by Proof Checking. Formal Methods in
System Design: An International Journal, 14(2):193{212, 1999.
[157] W. Wu. Architectural Reasoning for Safety-Critical Software Applications. PhD
thesis, University of York, 2007.
[158] F. Ye. Justifying the Use of COTS Components within Safety Critical Applications.
PhD thesis, University of York, 2005.
[159] L.D. Zuck, A. Pnueli, Y. Fang, and B. Goldberg. VOC: A Translation Validator
for Optimizing Compilers. ENTCS 65, pages 2{18. Elsevier, 2002.